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to secure sustainability of salmon harvests within the Pacific Northwest. Renewed
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Commission as the agent of fishery sustainability. The Pacific Salmon
Commission serves as a bilateral recommendation-making body. Through its
formal and informal, communications, the commission suggests action and defines
regional salmon policy. Over the past decade pressures related to overharvest,
changing oceanic conditions, and an increasing demand for production have
challenged the commission and the fishery as never before.
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numerous ratification processes were attempted, all but one failed. During this
time tensions mounted and expressed frustrations nearly prompted overt violence.
In August 1997 Canadian fishermen angered at the lack of a solution blockaded a
U.S. passenger ferry thrusting the issue onto the world stage. In response to the
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Northwest represent different but simultaneous values within rooted world view
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sustained administrative regimes consistent with their dominant understanding of
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that it is simply too early to tell whether this most recent attempt can or will "save
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DEFINITION
INTRODUCTION
In early June 1999, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and
United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright jointly declared, "U.S. and
Canadian negotiators have reached an historic agreement on the elements of a ten-
year accord to conserve and manage Pacific Salmon" (Axworthy and Albright
1999). After eight hard years of diplomatic wrangling, Canada and the U.S. had
found compromiseat least momentarily. The respective chief diplomats went on
to conclude, "The agreement represents a victory for all those on both sides of the
border interested in salmon conservation and the long-term viability of our salmon
industries" (Axworthy and Aibright 1999).
The 1999 "cease-fire" declaration gave relief to a long-standing strain on
the CanadianU.S. relationship and brought a sense of certainty to a situation that
had been boiling since 1992. The 1985 treaty was established to manage the
Pacific Salmon fishery for sustainable harvest. Through its construct, the Pacific
Salmon Commission, the fishery was to be managed cooperatively until 1992 when
a reassessment was to be accomplished. Unfortunately, its failures led to its "non-
renewal" in 1992 and subsequent years. The political schism over the fishery
challenged the leaders in Ottawa and Washington as few issues ever have. After a'1
period of intense political frustration an agreement was forged. The new document
and the management techniques contained within it potentially offer more than just
the possibility of a long-term cessation of regional hostilities. This new document
may well solve the problems that had spawned a bitter rhetorical war, but this has
yet to be proven. Most likely, we will not know whether the treaty was a success or
failure for some time.
The Central Questions of this Analysis
This thesis is an interdisciplinary study of the 1999 CanadianU.S. Pacific
Salmon Treaty. It is an analysis of the document and the context within which the
document was developed. This study is an evaluation of the values, culture and
political structures that gave it life and the truths that may or may not sustain it. At
issue are five specified research questions: 1) Why are salmon importantwhat
makes salmon valuable? 2) How do we know salmon, and how have we governed
salmon policy based upon that knowledge? 3) What is political culture and how
does it shape the context that produces salmon policies? 4) How does the Pacific
Salmon Treaty explain our relationship with salmon, with our neighbors, and with
the world around us? 5) What does our recent experience, in terms of the treaty
and its formulation, suggest for environmental policy development in the future?
The answers to these questions do not provide a comprehensive
understanding of salmon. However, they do provide groundwork for discerning
some larger truths. This analysis is offered to provide background for the3
conversations of the futurefor the decisions we will have to make about our
environment and our place within it. The following overview of the new
agreement, its context and the framework used for this study should provide a
useful foundation for the larger discussion on the complexities of salmon policy as
revealed through the formation, reaffirmation and function of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty.
The New Agreement An Overview
The new agreement is an evolution of the 1985 treaty. in truth, the 1999
"joint agreement" is a rededication of the 1985 treaty. The agreement is founded
upon the core principles and organizational structures previously established. It
binds Canada and the U.S. to the active prevention of overfishing, to optimum
production of a shared resource, and to providing "benefits equivalent to the
production of salmon originating" in respective territorial waters (Pacific Salmon
Treaty: Article III). The new treaty employs the organizational and administrative
policies empowered by the original language. The Pacific Salmon Commission
and its respective scientific working groups, its geographically apportioned policy
panels and its technical dispute committees have been renewed and strengthened.
The new treaty is intended to provide an assessment and response
management approach for salmon production that is based upon changing
technologies as well as a significant investment in "endowment funds" that should
help find lasting solutions to habitat and harvest problems. The U.S. committed toEl
provide an eventual total of $140 million dollars in four one-year allotments ($20
million, $40 million, $40 million, and $40 million). These funds are earmarked for
investment in the development and implementation of new technologies aimed at
stabilizing the fishery (Kowal July 31, 2000). The agreement is grounded in an
expressed faith in scientific measurement, cooperative policy implementation and a
"better science" philosophy commonly referred to as "abundance based
management."
The 1999 agreement also amended the internal mechanisms of the Pacific
Salmon Commission in terms of "respective party" decision-making. In essence,
the new agreement ends the necessity for unanimous consent of individual
commission members within the U.S. contingent.These modifications will
probably allow for timely and more representative decision-making (Kowal July
31, 2000). It is important to note that the agreement did not advance enforcement
powers. The Pacific Salmon Commission is still a recommendation-making body
and not a policy enforcement bureaucracy. Canada and the U.S. did not delegate
fisheries management enforcement powers to the Pacific Salmon Commission.
While the 1999 agreement might appear to be a minor "adjustment" to the
previously determined bilateral approach to the fishery, it is not. The new
agreement will have a major impact upon the fishery and those that are dependent
upon its health. Later in this study I will provide a more in-depth analysisof the
new agreement and its evolved processes. However, for now it is sufficient to
recognize that an agreement was found, that the agreement stands on the shoulders5
of the previously established principles and governance structure, and that the
evolution may have significant impact upon the whole of the fishery.
A Contextual Background
When assessing the past decade it is helpful to recognize that uncertainty
and desperation clouded choices. Many people saw events through particular
perspectives and then acted upon incomplete assessments. In the end, interests on
all sides were frustrated, even with a signed pact. The evidence presented in later
chapters will suggest that local, regional and national relationships have been
pushed beyond comfort. From 1992 until 1999, the struggle for agreement seemed
to many the elusive quest, something known but never quite realized. During the
interim, many attempts involving different methods of consensus building were
tried. An explanation of the history of the treaty provided in chapter two, will
describe how succeeding initiatives were implemented, promptly declared a failure
and nearly always ceremoniously replaced by anotherfailure. For several years
Alaskan trawlers enjoyed record harvests, quite likely at the expense of Canadian
stocks. While negotiations lingered, tension mounted. In late summer of 1997, a
group of Canadian fishing boat operators frustrated with the apparent lack of
progress in the salmon talks responded by blockading an American ferry (Wood
1997).
There was for a brief but intense period of time, the previously
unimaginable possibility of a small-scale armed confrontation between vestedinterests over salmon harvests. Overt violence between Canada and the U.S.
became a legitimate concern (Wood 1997). The rhetoric of frustration was
replaced by the rhetoric of war, and while war, direct and open armed conflict
between nation-states, probably was not a realistic possibility, a short bloody clash
between regional interests was very much a possibility. Put another way, the
agreement brought relief to a situation in desperate need of resolution. In response
to the bilateral accord, The Oregonian Editorial Staff concluded, "On paper, this
deal is a major breakthrough because it represents a fundamental shift in the way
both nations have always looked at managing the resource" (Oregonian June 4,
1999). The article further suggested that the agreement was a breakthrough on two
levels: putting words into motion as envisioned and agreed upon, as well as
transforming the management of a shared resource. This multi-level perspective is
a critical point.
The expectations associated with the cessation of the so-called "salmon
war" and the new "abundance based management processes" must not be
discounted. While there will undoubtedly be change, much remains unknown
about the basic mechanics of the new approach in terms of stock abundance data
and the data gathering processes. This suggests that the new treaty may yet prove
to be another hollow rhetorical victory at the expense of the fishery. At present, the
respective parties' capacity to dramatically alter the industrial economic
entanglements carried by the respective fishing fleets is an open question. While
there is little doubt that most involved in the process were and remain sincere in7
their attempt, the underlying conflict over contradictory goals and values is the real
war: the war that probably has not yet been fought.
The evidence that will be presented in chapter one on the economics of the
fishery suggest that even though the hostilities and harsh words have receded, a
lasting peace may be far from at hand until the underlying structural issues are
confronted and resolved. It is important to recognize how the ambiguity that
surrounds and sustains the Pacific Salmon Treaty has played a role in the crisis.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is the source document for a specific recovery strategy
developed upon a shared set of principles. As such it must be understood by those
engaged in seeking real progress in terms of the ecological and economic
challenges inherent to the fishery. This thesis should serve that function. At the
end of this study, readers should be familiar with the treaty, reasonably
knowledgeable about its context and aware of the organization the treaty
empowers. These are important things to know because the governance
mechanisms empowered by the renewal of this treaty as well as the underlying
principles that sustain it are significant indicators of a particular set of conservation
strategies for the fishery and its enduring health.
A Framework
When approaching this subject it becomes obvious that a systematic
analysis is needed. Salmon policy is complex. It is a combination of
environmental, economic, international and cultural relationships. The majorresearch questions previously identified can only be answered through an
examination emphasizing an interdisciplinary framework. This is so because
salmon policy is a subject that can quickly swallow one up. After all, any attempt
to explain our ongoing bilateral management of "an anadromous fishery that ranges
between inland and open oceanwithin the sovereign territory of two nations, four
states, two territories, and over thirteen tribal boundaries...is no easy task to be
sure" (Munro, McDorman, & McKelvey 17-28). However, after evaluating the
research problem a process revealed itself. To achieve the stated objectives of this
study, I will limit my analysis to a brief but necessary description of salmon the
species, as well as the symbol. Then I will attempt to put the history of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty into summary form so that the inherent elements of this
conservation oriented, science-constructed/science policy driven protocol are more
readily understood. Following this, I will explain how political culture is formed,
compare the development of Canadian and U.S. political culture and assess its
impact upon their respective governance structures.
This study includes an in-depth discussion of political culture because of its
direct and enduring impact upon policy determination. It should be noted that I pay
special attention to Oregon in chapter three because of its uniquç role as the first
identifiable Euro-American political culture in the U.S. Northwest and its
associated effect upon the formation of past and present environmental policy
initiatives. Once the values, history and culture pieces are in place I believe it is
possible to showcase how and why political culture defines the relative reach ofsalmon policy. Finally, I will evaluate the administrative function and
organizational mission of the Pacific Salmon Commission and suggest strategies
for future conceptual approaches to the problems that have yet to be addressed by
the on-going processes. Precisely because of the size and scope of the task at hand,
I have structured the framework of analysis to answer each of the five major
research questions in turn, with the last chapter serving both summary and
conclusion functions.10
CHAPTER ONE: SALMON & VALUE
Even though it is tempting to begin this discussion of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty with a plunge into the socio-political clashes over salmon, its habitat, its
harvest, and its fundamental valueprudence demands a more calibrated course.
A thoughtful study of the Pacific Salmon Treaty must first describe salmon and the
interconnectedness of the economic, political and social constructions related to its
existence before moving on to the larger, more complex tapestry of conflict. I
contend that salmon policy is hard stuff. It demands of us a systematic approach
and a thoughtful ascent. To do this, I want to take a step backback some 55
million years, possibly even 100 million years, to a time and place that gave birth to
the salmonidae species; the region now known as the Pacific Northwest
(Lichatowich 10). I argue that this is an important sidebar because one cannot
understand the full dimension of the conflict over salmon without at least a cursory
understanding of salmon the species.
Salmon 101: The Basics
Although the exact point in time salmon evolved into the species we
"know" is an intriguing mystery, the exactness is relatively unimportant. That
salmon did evolveis extremely important. It is vital that we recognize salmon
evolution as the result of production, production itself sustained by a specific
environment. In the case of salmon, a place produced origin. According to Jim11
Lichatowich, fisheries biologist and author of Salmon Without Rivers, "No other
region in North America has been as geologically active as the Pacific Northwest,
which means that no other region has experienced the same degree of habitat and
environmental transformation" (Lichatowich 11). Other species did not survive the
geologic "trip" but salmon did survive, and the species defined a region through the
acts. Political scientist Charles Homer, in his study "Habitat Preservation and
Restoration under the Pacific Salmon Treaty" argues that, "Salmon stocks are,
therefore, closely identified with specific locations within national territories
regardless of where they migrate" (Homer 45). In other words, salmon are
connected to the environment that produces them in a symbiotic relationship.
Unlike other flora and fauna, salmon are not refugees from other ecosystems, but
rather partners in the regional evolution of the Pacific Northwest. Thus, salmon
exist as an interwoven but transitory essence and it is upon this central thread that
the larger story rests.
What does "Anadromous" mean? Why is it important?
Most people in the Pacific Northwest are aware to some degree that salmon
are an anadromous species of fish. By definition, salmon (as anadromous fish) are
both fresh and saltwater fish. However, to fully recognize the value of salmon it is
absolutely critical to understand exactly what the term "anadromous" means.
Anadromous fish are bom in fresh water rivers, mature into adulthood in the open
sea, and return to spawn in fresh water. Pacific Salmon spawn to reproduce. They12
spawn once because shortly after they lay their eggs, they die. In death, the
decomposition of the adult salmon provides energy for the npanan areas young
salmon are born into. This cycle is representative of what Lichatowich and others
have termed, "a natural economy." It suggests thatenergy is constantly re-invested
in the long-term continuance of the species and its interdependent ecosystem. It
also suggests that anadromous fishare mobile links between the ocean and its
rivers. Salmon are links produced by the needs of an interdependent bio-system.
Energy is transferred by the very act of a salmon's birth, life and death. Thus,
anadromous fish fulfill a critical role within the ecosystems they exist.
Salmon Lifecycles
When considering the lifecycle of salmon, it is helpful to envision a
marathon of interconnected, individually contested "sprints." Instinctively, salmon
race against time facing a gauntlet of upstream adversities just to continue the
spec?es through a last mortal act of reproductionitself an act of rebirth.
Generation produces generation and over time the marathon is won. Each salmon
fights to finish because collectively the line between survival and extinction is
razor thin. Inherent in this effort is the passing of "institutional memory" and the
secrets of survival that are nothing less than a virtual warehouse of genetic
information millions of years in the collecting. When eggs hatch, juveniles develop
within the stock specific freshwater rivers where they were laid. For some stocks
this stage lasts weeks, for others this lasts years. The development time is species13
and stock dependent, based solely upon the genetic blueprint passedon from
generation to generation through the act of survival. During this time, young
salmon must find food, survive predation, and ready themselves for the trip tosea.
Now, they often must do these things withina weakened or polluted river
ecosystem (Lichatowich 11). During this stage of the salmon lifecycle a healthy
wooded nparian zone is crucial; young salmon withno food, no cover, and water
too polluted to provide the levels of oxygen they need cannot survive to make the
tnp to sea.
Once juveniles migrate to saltwater and the open sea, they spend a few
months to several years maturing. While at sea salmon soak up energy and store it
as flesh so they will be able to return to the stream of their origin to repeat the cycle
and simultaneously renew their habitat through decomposition and decay (Groot
and Margolis 1991). This is a critical point. Salmon uncaught are not wasted;
energy is transported back into the riparian area for sustenance of the organic
material that can sustain salmon (Groot and Margolis 1991). The plants and insects
that consume the materials the carcass provides become new energy for the food
chain that in turn supports salmon development. While scientists have debated
(and continue to do so) about the original "source" for salmon, whether freshwater
or saltwater, most agree that the lifecycle of salmon is special. The fact that the
species exercises dual-citizenship in fresh and sea worlds, while simultaneously
providing sustenance for both is itself something extraordinary, something that
often strikes a chord within the human imagination.14
How People Developed Knowledge of Salmon
Since the beginning of human occupation of the region we know as the
Pacific Northwest, the relationship between salmon and humans has been as
complex as it has been enduring. Lichatowich suggests that people were,
"radiating out through the ice-free areas of North America" at least 12,000 years
ago. (Lichatowich 25) The place they found was shaped through a multi-millennial
glaciation process and the violent transformation that was its fruit. The landscape
of the land is the evidence of the work glaciers performed over time; the continual
give and take of an evolving ecosystem produced the foundation of the region's
natural economy. Interestingly, anthropologists believe that salmon were relatively
unimportant to the early Pacific Northwestemers (Lichatowich 27). The difficulty
associated with trapping, processing and storing salmon was most likely recognized
as a "last choice" when other, (easier) food sources were readily available. This
suggests that the salmon-based economies among aboriginal peoples that
eventually formed did so over years, with significant amounts of investment in
terms of time, energy and trial (Lichatowich 27). In other words, salmon
economies evolved within the context of an evolving ecosystem; they were
connected to the changing nature of the region itself.
Fortunately, anthropologists agree that human activities are determined at
least to some degree by their biological and physical world. While there is an on-
going debate over whether salmon became a central food supply when salmon
stocks themselves became overly productive, or human need forced the decision15
whatever the case, the point is that salmon became the central figure in the evolving
human cultures of the Pacific Northwest (Lichatowich 11-15). As such salmon
became a critical component to religious, cultural and identity threads woven
throughout the fabric of native life. This suggests that the relationship between
salmon and people had (and continues to have) depth as well as spread. Salmon
exist as simultaneous values. However, these concurrent values are not necessarily
in competition. This phenomenon, the existence of salmon within simultaneous
value systems, is an extraordinarily important concept. To understand salmon
policy, we must understand how and why humans "know" salmon.
How We "Know" Salmon
The Pacific Northwestemers of the present, much like their predecessors,
"know" salmon through experience. Noted environmental historian Richard White,
in his book The Organic Machine suggests that people know the Columbia River
through labor. He contends that people know nature through a personal interaction
with it. The harvest of salmon defines the person engaged as well as the
relationship between (White 91). His conclusion is that knowing salmon and the
world they represent is an interdependent process, that true knowledge of salmon
can only come from a personal investment of time, energy and focus. This is a
compelling point. If knowledge is the result of investment, then the relationship
must have value. Thus, salmon the species have valuevalue beyond the sum of
their genetic biomass. Salmon have value because of the relationships that the16
various forms of human contact provide. This sense of varying depth in terms of
value reinforces the essence of the work done by George Lakeoff and Mark
Johnson in their collaboration Metaphors We Live By. In it they imply that
metaphor reinforces the relationship between the conceptual utility of a value and
its practical place in human activity.
Lakeoff and Johnson's theories define a world of attached values. Through
metaphor, the purposeful figurative comparison of unlike things through the
operator "is" we compare abstractions and then "know" things. Lakeoff and
Johnson view metaphor in terms of a "conceptual understanding" that "govern our
everyday functioning... concepts[thatj structure what we perceive, how we get
around the world, and how we relate to other people" (Lakeoff and Johnson 3).
People learn to value the world in which they live based upon the assumptions and
connections that metaphors provide. By extension, their research supports the
notion that salmon have been valued in specific conceptual understandings for so
long and in so many different ways that it would be nearly impossible to separate
the incomplete abstract tools from the meaning they provide. Lakeoff and Johnson
might further argue that it would be folly to try.
Salmon exist as species, as a vital agent within an evolving ecosystem but
they exist metaphorically as well. Human constructed values have been attached to
salmon and their function. Later in this study there is a more fully developed
assessment of the role of myth, the function of political culture and the power of
metaphor within the context of salmon policy. For now, it is enough to suggest that17
we know salmon as simultaneous values. For instance, we know salmon as
consumable/producible resource, as cultural icon, as religious and/or mythic
symbol and more recently as endangered species. On the surface, these value
systems have little in common except having an impact upon on salmon policy.
However, it is precisely because of this impact that we must explore each in turn.
Salmon as Resource
Pacific Salmon are harvested for profit. This suggests salmon have value as
a harvestable resource and that they exist as "product." This concept, salmon as
producible material industrial input has saturated the regional understanding of its
existence. Professors Gordon Munro, Ted McDorman and Robert McKelvey in
their 1998 political-economic assessment "Transboundary fishery resources and the
Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty" claim, "While the harvests of the
Pacific Salmon are subject to substantial fluctuation, historically the resource has
played a major role in the fishing industries of Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and
British Columbia" (Munro et al. 3). This is stated with anopen understanding that
salmon has played that major role largely in spite of our best efforts to "manage" it.
Not surprisingly, they conclude that finding enduring strategies for the health of the
fishery are in the region's economic self-interest (Munro et al. 33).
Their finding is not news: salmon harvests have long played a major role in
the region's industrial economic development, especially since 1864 when
Hapgood, Hume and Company founded their first cannery on the Sacramento River18
(Schwantes 202). After the introduction of canned salmon and the associated
human activities that arose to support it, the "harvest" model became the dominant
paradigm. It gave rise to mass investments in full development of the industry that
in turn spawned artificial propagation of fish through constructed hatcheries. This
approach to salmon management is the enduring legacy of former U.S. Fish
Commissioner Spencer Baird (Lichatowich 122). His understanding of the
"harvest model" cast a long shadow. Within the model, seed (salmon fry) can be
planted at will, harvested efficiently and managed for future planting/production
needs. In the spirit of the times, Baird saw a situation where all variable factors of
the process could be known, controlled and maximized for "optimum production."
Salmon as industrial Product
Within this context, salmon became less a natural partner and more of an
industrial servant. Put another way, salmon once stripped from the "natural order"
became known as a resource that could be created at will through human
intervention. In theory, salmon could be created in such numbers that escalating
harvest and its associated profits were limitless. Unfortunately, things were not
what they seemed. In an attempt to encapsulate the irony that is salmon, biologist
Lichatowich uses the phrase "free wealth" to explain the meaning of salmon within
the resource value system. Salmon, produced by nature and supplemented by
human activity, exist in an open and accessible public fishery where wealth is19
available for any that seek it. By extension the fishery's health has been similarly,
openly entrusted (Lichatowich 81).
From the earliest days of human settlement of the region until the present,
the utility of salmon has been known as a ready source of food and profit. Although
the "first" inhabitants may have sought other food before they accepted salmon as
their mainstay; eventually they constructed an entire culture surrounding the
constant bounty salmon provided. The salmon cultures had immense relative
wealth and dwelt within a sustainable ecology. Ironically, this constant essence,
and its perceived everlasting perpetuation, allowed the resource to be expanded in
utility from personal consumption for sustenance, into an exploitative resource for
the taking. Salmon became, at least to some, nothing more or less than a necessary
input for the continued evolution of an industrial economy (Lichatowich 1999).
This is an important value when considering the macroeconomics of emerging
nations.
This transformation of the salmon through the harvest or "garden" filter,
and its subsequent devaluation as "just another crop" that can be controlled through
human management, secured a series of assumptions about salmon that have
proven incomplete. Hatcheries have achieved much, but they may have
simultaneously put the entire ecosystem and its future at risk (Lichatowich 124-
145). Over time, the Pacific Salmon fishery and its industrial economy helped
promote Euro-American settlement of the area. This in turn provided the
infrastructure and cultural foundation for industrial valued development. However,20
the fishery economy and the market forces that compel its decision-making are not
value-free. Profit and not sustainability, are its most significant value. While other
values clearly exist within the market model, they are not an equal variable.
Resource Economics: The Logic of OverfishingRational Advantage
The exploitation and over-exploitation of salmon through harvests based
upon incomplete assumptions has caused harm. The contending values of salmon
have been misunderstood. People often inaccurately assign the natural value of
salmon to the industrial value of salmon. This superimposition of conflicting
meanings is not helpful; it clouds the issues and quite likely impedes discussion.
When people confuse values they may accept truths that simply do not exist. To
the natural economy, a salmon is an actor with a role to play; to the industrial
economy, a salmon is $X dollars per pound. The decision matrices of fishing
interests are bound by the industrial economic rules of the day. Economic theory
doesn't consider non-economic valuesthis is neither good nor bad, but reality.
Any attempt to compare the different and largely incompatible value systems of the
natural economy and the industrial economy is a risky proposition. This practice is
especially interesting given the undisputed prominence of "profit motive" within
our constructed industrial economy.
The market theory clearly assigns primary value to profit based upon
rational, context-bound decisions about availability of material, production cost and
perceived near-term benefit. The market theory holds only those values21
enumerated in terms of tangible, predictable industrial economic gain. Future
opportunities and "valueless" goals are simply irrelevant to the capitalist model.
Oddly, some people have forgotten that economic profit incentives that maintain
the marketplace are just that: interconnected incentives for distinct economic
advantage. If a fish is an economic instrument solely, then it will be managed as
such for the best profit. A fish caught today by this standard is worth limitless fish
tomorrow because tomorrow's fish by definition have an uncertain availability. To
more clearly understand what this means in tenns of how we know the salmon as
resource, we must examine the tenets of fishing and industry.
In their highly regarded work Fish, Markets, and Fishermen: The
Economics of Overfishing Susan ludicello, Michael Weber and Robert Wieland
argue that, "when marine fish stocks are treated as free goods in an open-access
regime, they will be overfished if it is feasible to do so" (ludicello et al. 41). At
first, this statement seems counter-intuitive. Why would fishing interests overfish
their own product? The answer lies within the open-access or ambiguity of access
to continued materials for production. In other words, if the economics of the
situation present high profit and low production costs through over-harvest
protocols, they will continue. Taken further, if a better profit can be gained through
unsustainable long-term practices, they must be continued for best short-
term/tangible return.
Garrett Hardin's groundbreaking commentary, "The Tragedy of the
Commons" is a useful theoretical explanation of this type of phenomena. His22
illustration shows how and why people that are knowledgeable about the
diminishing capacity of their commons, are driven to over-exploit. The public
"race" to gain advantage through focused harvest of ungoverned (accessible)
natural resources wealth is a powerful force. It compels short-term thinking
because of the recognized ambiguity of long-term accessibility (Hardin 1968).
This in turn serves to further expedite the destruction of the root resource and
increases relative pressure for over-exploitation and unsustainable harvest
behaviors by competing interests. Within this context, over-harvest is a rational
choice. It is rational so long as uncertainty of future access to a natural resource
exists. Ambiguity in terms of availability within the industrial economy promotes
a winner-less race for over-development of a shared resourceit cannot help but
do so. Simply stated, natural resources are by definition difficult to manage
because of uncertainties resulting from natural processes. This promotes short-term
thinking that is both rational and destructive.
The Pacific Salmon Fishery & the Specific Value of the Resource
Pacific Salmon are transitory fish by nature and dependent on fresh and
saltwater ecosystems. Ownership and control of stocks within the fishery is highly
difficult to establish and nearly impossible to maintain. Lack of clear ownership
provides ambiguity in terms of future access to low cost material. Even with an
aggressive, well-constructed management regimeaccess to future materials is
difficult to ensure. As previously mentioned this stress in turn presents a dilemma23
for fishing interests. In a highly capitalized industry, competitors can deplete
resources for profit in rapid fashion; they are compelled to do so. This explains
why, "Once the stocks show some signs of recovery, the pressure to ease up on
limitations will increase, fishers will seek ways to avoid restrictions and improve
their catching power, and the reproductive capacity of the fish will again be
overcome by excessive fishing mortality" (ludicello et al. 42). In their study
fisheries around the world have witnessed the same cycle. Open access promotes a
"race for the fish." The rush for development of the fishery leads to resource
depletion and habitat degradation (ludicello et al. 40). This cycle is only magnified
in the Pacific Salmon fishery where other variables provide even more ambiguity
and complexity for management. In other words, the experience of every major
fishery in the world proves that capital intensive fishing interests will use every
power at their disposal to ensure the catch even if it proves to be their last.
In his book, Dead Reckoning: Confronting the Crisis in Pacific Fisheries,
Terry Glavin concludes, "The increased fishing efficiency produced by
overcapitalization results in increased public expenditures for fisheries
management. ..regimes must become far more elaborate and far more precise in
order to come to terms with increased catching power" (Glavin 49). The process of
fish management is difficult enough in the abstract. However, the realities of the
Pacific Salmon fishery suggest that success is even more so. In truth, long-term
sustainability may be nearly impossible, at least on a predictable basis because the
fishery has so many uncontrollable variables. Factors concerning such prediction24
include: oceanic climate shift, hatchery effects, incomplete assessment techniques,
technological efficiencies in harvest methodology, riparian deterioration, dams and
riverine blockages, and other political, social and economic constraints. These are
the issues that define the Pacific Salmon fishery; that suggest success is similar to
"trying to put a person on the moon every year" (Glavin 44). This analogy, for
those familiar with the complex processes and razor thin margins for error
associated with the Apollo Project, reveals at least a sense of the multi-faceted
complexity of the situation. Expectations for perpetual success may be more than
can be assumed.
Managementofthe Resource
To begin with, management strategies require consistent and accurate data
so that rational choices can be made and sustainable policies implemented. Within
this context, "fixed" variables are the ideal. However, how can long-term solutions
based upon abundance, if that can be fully derived, be attempted given the nature of
a transitory species? An anonymous fisheries biologist once said, "Counting
salmon is like counting rocks, except that the salmon are constantly moving, they
are invisible, and the rock may have already been counted before." This comment
is offered to illustrate the difficulties associated with determining certainty in
relation to the fishery. Even though well-intentioned scientists measure statistics
with the newest technology at their disposal, the results are imprecise by definition
even on good days. This imprecision fuels the crisis. Production and harvest of25
natural resources can be complex enough with precise data but is nearly impossible
(in terms of certainty) for salmon. Glavin further argues, "The consequences of
this treadmill are massive private investment, massive public investment,
diminishing social benefits, increased rates of error, and often the collapse of entire
fisheries" (Glavin 41).
This assessment suggests that the efficiency of modem fishing technologies
added to the power of the demand-price relationships compel industries to over-
harvest because there is no assurance of future accessibility. In a competitive
world, businesses must take available opportunities for profit or risk other
businesses profiting "at their expense." This behavior is rational given the
particular characteristics of the dilemma. Harvest interests often act without regard
for changes in climate, product availability through alternative sourcing and the
health of the fishery because they are oriented toward today and not the possibility
of tomorrow. The economics underlying the way we know salmon demand short-
term profitability over long-term potential. Resource availability in the present is
more significant, in economic sense, than the potential for resource availability in
the future. Precisely because salmon are a shared commodity (Canadian, U.S.,
Native American Tribes)no one owns the fish and their value has been readily
accessible by any/all seeking to make profit from its availability. This knowledge
reaffirms Hardin's haunting prophecy. It allows irresponsibility to continue under
the cloak of anonymity. It appears that how the people of the Pacific Northwest26
know salmon, in terms of an ever-present accessible resource, is as problematic as
it is enduring.
Salmon as Cultural Icon
Salmon as resource and/or available wealth is not the only way people of
the Pacific Northwest know salmon. Salmon are also recognized as a cultural icon
throughout the region. Author Timothy Egan claims,
The secret of life in the Northwest runs in packs of silver; as
with most mysteries, it lies just below the surface, evident
to anyone who thinks it important enough to look. At
Willamette Falls, this secret reveals itself in rare flashes
amidst the industrial clutter of Oregon City. The river here
is a beast of burden, powering the street lights of nearby
Portland, grinding wood pulp to paper, settling into locks
that lift ships on their way. Against this metallic frenzy
a few Chinook salmon huny upstream, driven by a singular
impulse to pass on the baton of life and then die...(Egan 180).
The genetic predisposition of the salmon's journey to renew the region with its life
force has defined and still reaffirms a particular cultural identification for the
people of the Pacific Northwest. Regional investment in the notion of salmon has
created shared identity. Many people within the Pacific Northwest take no small
measure of pride in their "lifestyle" that as a matter of course includes a
relationship with salmon in some form or fashion. The salmon has been framed as
a robust embodiment of the regional psycheit personifies the metaphorical
challenges of life, purpose and meaningful death. We find its image everywhere
because nearly everyone finds at least some margin of solace within its shadow.27
This is no small thing when considering the connections between salmon and the
people that derive cultural self-worth from its continued existence.
White contends that, "Salmon are not so much a means of making a good
living as symbols of the good life itself' (White 92). He recognizes that making a
livingthe traditional economic relationship of life within the industrial economy
is one but not the only significant value. I contend that this is especially true
when the society at large becomes increasingly disconnected from the resource
exploitative industries that spawned its development. The theory of cognitive
dissonance would suggest that when people recognize a drastic alteration to the
world they know and were defined by they would be compelled to seek corrective
action; a return, at least to some degree, of the world they know. Icons are
representative and recognizable symbols that humans construct identify upon.
Icons are anchors on which people can understand and organize their world
through. This may be why the cultural value of the symbol of salmon has endured,
and even grown over time. To prove the point, we need look no further than a
recent speech by Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber at Oregon State University on
January 6, 2000. In it he said,
There is a growing sense that what has defined us is
slipping away. In particular, salmonone of our great
icons here in the Northwest is in trouble. If as Norman
Maclean says, 'eventually all things merge into one and
a river runs through it,' then salmon swim through it
twice (Kitzhaber January 6, 2000).Salmon as Religious/Mythic Symbol
Salmon exist as more than industrial input, more than cultural icon. Salmon
exist as religious and mythic symbols of the "natural world" as well. By function,
the symbol of salmon can evoke specific attitudes and impressions associated
through time, space, logic or imagination (Edelman 1964). Over time, the
symbolic value of salmon has been sustained through myth. However, too often
myth is confused with fiction. Anthropologist Zdizislaw Mach argues that myth "is
a symbolic text which presents a story which in turn transmits values, norms, and
patterns essential and fundamental or a given culture" (Mach 58). Political scientist
Lee McDonald in his essay "Myth, Politics, and Political Science" suggests that,
"myth does not tell truths, but does tell the truth; a myth is something that never
was, but always is" (McDonald 141). Stories that are told through narrative myth
can emphasize a particular societal experience and ground a people to place.
McDonald concludes that, "myth is uniquely able to bridge old and new, to absorb
new meanings, to give structure to the inchoate" (McDonald 143). In other words,
the story of salmon can help describe the indescribable. The drive to continue the
species despite the. obstacles of life is a powerful and enduring story that provides
humans with a sense of meaning and a context of place that they need. In the
Pacific Northwest, catching a salmon for personal consumption is, at least for
native peoples, nothing short of a religious act; it reifies identity in a way few
things can (Egan 185).29
Political scientist Michael McGinnis in the introduction to his study "On the
Verge of Collapse: the Columbia River System, Wild Salmon and the Northwest
Power Planning Council" claims, "The vision of wild salmon swimming and
spawning is an essential feature of the wild Pacific Northwest" (McGinnis 64). His
article focused mostly on the Columbia River and its dams and hatcheries, but
asserts that; "respect for natural values requires that human beings recognize their
duty as citizens of diverse ecological communities" (McGinnis 74). Although the
"Great God Salmon" has long ago been discarded as a deity to be worshipped, his
mythic presence and the truths his story reveal endure (Egan 1 85). We know now
that salmon really are not "people" at least in human terms but yet we recognize
that salmon have a distinct place within our consciousness.Inherent in the myth
are the fundamentals of balance; keys to a natural economy that exists, parallel to
the industrial economy we see the world we live in through.
Timothy Egan's words express the connective nature of salmon within the
region. He wrote, "In the Northwest, a river without salmon is a body without a
soul" (Egan 182). For many reasons salmon have a place, an undeniable, essential
and distinct place and associated valuation within the human constructed world of
the Pacific Northwest. And while the natural economic value of salmon may not be
the most important it is significant nonetheless. The solar transformation process
that is the life cycle of the salmon lends itself to mythic association. Salmon are
born, seek out the ocean and soak up energy created by the power of the sun and
atmosphere and then return that power to the riparian areas of their birthit is anundeniably noble existence and it permeates the region's conscience. Any attempt
to deny or ignore this value would cheapen the experience of living in the Pacific
Northwest as well as hinder the possibilities for the success of long-term strategies
for regional economic and ecological health.
Salmon as Endangered Species
Salmon have recently been identified as an "endangered species." This
distinction as an eco-system health "at-risk indicator" is a new value for salmon. It
is symbolic of the consequences of human activityit is an illustration of the clash
between the natural and industrial economies. As explained later in this study,
endangered status is a political value often associated with cultural root metaphors
in conflict. Salmon as an endangered species fuels political strife because of deeply
held but contradictory political orientations. For many, this new metaphorical
existence is a hard pill indeed. Long recognized as an "indicator species", the
listing of salmon stocks by the federal government was an epiphany of the first
order. To better understand the issue it is helpful to look to the work of
communication scholar Mark Moore and his essay "Constructing Irreconcilable
Conflict: The Function of Synecdoche in the Spotted Owl Controversy." In his
study Moore argues that the spotted owl in Oregon was by its mere existence in
time and place, a symbol of a greater whole. He finds that the spotted owl
represented simultaneous yet, "competing social realities about life and liberty,
with opposing rhetorical tropes" (Moore 1993). Moore recognized that the owl31
simultaneously meant contradictory valuesroot values that defined particular
world view orientations and policy preferences. In his study he found that the
confusion only served to further entrench instead ofease the opportunities for
compromise as tensions grew.
Moore's research suggests that divergent social constructions over accepted
symbols promotes a political situation that is irreconcilable by design and helped
escalate the timber crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s asa matter of function.
He argues that representational ideographs (one-term summations of a political
orientation in synecdochic form), "can also limit discourse to a part of the problem
that does not resolve the conflict" (Moore 146). Through his research, Moore
discerns the interconnectedness between the natural world and conflicting core
values held by the inhabitants of a natural resource economy. He claims that the
value systems find within the respective rhetorical tropes could be reduced to root
values: "life" meaning a cluster of orientations fixed upon ecosystem health and
species protection, and "liberty" meaning a cluster of orientations fixed upon
human freedoms to use nature for wealth and sustenance (Moore 1993). For those
knowing the owl as indicator species, it exists as the embodiment of the values
associated with life itself. By contrast, for those dependent upon the timber as
resource for a "way of life", the legal issues surrounding it exist as obstacles in the
path of accessing material needed for tangible gain and as such, a control on
individual liberty. The dual nature of the owl was itself the fuel for continued32
political conflict because ultimately, "we want our environment and our economy"
(Moore 158).
It is important to understand that these values are core valuesthey are
elementary pieces of particular world views. The attached values are so solidly
connected to the "thing" in question that they become the "thing" itself. This is
especially challenging when considering the salmon. For if the spotted owl, a
relatively unknown and minor species simultaneously means "life" and "liberty" to
respective "sides" in conflict over forest management, then what happens when the
value in play is salmon? It is an interesting question becauseour relationship with
salmon is even more complex than our relationship with spotted owls. Spotted
owls have not traditionally been a regionally significant species, at least compared
to salmon. Salmon and our multiple relationships with its harvest and consumption
help define the Pacific Northwest and its people.
While it may be possible to reduce the dispute over salmon to a life versus
liberty clash, I am uncertain whether salmon can be properly classified as a
representational ideograph and/or synecdoche. While the attempt is worthy of
future study, that assessment is not the purpose of this thesis. For now it is
sufficient to say that our relationship with salmon is complex and interwoven
throughout the fabric of this place and its people. It is a relationship based upon
different but simultaneous salmon valuesnow including endangered species. The
ambiguity added by this new status will likely serve to add fuel to the already
emotional discourse over present and future recovery strategies.33
Added Complexities
We know some truths about the mechanics of the fishery and its current
status. We know that habitat degradation, hydropower (dams) and the associated
constrains imposed by it, over-harvesting of declining at-risk stocks and the impact
of hatcheries have played significant roles in the demise of wild salmon stocks. All
are recognized agents of harm. Together, these issues compose the so-called "Four
H's" and have constituencies that prioritize and rationalize their own role in widely
varying degrees (Lichatowich). In simple terms, agricultural use, increasing
urbanization and our recreational choices impact habitat. Hydropower impacts
temperature, nparian health and fish transit to and from ripanan areas. Harvest
severely impacts bio-diversity as well as the obvious theft of energy from
dependent ecosystems. Finally, hatcheries produce fish through artificial
propagation techniques that have proven unsustainable in the wild and are believed
to promote disease.
The Four-H's affect how we know salmon because we are connected to the
activities related to each. All of these factors are significant pieces of the larger
puzzle. Every knowledgeable person engaged in activities related to these
endeavors knows that they are a part of a larger tragedy. Interestingly, nobody
accepts responsibility for the tragedy even though all recognize their inability to
successfully deny involvement. In the case of the salmon fishery, the iceberg
appears to be as unavoidable as it is undeniable. Unfortunately, knowing a problem
is only part of the process. Finding solutions is quite another. When the NationalMarine Fisheries Service proposed rules for the management of Pacific Northwest
salmon stocks through the powers of enforcement granted agencies through the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the people of the region came to value salmon in
yet another way, salmon as ecological domino.
Salmon as Problem
With the listing of salmon as endangered, salmon became a problem in need
of a solution. This value: salmon as endangered species in need of political
solution is itself an interesting development. Noted political scientist Murray
Edelman in his book Constructing the Political Spectacle concludes that, "The
language that constructs a problem and provides an origin for it is also a rationale
for vesting authority in people who claim some kind of competence" (Edelman 20).
Edelman's claim was validated by the language and arrangement employed by
Commerce Secretary William Daley during his formal announcement, "After
careful study, and consultation with state and tribal scientists, the Commerce
Department's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is today listing as
threatened or endangered several groups of Pacific northwest salmon" (Daley
1999). With this introduction, he couched the problem as a scientific construct
with solvency found only through trust that NOAA in consultation with other
experts can make things better. Science in this context is the cure for a disease; if
science detects a "problem" then science must be the logical, competent agent for
solution.35
Salmon as Scientific Problem: In NeedofScientific Solutions
In the case of salmon, science has played a major role since the very
beginning. In truth, we have remade the ecological landscape in the name of better
science. Through its myriad of processes science has always suggested a new
answer for the latest identified problem through quantification of inherent problems
with the status quo. Therefore science being the rational choice for solution
development (because science detected and identified the problem) must be called
upon to act in the best interest of the aggrieved species and the region as a whole.
The next logical conclusion would suggest that federal policy, through the
intervention of NOAA and the experts, must by definition be the best approach of
providing the needed scientific remedies because federal policy was the entity that
gave definition to the problem as it exists. This may be a false trust. The federal
government may be incapable of recognizing, in an institutional way, its limits.
Edelman further asserts that, "The most common course is the enactment of a law
that promises to solve or ameliorate the problem even if there is little likelihood it
will accomplish its purpose" (Edelman 1988: 24). This would suggest that
legislation passed, while measurable and accountable for administrative purposes,
may have little real effect upon the root cause of the stated problems.
While there is little doubt that the ESA has made a difference for specific
species across the nation, it is important to remember that the ESA was never
intended as an international ecosystem management tool for mass production of
transitory fishfor harvest. When considering the ESA listing of the salmon it is36
important to remember that easy solutions rarely exist in the real world; action is
obviously needed but cookie-cutter approaches to problems two hundred years in
the making may be the perfect recipe for policy failure. Another consideration
must be the institutional memory of federal activity in regards to the Pacific
Salmon fishery. Many understand that the fishery has been worsened by federal
activity more often than not. On one hand they see the federal government as the
logical governmental agent because of capacity, competence, expertise and
theoretical wisdom; on the other, they see the last two centuries of evidence.
It is helpful to remember that the major challenges to the fishery were
constructed, at least funded, by the United States Government. The conservation
based Pacific Salmon Treaty is ultimately, a federal construct. In its language and
the principles that bind the United States and Canada together on this issue,
conservation for the expressed purpose of equal harvest is the end goal. This
policy, a plan to perpetuate the conservation of a harvested resource must not be
confused with something that it is not. This is a federal agreement to share wealth
between two historically friendly sovereign states; implemented for mutual interest
and national security. Additionally, the creation and expansion of hatcheries was a
federally sponsored policy initiative (Lichatowich 124-135). Dams, the same dams
that prevent salmon stocks from easy passage up and down the inland rivers, were
built by federal agencies with the full faith and credit of the United States of
America (White 89-113). The United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management each had a role in the reclamation of the land and the deforestation37
and alteration of native riparian zones (Egan 194-2 12). The barren areas that used
to help salmon spawn are a lasting legacy of federal intervention. It is important to
recognize these connections because this newest way of knowing the salmon
through personal investment and action through federal expertise is questionable at
best.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to answer the first research question: "why
are salmon importantwhat makes salmon valuable." Salmon are important
because they are valuable. To begin with, salmon are known as a natural resource.
As such, the industrial economic value of salmon plays a multi-faceted,
omnipresent role in discussions concerning salmon policy. Secondly, the people of
the Pacific Northwest know salmon as a cultural icon and as a mythic hero that
reaffirms a shared but constructed identity for a people and place. Finally, salmon
serve a symbolic function as an endangered species, a powerful notion that has yet
to be fully grasped. Salmon are valuable because people have assigned value to
them; different aspects of their existence hold different valuesconcurrently. As a
whole, this chapter posits the notion that salmon are indeed, more than just fish.
Salmon policy is difficult to reconcile, at least in part, because of the contradictory
orientations associated with human assigned values. Unfortunately, as scarcity
increases, value and demand is similarly increased. This may explain how billions
of dollars are spent annually on paradoxical practices; practices established andmaintained in the name of "saving salmon." The next chapter isan exploration of
our history with salmon as manageable resource. It is offered as background so
that a more developed understanding of our contradictory notionsmay be
discerned.CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF A TREATY
The history of the Pacific Salmon Treaty is evidence that enduring political
crises are the fruit of shared history. Political conflict, regarding salmon policy,
has been formed and sustained by a relationship between invested interests. It has
often been the result of perceived inequalities of power, influence, and liberty. It
seems that crises exist as a human response to the ideal we call "fairness." The
Pacific Salmon wars and the events and reactions that have colored the salmon
community of the Pacific Northwest reflect a push/pull relationship between
salmon and the cultures that evolved within the region. The frustrations and rancor
so apparent in the struggle did not occur overnight. The issues involved and the
underlying clash of value-systems are centuries old and when taken together, reflect
a common heritage for a region and its people. By extension then, the Pacific
Salmon Treaty as a preferred political solution was crafted as a fix to the failures
and frustrations born of a shared history. Ultimately, the Pacific Salmon Treaty is a
political instrument that exists to fulfill the need for clarity and consistency in
human arrangements associated with salmon, its harvest and its long-term
management. It establishes and maintains rules for Canada and the U.S., brings
function from language, and governs a fishery. As written and implemented, it has
tremendous inherent capacity as a tool for organization of labor, implementation of
policy, and as a regional legitimizing influence.Thoughtful study of political crises requires at least a cursory understanding
of reality, past and present. It demandsan analysis of the broad historical themes
that construct the relative context. This suggests that to understand the salmon
policy of the present, it is necessary to investigate the salmon policies of the past so
that the present can be more readily known. Previous events and the political
reactions to those events cannot be ignored if one seeks to develop meaningful
interpretation. Therefore, to understand the current treaty and the context of its
inception we must first have a working knowledge of how and why we find
ourselves at this place, at this time. To achieve this, I will begin with a description
of the origin of the debate. Next, I will furnish a brief analysis of the 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty and describe major themes inherent to its language and utility.
Following that, I will provide a historical summary of the post-treaty "frustration
years", and discuss significant events that helped foster a renewed interest in
securing a treaty. Finally, I will detail the new agreement, with careful attention to
the factors that led to its inception, and suggest near-term possibilities concerning
its success.
The Origin of the Debate (18001985)
For thousands of years the earliest immigrants to the Pacific Northwest
existed in relative balance with salmon and the environment that sustained salmon.
The natural economy that gave rise to the so-called "salmon cultures" was the
outcome of a blending of religion, myth and human development. It emphasizeda
the necessity salmon of consumption while concurrently reaffirminga symbiotic
relationship between humankind and salmon. However, when the Hudson'sBay
Company (HBC) established itspresence in the Oregon Country and British
Columbia, the associated values ofan industrial economy slowly crept into the
regional psyche. The notion of exploitative profitability beganto slowly erode the
universality of the natural economy. The rise in influence of the HBC and its
expanded reach through its subsequent experimentation with products beyond the
fur market began the transformation and revaluation of salmon. By 1824, theyear
the HBC moved its headquarters from Fort George (Astoria) to Fort Vancouverthe
metamorphosis in cultural valuation was well underway (Lichatowich 54). This
process ultimately transformed salmon's essence from natural wonder into natural
(free and available) resource: exploitable, predictable and producibleraw material
for an industrial economy (Schwantes 200-202).
Unfortunately, this transmutation was only accelerated when thewagons of
the "Great Migration" (1840s) came. The rapid migration of people seekinga new
fortune in the seemingly inexhaustible natural bounty they found, broughtan
industrial orientation that saw the "remaking" of the natural worldas nothing less
than a sacred quest (Smith 123-144). Later chapters will analyze thecore rhetorical
visions that helped foster an enduring political culture for Oregon and much of the
region, but for now it is important to recognize that the "Great Migration" produced
a simultaneous "Great Transformation" for the salmon and the world within which
salmon evolved. Beginning with the first "production" sites in the region, the42
Hapgood, Hume, and Company canneries on the Sacramento River built in 1864
and the Eagle Cliff (Washington) site in 1866, Pacific Salmon became a worldwide
marketable commodity (Lichatowich 86). With the introduction of "modern"
technology, salmon in its canned form became a manufactured product that could
be safely stored, processed efficiently and shipped virtually anywhere (Schwantes
200-202).
Almost overnight, canneries and the vision of "free wealth" they promised,
converted the utility of salmon. Salmon were no longer just an available source of
food for consumption or trade; salmon became raw material for a production-based
economy (Lichatowich 84-88). Historian William Robbins in his book Landscapes
of Promise reports that by 1874 there were twelve canneries between Astoria and
Portland alone; and by 1883 there were fifty-five along the Columbia reaching a
peak production of 43 million pounds of Chinook catch (Robbins 1997: 134). The
opportunities for swift profit readily available throughout the region in combination
with new technology designed to make harvest techniques more efficient, made the
industrial production of salmon increasingly more lethal. Gilinets, traps, fish
wheels, and the use of seines took salmon at incredible rates. Just one fish wheel at
The Dalles took over 227,000 pounds of salmon in a three-month period in 1894
(Robbins 1997: 134). By the last decade of the Nineteenth Century people started
to recognize undeniable declining catch rates and sincerely desired a remedy but
were uncertain about what to do and how to do it effectively (Robbins 1997: 142-43
144). This uncertainty has proven to be a common thread interwoven throughout
the history of the Pacific Salmon fishery.
Through the lens of hindsight, it is easy to see the massive ecological
transformation that occurred during the first full century of Euro-American
involvement in the west as a result of the industrial visions rigorously implemented
by fortune seekers. The reality defies adequate description. During that time the
natural economy was replaced by the industrial economy. Nature and its valuation
changed; this was especially so in Oregon and Washington but in British Columbia
as well. The result was resource exploitative industrial economies. Logging,
agriculture and fishing became the underpinning for societal development;
humankind's dominance of the natural world for human need was a foundation of
thought not easily reconciled with nature's finite capacity. With this in mind, with
an exploitative-based infrastructure in place, it was logical that the growing need
for expansion of profit produced strife between Canadian and U.S. interests.
Case Study: Fraser River
In this context, wealth in the form of natural resources was a "contested"
race and the Fraser River sockeye population was the first widely sought-after
prize. These fish, reared in Canadian waters, instinctively migrated through the
Strait of Juan de Fuca into ocean areas easily accessible for Washington fishers.
Knowing this migratory behavior and the context it was bound within, the outcome
was predictable, "The Americans were soon catching more. of the Fraser's salmonthan were Canadian fishermen" (Lichatowich 176). In 1901 Americans canned
1,105,096 cases (48 one-pound cans per case) of Fraser River sockeye compared to
928,669 cases canned by Canadians (Lichatowich 176). The measurable "take" by
Americanstake of fish reared within the sovereign territory of Canadian
waterwaysfast became a major regional issue.
It is estimated that during the first decade of the 1900s, the massive traps
used by American commercial fishers caught nearly 60% of the Fraser River's
sockeye salmon (Lichatowich 176). When this happened, Canadian fishers
demanded greater equity in terms of harvest; they asked "Why should Americans
harvest the largest share of Canada's premier fisheries resource?" (Lichatowich
176). This was an interesting question; a question which led to discussion between
the State of Washington and the Dominion of Canada and eventually to the Bryce-
Root Treaty of 1908 (Lichatowich 176-177). In following years Canada and the
U.S. developed regulations for management of the Fraser River sockeye harvest
that provided for a "fair share" of the fish for both parties.
While the Canadians passed the salmon management measures with due
speed, the U.S. Congress became entangled in "state's rights" claims made by the
State of Washington and was ultimately unable to pass the required enabling
language; by 1914 Canada abandoned the treaty (Lichatowich 177). As an
historical aside, the capacity by the Canadians but not the Americans for swift
government action that was apparent then has remained a constant throughout the
history of the treaty. Canada's government was constructed in a manner that45
allows for direct command and control of bureaucratic functions; this relative
strength in terms of administrative capacity is not conjecture but rather historical
fact (VanderZwaag 66-77).
Despite the failure of implementation of the Bryce-Root Treaty, Canada and
the U.S. reinitiated negotiations for a salmon agreement in 1918. The Hazen-
Redfield Commission was assembled in response to the devastation of the Fraser
River sockeye population that occurred the year before. By 1917 a fishery once
worth more than $30 million per year was on the verge of collapse (Lichatowich
177). The joint Hazen-Redfield Commission called for the establishment of an
international committee that would manage the fishery resource and guarantee
equity and access. The proposal was passed by the Canadian House of Commons
but was stalled and then eventually killed in the U.S. Congress by Washington
fishing interests (Lichatowich 177). This is an important case study because our
shared history is witness to a repeated inability on the part of the U.S. Congress to
act in concert with its Canadian counterpart.
Delay, Frustration and Missed Opportunities
Unfortunately the continued intransigence on the part of the political
leadership in the State of Washington produced long-term consequences. In 1918 it
was estimated that only 85,000 sockeye salmon escaped the gauntlet that was the
fishery; down from as many as 12 million in 1901 (Lichatowich 178). This 11.9
million fish decline in returning spawners not only produced fewer eggsandfewer salmon over timebut the denial of energy transference through
decomposition and decay that accompanies the natural process. Ultimately the
continued practices altered the physical nature of the rearing grounds and put at risk
the ripanan areas capacity for the natural production of salmon (Lichatowich 178-
179)
Throughout the early 1920s, negotiations for a limited treaty continued but
produced few tangible results. Tension mounted: for a brief period Canadians even
considered physically altering the mouth of the Fraser River in an attempt to
redirect migration patterns. According to Jim Lichatowich, two events in the 1930s
gave new life to the promise of a bilateral treaty: Washington State Initiative 77 (a
measure passed by Washington voters in the fall of 1934 that prohibited traps and
other forms of fixed-gear) and a natural variation of migration pattern for Fraser
River sockeye (Lichatowich 179). It appears that an internal political clash within
Washington waged for its own reasons in conjunction with an unpredictable but
natural alteration in sockeye salmon behaviors permitted the fishery to continue.
This "happy coincidence" provided Canadians with more catch and allowed
frustrations to ease, if not end. On August 4, 1937 a salmon treaty for bilateral
management of Fraser River sockeye salmon was ratified by Canada and the U.S.
and the "joint Canada-U.S. program to restore the sockeye salmon in the Fraser
River was under way..."(Lichatowich 180).47
The Origin of a Solution
Success in adoption of a treaty and its subsequent implementation did not
however, guarantee success for the fishery. While the newly empowered
International Pacific Salmon Fishing Commission (IPSFC) "did a remarkable job
of creating fishways, ladders and spawning channels aimed at restoring sockeye
and later pink salmon," the IPSFC was constrained by its mandate and unable to
manage the "newest" threat to the sustainability of the speciesinterception
fishing (Glavin 110-124). In the years following the Second World War until the
early 1970s, Canada and the U.S. became increasingly concerned with the
economic threat foreign (non-American and/or Canadian) interception fisheries
posed (Jensen 376). Interception fishing, the purposeful harvest of salmon at sea
(in international waters) during measured migratory routes is a method of large-
scale harvest that denies large numbers of salmon the opportunity to spawn.
Canadian and U.S. fleets have been practicing variations of this kind of
activity since the beginning of the fishery but the Japanese, Russian and European
fleets, with no investment in the shared costs of the ecosystem, increased pressure
on regional fleets because they harvested salmon outside the boundaries of the
convention (Finley 2000: 115-116). While it would be difficult to ascertain
whether it was the Japanese, Russian or European fleets that put the "most"
pressure on the fishery (because of the process involved), it is accurate to suggest
that together their impact was significant. When these non-regional fleets
harvested salmon that had been apportioned for Canadian and U.S. interests they inturn produced and then sold salmon at a relative advantage. They took wealth-
natural as well as industrial economic value without having to compensate either
system. This evolution of fishery harvest techniques and its implementation on a
mass scale must not be lost in the discussion because it added even more fuel to a
political situation that had been simmering for five decades.
By 1971, the year formal negotiations toward a salmon interception treaty
began; frustration was a shared Canadian-American experience. Over the "ensuing
fourteen years of talks, the focus of the negotiations changed dramatically as the
countries' interests and understandings evolved. For many years, the talks were
concerned principally with bilateral allocation.. .there appeared to be no
conservation problems" (Jensen 381). However by the mid- 1970s, a new
consideration entered the discussion: salmon propagation and the need for
conservation policy (Jensen 38 1-383). This subtle broadening of the talks greatly
complicated the task of the negotiators at the table. When assessing the treaty it is
important to remember that up to and including this period of time, allocation of the
natural bounty was first priority, conservation was second (Jensen 1986). During
the early 1980s, as Canada and the U.S. tried to construct rational assessment
accounting methods for simultaneously allocating harvest and conserving scarce
resources, pressure mounted for a solution. In the end, it is highly probable that the
agreement forged in 1985 had at least as much to do with the need for a statement
of Canadian-U.S. friendship as it did with a sustainable mechanism for
management of the Pacific Salmon fishery (Jensen 1986).When considering the origin phase of the treaty's history, three points can
be recognized as the key contributing factors. The first is accessibility to salmon as
a resource through allocation regimes that guarantee control and profit for those
engaged in the industry; as such they are of paramount importance. Second, the
frustrations exhibited over interception fisheries and the perceived inequalities
related to its occurrence is not new; harvest rights and tension have accompanied
this political context since its origin. Finally, Canada through a more direct,
unitary form of government has demonstrated over time a political leadership
capacity to act decisively on salmon policy when necessary; the U.S. by contrast
has demonstrated the opposite. The climate these factors helped produce, a climate
of longstanding tension and uncertainty, constrained the potential of the 1985
Pacific Salmon Treaty and shaped the course of events in Northwest Salmon policy
until the end of the
20LhCentury.
The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
Even though conflict over natural resources can be initiated by nearly
anyone, treaties are the constructed work of specialists; experts with a particular
skill-set and range of experiences. Often, a treaty is similar to an ice-sculpture
carved with precision to fine points over the course of years. Just as often,
politicians that by definition exist within a constrained contextual situation publicly
consummate these sculptures with little real understanding of the particulars
involved. The Pacific Salmon Treaty is proof of this phenomenon. Signed at the50
"Shamrock Summit" on March 18, 1985 by Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Muironey and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Pacific Salmon Treaty wasan
agreement tailored for greater political theater. Some believe that the Reagan
administration, "stung by Canadian and domestic criticism of its slow actionon the
transboundary acid rain issue... turned its eye to this [signing of the treaty]
opportunity to improve relations with the Canadians" (Jensen 397).
A Treaty is a Treaty
Muironey and Reagan, men with a shared Irish ancestry and a purported
private camaraderie that minored their respective countries' unique historical
friendship recognized their political situation within its greater context. It appears
that they also knew good theater when they saw it. The two leaders recognized that
the act of reaffirming their strategic friendship during a challenging time in world
historyduring the political uncertainty within the Soviet Unionas tangible
political gain with little or no loss. Muironey and Reagan were practiced
politicians. As such, they probably recognized that "win/win" opportunities in the
tense international climate were rare indeed. Accordingly, they seized the
opportunity unapologetically under a thin veil of Irish pride. In this context, they
likely saw a treaty (and all treaties that broadcast goodwill and partnership) as a
useful tool, regardless of the details. This pragmatically constructed stage must not
be lost in the discussion; 1985 was a good time for a treatythe relative utility of
said treaty was something that could be "worked out."51
Fortunately the treaty Muironey and Reagan signed was most likely, much
better than either of them probably knew. The1985Pacific Salmon Treaty
provided a framework for a scientifically determined allocation system. It ended
fourteen years of tense bilateral negotiations. The agreement bound Canada and
the U.S. to a formal, bilaterally maintained, science-driven policy-making
organization: the Pacific Salmon Commission. Ultimately the treaty glued together
two sovereign nations, four U.S. states, twenty-four U.S. Treaty Indian Tribes, one
province, and one territory for a common set of mutually beneficial goals
(Yanagida577-578).With the range of expectations, reasonable as well as
unreasonable, held by the respective parties, it is obvious that crafting the treaty
was no small task. It must be noted that whatever its long-termresults, the
development of the treaty itself was an amazing accomplishment.
As adopted, the1985Pacific Salmon Treaty was an evolution of previous
arrangements between Canada and the U.S. in terms of the salmon fishery. Even
though the document produced certain undeniable ambiguities - and associated
problems that exist still todaythe1985treaty was far better than anything prior.
While evolutionary steps were taken in the direction of progress for the fishery, the
journey was not completed. This is an important point to make. For on the whole,
the agreement promised a rational, long-term approach. It was sensitive to the need
for allocation as well as conservation mechanisms, all the while ensuring the
continuity of the respective member's sovereignty concerns. Unfortunately the52
promise of the treaty was offered without an inherent capacity to produce the
intended results.
Understanding the 1985 Treaty
When assessing the Pacific Salmon Treaty as a source document it is
helpful to approach the task with respect for time, place and context. History, by
definition, is the development of previous histories: itself a result of earlier
situations and decisions. Therefore, a critical study of the major themes that were
the foundation of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty seems warranted. This demands
an examination of the two major conceptual values that dominate the language of
the agreement and in effect, define the 1985 treaty: allocation and conservation
(Jensen 400-4 10). To do this, I will begin with an assessment of the meaning of
allocation through the principle of equity, a core principle defined in Article III of
the treaty. Afterwards, I will describe the consensus-oriented administrative model
empowered by the agreement to ensure conservation of the resource, assess its
plausibility given the unique political situation, and comment upon its role in the
most recent controversies.
The Search for Equity
Thus far I argue that the Pacific Salmon crisis was and remains a complex
web of interdependent value clashes. I further argue that at the heart of this
dilemma is the rather capricious nature of "equity." There are multiple,53
legitimately held definitions of equity. Added to this is the reality of a bilateral
construct. Canada and the U.S. as sovereign powers with internally developed and
sustained political cultures maintain distinct and often differing cultural
expectations of the value of equity. As humans we naturally hold individually
formatted conceptions of reality; this is exponentially true when considering
nations of peoples with regionally determined experiences and policy desires. This
must be understood because the entire regime of allocation assumptions for the
1985 treaty was based squarely upon a particular understanding of the meaning and
value of equity. Interestingly, this one term implies a host of political and cultural
issues including sovereignty, harvest and individual liberty. Salmon as resource is
finitesalmon exist within a world of limitsand in zero sum games "equity" has
been recognized as the favored answer (Jensen 400-410).
Article III of the treaty was written to guarantee equity through formal
practice. It established specific directives: "prevent overfishing and provide for
optimum production; and provide for each party to receive benefits equivalent to
the production of salmon originating in its waters" (Pacific Salmon Treaty Article
III, 1.a). Joy Yanagida in her study of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty suggests
that, "The purpose of the equity principle is sensible enough... [but] This is more
simply said than done" (Yanagida 588). Yanagida is referring to the long-standing
conflict over the perception (that has some support) of "Canadian salmon" being
taken by U.S. fishers and the related proposal for compensation for lost (stolen)54
harvests. However, time has shown us that several other, arguably more ominous
problems arose out of the attempts to implement the so-called "equity principles."
An Incomplete Approach
The first problem related to effective implementation of the equity principle
was the incompleteness of the science that assessment methodologies were based
upon. The conservation and harvest regulation strategies produced by the Pacific
Salmon Commission were based upon previous and on-going catch statistics and
updated weekly with respect to pre-season allocation commitments (Glavin 45).
Inherent in this approach is an expectation of and reliance upon stable catch
projections. This notion of sustainability, an approach that did not rationally
consider the "unknowable quotient" in terms of the evolving and dynamic nature of
the riparian areas and shifting oceanic conditions was wholly insufficient for the
task at hand.
This is the case because the Pacific Salmon fishery is not a zero-sum
scenario; nature and not humankind control the variables; there are no absolute
"constants" in the equation because the natural economy simply does exist that
way. Carmel Finley, a salmon policy scholar at Oregon State University, puts it
best "I contend the treaty was based on obsolete science, and that it set
unreasonable expectations which hamper negotiations to this day. The treaty also
envisioned the resource as a giant salmon machine... The problem of course, was
that ocean conditions changed drastically after 1983" (Finley 1998).55
Finley further argues that the very nature ofa "steady state" ocean is itself
an incomplete and/or dangerous notion because it implies a level of control and
certainty that simply cannot be found,nor kept (Finley 1998). Far too many
variables can throw the entire regime off kilter and with devastating effect. The
point is that the mechanisms designed to provide for equal apportionmentof the
salmon "pie" through optimum productionwere based squarely upon the salmon
ayailability of the present, and a relationship of past productive performance.
While this model may well work for standard industrialeconomy activities, where
control of the raw material and its availability isa constant, it was not realistic
given the nature of the fishery involved (Glavin 45-46: Lichatowich 164-169).
This approach did not anchor "abundance" assessmentsto the plausible, ecosystem-
specific future possibilities. In other words, the treaty through the medium of
scientific methodologies and the flawed and/or incomplete science-based policies
that were born of them, sought to drive thecar by using the rearview minor as its
guide; by all measures, an incomplete approach when attempting safe forward
progress.
How is the ConceptofEquity Applied?
A second problem developed from the language of Article III. This
problem is the difference in conceptual understanding of the term "equity" within
the context of rivers of origin and "benefits equivalent to the production" of
salmon. During my research, I find scientists and legal scholars on both "sides" of56
the argument. However, established international legal precedents specified a
"truth" that failed to support Canada's proprietary view of salmon "ownership"
(Shelton and Koenings 161: Shepard and Argue 3). Canada had argued that this
provision suggested salmon (wealth) allocation should be equalized based upon
theoretical production value of the rivers of origin, whereas U.S. fishers had
maintained that salmon as a whole should be apportioned on the equity basis.
This was a major rift because Canada found the precedent and the resultant
lack of policy change less than satisfactory. Canada saw inequity in terms of catch
(and over-catch) and the absence of recompensatation for the estimated value of the
salmon that originated in Canadian waters. Even now, Canada still maintains that a
river of origin standard has a higher legal standing than the U.S. accepts.
Interestingly, the 1985 treaty as adopted, provided no exclusive rights for the
"country of origin" (Yanagida 589). Nevertheless, Canada continued to argue the
point. This struggle had the net effect of lessening attention and feasibility of the
concept of a mutual fishery and instead polarized vested interests and escalated
conflict (Shelton and Koenings 161). Unfortunately the frustration was grounded
in the confusion over the perceived "equity" of U.S. fishers taking sockeye salmon
from the Fraser Riveran ecosystem entirely within Canadian territory. The
"Fraser River over-harvest" and the subsequent hard feelings that resulted were a
logical reaction to a perceived inequity; it was undeniably emotionally appealing
and politically useful for anti-treaty rhetoric. However, under the terms of the 1985
treaty the issue existed beyond the reach of official remedy.57
The Salmon Paradox. Optimum Production Without Overfishing?
There was a third problem with the treaty. However, unlike the text-bound
problems this one was more discrete. The problem was a fundamental rhetorical
contradiction over the simultaneous ("optimum production" and "prevent
overfishing") major principles. These values are contradictory and they promote
opposing policy approaches. If the purpose of the treaty was to ensure sustainable
levels of harvest through conservation strategies while concurrently aggressively
pursuing optimum production through enhancement strategies, how can success be
measured? Was the goal a steady-state harvest, or increased production levels and
the associated ecosystem consequences that would result? As described in chapter
one, harvest within the context of ambiguity produces over-harvests because of the
pressures of rational economic decision-making. Sustainability, even for future
consumption, is put at risk whenever over-harvest is approached, even more so
when it is attained. There is inherent within the language and application of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty a utilitarian and conservation value clash: either salmon are
to be maximized for best economic profit that by design emphasize short-term
gains, or salmon are to be managed for long-term sustainability of the stocks. It
cannot be both.
Fishery sustainability within this context suggests assessment and allocation
regimes that consider the dynamic nature of oceanic and nparian habitat conditions
and a less aggressive harvest protocol. Sustainability of the fishery would demand
natural indicators that current science may not yet know to consider. Ifsustainability was/is indeed the primary value thanany management regime applied
would keep a door open to changing knowledge of and about the ecosystem that
sustains the fishery.I argue that if science has yet to find a best method for
assessment for equity in general, then it has by definition less capacity to
successfully assess stocks so that abundance is guaranteed inan uncertain
ecosystem. There was no provision for either of these concerns. Therefore, the
highest value of the document was the maximization of salmon for best economic
profit that in turn lent itself to short-term rather than long-term planning,even
though this contradicted other enumerated values found within the language of the
treaty.
internal MechanismsConflicting Administrative Objectives
The allocation and conservation mechanisms and the flawed assumptions
that were produced by them were only a piece of the puzzle. There was another
major deficiency inherent to the language and construction of the treaty. This
particular problem was one of administrative incapacity- a problem of "process".
The Pacific Salmon Commission, which was undeniably the result of well-intended
and honorable people, was an example of too much dependence upon consensus
and too little enforcement capability. Conservation was a stated goal of the treaty
but the mechanisms empowered were inherently incapable of the level of
management and decision-making those successful conservation strategies require.
Like many other international ventures, the entity as envisioned was not the entity59
that was empowered. The bilateral technicalcommittees, panel authorities, and
even the membership and voting rules for the commission itself createda
monstrously inefficient method of fishery management (Schmidt132-133).
While the breadth of the principle policy objectives of the PacificSalmon
Commission (as outlined in Article III)were well known and even celebrated by
those engaged in its fashioning, the original language of the1985 Treaty formalized
inherent contradictory expectations. This in time fueledan unanticipated set of
interrelated problems. Through bilateral agreement, thetreaty compelled the
respective parties of Canada and the U.S. to act witha unanimous voice on major
policy initiatives. While this was nota problem for the Parliamentary System of
Canada, it turned out to be a major problem for the specified members of the U.S.
Contingent. This was so because of the peculiar institutionalarrangement of
jurisdictions and powers shared by states and the federalgovernment.
On the U.S. "side", one representative from thestates of Alaska,
Washington and Oregon, as well as one representative for "treaty recognized"
Native American tribes were compelled to make decisions collectively. Simply
put, the U.S. contingent was one vote- it was unable to make policy decisions
without unanimous consent of the representatives. The net effectwas a de facto
"veto" that gave wide powers to individual internal U.S. interests. Thiscaveat
opened the door to "veto politics" and as such transformed the internal workings of
the U.S. effort into something it was not envisioned to become. This is important
because it would be difficult to understand the post-treaty years withoutrecognizing that this structural deficiency was a principle obstacle to timely
correction measures that might have otherwise taken place.
Assessment of the 1985 Treaty
As a whole, the 1985 treaty constructed an ideal management approach that
did not fit with the real-world situation it was supposed to manage. The Pacific
Salmon Treaty and its elaborate decision-making protocols were basedupon a
consensus model. Unfortunately for the fishery, consensus is not necessarily a
shared goal in contested economic activities. Given the history of the fishery,a
system that required a vested interest managing a scarce resource by unanimous
consent was in the final analysisalmost a good idea. While the model included
many good "advanced" initiatives such as overt public participation by tribal
interests, its infrastructure provided no available means for timely response during
crisis (Yanagida 585). The science-based governance structure was put atrisk
because of the limitations of science. It is important to note that the elaborate
administrative architecture, a process that required sequential committee to
committee "steps" (aimed at ensuring a scientifically justifiable framework for
policy action) would have been difficult enough to manage without the added
burden of unanimity between U.S. commissioners. This caveat gave considerable
"veto" power to individuals in the governance process and as previously
mentioned, fueled the fire that was to come.61
The Post-Treaty Years
Shortly after the 1985 treaty celebrations had ended,a slow but undeniable
truth revealed itself: the treaty and its associated mechanismswere insufficient for
the task at hand. Terry Glavinargues that,
It is a great tribute to Canadian and American fisheries
scientists, and to the scientific and technical staff at the
Pacific Salmon Commission, that such a complex management
regime survived at all to say nothing of the remaining
salmon populations the system had been designed tomanage
(Glavin 44).
The processes implemented to save salmon andsecure the associated benefits of its
harvest were constrained by the language of the treaty's inception. During the
adopted "life" of the treaty, 1985-1992, the salmon fishery changed dramatically.
In an analysis of the Pacific Salmon Treatya decade after its ratification, Michael
Blumm and Lorraine Bodi conclude, "Most of the commission's deliberations
during its initial decade have concerned short-term harvest allocations,not long-
term reduction of intercepting fisheries or rebuilding of depleted fish runs" (Cone
and Ridlington 276). As implied by the economic theories underpinning the
utilitarian values interwoven throughout the treaty, short-term adjustment andnot
long-term sustainability was the primary focus of the Pacific Salmon Commission.
The Economy of the 1980sand early 1990s
When assessing the 1980s and 1990s, context is important. This was a time
of wide-ranging economic transition. It was an era of structural readjustment and
economic uncertainty. These factors combined to help producea political62
environment that compelled leaders to seek economic solutionseven if those
solutions were unsustainablebecause people needed work and the region needed
economic activity. This industrial inclination, often at the expense of ecological
sustainability was especially pervasive in the U.S. In the early 1980s a harsh
recession transformed the economy of the Pacific Northwest forever (Schwantes
483-515). Interestingly, the so-called U.S. economic recovery that lasted from
1983-1990 was itself sustained by massive government deficits anda ballooning of
the national debt. It was bracketed on either side by recession economics. Times
were especially bad in traditional natural resource economies during the transition.
Within the Pacific Northwest, salmon as resource took on an elevated significance
as a result.
During the 1980s and 1990s exploitative industries such as timber, mining
and fishing were pushed to the limits of productivity throughout the Pacific
Northwest despite mass job loss and localized production capacity diminishment.
The forests were "opened up" and timber was harvested in great quantity.
Agriculture began marketing new products in new ways, and a new economy was
in its infancy (Schwantes 483-515). These economic and cultural stresses had an
impact upon the ecosystem that sustained salmon. Resources were depleted for
industrial and not natural capitalization. It produced a climate of exploitation that
had an impact upon the regional psyche of the humans that shared an ecosystem.
People gradually recognized the decline in the "natural bounty" and some became
more vocal about what they wanted, when they wanted it, and why. Within this63
context, the Pacific Salmon Commission and all the other major interested agencies
and interests, estimated at well over fifty, tried to find an elusive balance.
The Search for Treaty Renewal
In 1992 the Pacific Salmon Commission negotiations for the scheduled re-
ratification of the treaty did not provide new arrangements. Consequently,
Canadian fishers became angry over the inability to find solvency for the core
dilemma: the issue of equity in harvests and profit "on the table" since 1985.
Given the economics of the time the salmon fishery was to many one of the last
threads of an exploitative-based society that encompassed much more than just
"making a living." To these people the ambiguities associated with the treaty put
their way of life at risk. This uncertainty added to the escalating frustration
throughout the early 1990s on both sides of the border. As interception fisheries of
all nationalities (especially the Alaskan fishing fleet) continued to profit, often at
what the Canadians believed their loss, pressure for relief mounted.
It should be remembered that Canada and the U.S. tried to find compromise.
In 1993 a direct government-to-government negotiation was initiated. This in turn
resulted in the appointment of a "neutral" mediator in 1995. It was felt that both
"sides" were too close to the issue and that only an "outside" perspective could
provide clarity and credibility to an increasingly charged political environment.
During this mediation process New Zealand Ambassador to the United Nations
(and former chair of the World Trade Organization) Chris Beeby presented aformula for relief that would have curtailed U.S. fisheries and/or compelled the
U.S. to pay compensation (Finely 1998). Beeby's formula would have used
domestic wholesale value of fish to establish the value of catch for each country.
He proposed his "solution" and was summarily dismissed without official bilateral
comment. To date, the U.S. has declined to formally comment upon the Beeby
Initiative. However, Ambassador Beeby served a purpose because his publicized
failure reaffirmed the difficulty involved in an enduring solution. As time passed
the respective negotiators themselves recognized the growing divide between the
fishery interests and found no other "common ground" except that a solution was
needed, a solution they couldn't provide (DFO 1999/hq(1 13)).
The Post-Beeby Escalation
As an illustration of the growing discontent in the region, two simultaneous
opinion editorials (op-eds) published in the September 1994 "Alaska Fisherman's
Journal" showcase the significance of the issue in terms of regional politics as well
as the relative schism between the respective parties. In his article "A Matter of
Equity" Canadian Minister of Fisheries Brian Tobin argued that, "From 1985 to
1993, U.S. interceptions of Canadian-origin fish rose from six million per year to
nine million - an increase of 50 percent.. .In the same period, Canadian
interceptions of U.S. fish fell by 40 percent" (Tobin 17). He concluded that,
"Clearly, agreement under these circumstances was impossible.. .The way to solve
the problem of declining U.S. salmon production is not for U.S. fishers to catch65
more Canadian fish but to restore American production at the source" (Tobin 40).
In his response, "Caveat Emptor" U.S. Senator (Alaska) Murkowski argued,
"Canada insists that 'equity' can only be served by cutting U.S. (read 'mostly
Alaskan') harvests. But under the treaty, 'equity' isn't about fish numbers, it's
about making sure that the relative value of each country's fishery is consistent
with its salmon production" (Murkowski 17). He further stated, "The failure of the
Canadian strategy should have been predictable. It was ensured by Canada's
persistence in making unrealistic demands and its use of strong-arm tactics..."
(Murkowski 35).
Tobin and Murkowski's rhetoric espoused a need for rationality anda
simultaneous call for solvency to a shared problem; yet they each failed tosee the
opposing point of view objectively. It is obvious from the distance between them
that things had gotten too far apart for meaningful progress. The short-term
discomfort associated with a lasting compromise appears to have been too higha
price for either of them to accept (at least in 1994). It is worth noting that within
their respective articles, the underlying philosophical schism that sustained the
escalation of frustration and animosity over the solution-less salmon crisis was on
full display. The salmon was was fought over the seemingly competing values of
equity and liberty. Unfortunately the underlying crisis did not subside with
successive negotiation efforts: from 1994 until 1997 tension continued to escalate.
Throughout the region hostility over the lack of progress grew on all sides, to levels
previously unthinkable within the modem CanadianU.S. context. The mid-1990s were a time where the demand fora long-term solution grew from a
dismissed footnote into a serious international problem- and yet compromise was
always just beyond reach.
The 1997 "Pacific Salmon War"
In late July 1997, Canadian fishermen angry at American harvests of
"Canadian" sockeye salmon had had enough. Acting on their own and with the
expressed intent of raising the international awareness and consciousness of the
issue, they employed a makeshift blockade with some 100 fishing boats thereby
trapping an American ship in port. The Alaskan ferry "Malaspina" withover 300
passengers on board (many U.S. citizens) was kept in dock in the British Columbia
port of Prince Rupert for three days (Wilson-Smith 24). The fishermen involved in
the blockade demanded the major concessions outlined in Ambassador Beeby's
proposal offered more than a year before (The Economist 36). With this singular
act of protest and the ensuing journalistic frenzy that resulted from it, the Canadian
fishermen had achieved at least one goal: international attention was fixated upon
the strange happenings in the Pacific Northwestthe same Northwest once
believed to be a model of bilateral cooperation.
In response to the blockade the United States Senate voted 81 to 19 for a
resolution calling on President Bill Clinton to send the United States Navy to
protect the American's "right of innocent passage" through Canadian waters (Wood
12). In further response to the blockade Alaskan Governor Tony Knowles67
announced that he intended to sue the Canadiangovernment and the fishermen
involved for damages and then promptly revokeda 36-year-old lease that routed
Alaskan ferries through the port of Prince Rupert (Wood 13). For threetense
weeks (following the release of the ferry and its patrons) public dialoguetook the
form of "war rhetoric" as Canadian and U.S. political figuressaw political
opportunities and entered the fray. British Columbia Premier Glen Clark
announced a counter-suit contending that, "American fishermen had brokenan
international treaty" and sought damages inexcess of $300 million (Egan A 14).
Newly elected Washington Governor Gary Locke, previously silenton salmon
issues, became directly involved. Likely recognizing the stakes, Locke added fuel
to fire by ratcheting up the rhetorical confrontation with his neighbor to the north.
Following one particularly colorful phone conversation he stated, "I hada private
talk with Premier Clark, and he made itvery clear to me that he's willing to
grandstand this issue, and fish the salmon to extinction, if that's what it takes"
(Egan A14).
As if to up the ante Premier Clark asserted that he would deny the United
States Navy access to a submarine base located in British Columbia until the issue
was resolved. Evidently, his words sent a chill through both the respective capitals
because shortly thereafter Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and U.S.
President Clinton became directly involved. Cooler heads prevailed in the crisis
and a new commission was established. Chretien and Clinton jointly appointed Dr.
David Strangway and William Ruckelshaus to "reinvigorate the stakeholderprocess established... [during 19961 and to resolve the Pacific Salmon controversy"
(Strangway and Ruckelshaus 1998). This intervention by the Canadian and U.S.
Government, with the simultaneous beginning of the fall salmon harvests, de-
escalated the crisisat least for a while.
The Impactofthe Strangway-Ruckelshaus Initiative
The Strangway-Ruckelshaus Initiative did not succeed, at least as intended.
From August 1997 until January 12, 1998 Strangway and Ruckeishaus held
hundreds of meetings with the respective leadership of each nation's agencies and
interests. It was a sincere effort supported at the highest levels of government on
both sides of the border. Strangway and Ruckeishaus implemented an aggressive
campaign designed specifically to bring the vested stakeholders to the table and
find a useful approach. Unfortunately there was no compromise to be found, at
least between the stakeholders. In the end Strangway and Ruckelshaus recognized
that they had no reasonable or realizable process for success. It appeared that their
initiative was an utter failure; yet another opportunity lost, proof that the salmon
conflict was irreconcilable. However, this was not the case. Through their failure
Strangway and Ruckelshaus gained insight into the nature of the problem, a
theoretical framework for solution and most importantly - they learned about the
dynamics of the people invested in the fishery itself.Based upon this information
Strangway and Ruckelshaus released a final report that would in time provide thefoundation for what has since become the June 1999 agreement. In brief, the report
suggests four recommendations:
I) A new process; free from the stakeholder concept,
2) Adoption of interim fishing arrangements conceived by fish
managers and scientists, enforced by governments,
3) Development of a practical framework for implementing
4) Article III leading to establishment of longer-term fishing
arrangements, and
5) A comprehensive review of the PACIFIC SALMON
COMMISSION and its mission.
(Strangway and Ruckelshaus 1998).
The report also implies the political utility of a meaningful investment of time and
treasure in scientific research for enhancement of the fishery. They recognized that
research monies would help develop better fisheries management strategies as well
as provide for a direct investment in habitat and riparian repair (Strangway and
Ruckelshaus 1998). Both saw the need to reduce the ambiguity and provide for a
sustainable access, enforced by government regulation, to a shared fishery.
Predictably in the aftermath of the failure, many lost hope and support for a
compromise proposal wavered. Yet a few key figures remained vigilant for a
lasting solution. On September 29, 1998 Terry Glavin speaking to the David
Suzuki Foundation argued for a "new bi-national treaty [that] must reflect not only
the legitimate interests of fishermen, but also the public interest in salmon, which is
a classic common-property resource in the U.S., and in Canada..." (Hogben 1998).
While Glavin's call for action was not immediately answered, it was a harbinger of
a renewed effort at salvaging a treaty.70
Forging A New Agreement
The time between the collapse of the StrangwayRuckeishaus effort and
the successful June 1999 agreement seems to have been a time of opportunity. The
senior political leaders of the respective nations were invested in a solution even
though it remained beyond reach. The pressure that had been escalating for years
was beginning to have an effect upon the relationship between Canada and the U.S.
Both sides knew this and they wanted a workable solution. The Strangway
Ruckeishaus Report clearly suggests as much. After reviewing the facts, I contend
that the convergence of four distinct factors made a successful political solution
probable. These four factors include: 1) the listing of Pacific Salmon under the
Endangered Species Act; 2) creation of "endowment funds" for investment in
scientific approaches to better species management and habitat recovery; 3) a
renewed, visible effort on the part of key regional political leaders; and 4) a shared
economic need for a healthy, sustainable fishery. While it is arguable that any one
of these factors would have been sufficient enough reason for either of the
respective parties to adjust their positionstheir convergence spawned an
undeniable sense of urgency and a renewed willingness to compromise for a lasting
solution.
The ListingofSalmon under the Endangered Species Act
Although some might argue the point, the listing of salmon under the ESA
was a powerful incentive for settlement. It was an undesired but predictable71
response to a problem that simply hadn't been remedied by regional interests. To
date, no person is completely sure what the listings will prescribe in terms of urban,
rural and industrial transformation; the specter of unpredictable and painful change
is afoot everywhere within the U.S. Pacific Northwest. The resulting lack of clarity
in terms of impact scared many within the fishery to reconsider previous positions
so they could salvage at least a portion of a harvest. This is an important point
because a treaty would bind the U.S. to a predictable if flexible harvest schedule at
a time when such harvest would otherwise be in question. By contrast, the listing
of salmon stocks without a treaty could very well have led to fishing closures and
the de facto denial of a large segment of the fishery (Spencer 1999).
"Free Money "for InvestmentThe Endowment Funds
The second factor that helped promote an agreement was the willingness of
Canada and the U.S. to create two endowment funds for "scientific cooperation,
stock enhancements, and habitat enhancement" (DFO 1999/hq(1 10)). Canada and
the U.S. will jointly administer the endowment funds. Beginning in 1999 the U.S.
will phase in contributions that will last approximately four years. The key
provisions of the funds will focus on more flexible fishery assessment
methodology, clearer scientific data on the relationship between river and oceanic
conditions on specific stocks, and enhancement of "wild production through low
technology techniques" (DFO 1999/hq(1 10)). This approach did not include an
apology or re-compensation funds and creates a U.S. Government-funded72
endowment dedicated to promoting sustainable methodologies. It also provided
"maneuver room" for the respective parties within the negotiation. U.S. Fraser
River Panel Member Robert Zuanich in his testimony before Congress claimed
that, "without new agreements to reduce Canadian fishingpressure on Northwest
salmon, state and local officials simply could not mounta credible recovery plan to
respond to expected ESA listings" (Zuanich 1999). In other words, the funds allow
added flexibility for the regional re-investment in the salmon ecosystem and its
management.
United States Special Negotiator for Salmon James Pipkin in his testimony
before Congress in support of the endowment funds argue the agreement was, "a
major achievement.. it represents a long-term solution to the controversy that for
many years has been an irritant in our relationship with Canada" (Pipkin 1999). In
specific discussion of the funds, Pipkin concluded, "thenew bilaterally-managed
funds will facilitate initiatives that optimize production, to the benefit of fishers in
both countries. The funds will also provide a strong incentive to the parties to
reach agreement on fishery regimes in the future, since money from the funds will
not be available unless bilaterally agreed fishery regimes are in place" (Pipkin
1999). Whatever the long-term result of the treaty, it seems obvious the promise of
investment funds paid for by the U.S. Government and not the U.S. fishing interests
made a recognizable difference in the situational context and led to an agreement.73
Involvement of Regional Leaders
A third factor that led to U.S. willingness to seek a solutionwas the sheer
force of will exhibited by the region'sgovernors, especially Oregon Governor John
Kitzhaber. Kitzhaber brought a unique skill-set anda reputation for creative
approaches within environmental policy to the table. He is widely recognized for
his "Oregon Plan for Salmon Recovery" as wellas his co-authoring with Utah
Governor Mike Leavitt of a National Governor's Association Initiative for
scientific-policy approaches they entitle, "Enlibra" (Duin 1999). The Kitzhaber-
Leavitt collaboration is a framework for sustainable approaches to industrial and
ecological management and will be the subject of future study. However, fornow
it is sufficient to suggest that Kitzhaber used his political capital to help foster
agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty as he has throughout his tenure on other
environmental issues. His reputation for bringing diverse interests together and
deriving regional cooperation has been well documented (Duin 1999). Whatever
the case, when Kitzhaber and Locke became personally invested in the process the
context changed and an agreement was soon found. Both men sent personal
representatives to the negotiations and both continuously stepped in when and
where needed.
It should be noted that Washington, Oregon and Alaskan negotiators were
at the bargaining table throughout the latest agreement process (Spencer 1999).
This is important because it hadn't always been the case. The end result is a treaty
that reflects the values Kitzhaber and Locke favored while simultaneously74
reflecting (through new management techniques) a continued investment inan
"optimum production" ideal. The treaty promotes allocation of resources after
sustainability measures have been securedinstead of what had been the de facto
process of the 1985 Treaty. Not surprisingly, the core tenets of the process are
remarkably similar to the philosophy of Kitzhaber's Oregon salmon plan. This is
important because even though Oregon's intrastate initiative ultimately failed to
prevent federal listings of Pacific Salmon, the basis for the approach appears to
have been one of the recovery models used for the Pacific Salmon Treaty
agreement. While the efforts of Kitzhaber and his counterparts obviously were not
the singular reason for agreement, their ability, expressed desire and personal
involvement in the processes did in fact help lead to an agreement and must be
recognized as a factor of the end result.
The Economic Need for Certainty
When considering the factors that led to an agreement, no analysis would be
complete without appreciation for the fundamental role of economics or more
specifically the value of "risk management." Business craves certaintyit cannot
exist without it and while the history of the salmon crisis is replete with bilateral
wrangling over ambiguity in harvest, the region's economy and political context is
different now. The economic success of the last two centuries has had a related
effect upon the region's natural sustainability capacity. Fishing interests knew that
a solution was needed. Things were getting out of hand. Profits were becoming75
increasingly uncertain. The economics of the moment favored an "abundance-
based management regime" that employed harvest techniques as defined by current
science, harvest techniques that guaranteed fishing interests at least the promise of
present and future profitability.
After reviewing the evidence, I contend that fishing interests recognized the
changing dynamics of the fishery and knew that something had to be done. I
further contend that they saw certainty as defined through the Pacific Salmon
Treaty as a commodity worth buying. In industrial economic terms, the risk was
worth the potential reward because continued ambiguity had become more costly
than sustainable behaviors. In other words, the promise of the latest agreement
assures invested parties that catch, at least some predictable catch, will be
guaranteed without the costs associated with continued ambiguities or the costs
associated with challenging major pieces of the ESA in court.
Chapter Summary
When considering the long, colorful history of the Pacific Salmon Treaty it
is easy to be lulled into believing that economics was the singular purpose behind
its need, development, implementation and future success. While economic
considerations championed by Alaskan Congressional pressure did in fact nearly
derail even the latest bilateral agreement through Congressional delay in late 1999
(Paulson 1999), economics were not the solitary issue. Following further
compromise, the agreement in form was eventually funded with the public support76
of Alaska's U.S. Senator Stevens. Re concludes, "We haven't quite gotten to the
point of the absolute protection that we were assured we were going to have, but
we've come as close to it as we can" (Associated Press 1999). In the end, even
Senator Stevens recognized the absolute necessity of a stable fisherythe kind of
certainty only secured through a binding, bilateral treaty. This evolution in
understanding was itself a significant "watershed" event.
After eight years of struggling for re-ratification of the 1985 accord, Canada
and the U.S. resolved the Pacific Salmon crisis; at least the political crisis. With
the new treaty, fixed harvest quotas will be replaced with "abundance-based
strategies" that are designed to promote and protect stock survival. The new treaty
also sets respective limits for Canadian harvest of pink salmon and Alaskan harvest
of sockeye. Both Canadian and U.S. fishers will have to reduce their harvest of
certain Chinook stocks. Additionally, funds will be committed to priority riparian
and habitat repair efforts as well as scientific discovery aimed at new management
approaches (Silver 1999). This agreement, a blueprint for regional cooperation for
salmon policy, was co-signed by the U.S. Treasury and provides a flexible structure
for management of an important resource.
At present, the agreement is "on track". The first year funds are "in the
bank" and the structural adjustments are on-going (Kowal July 31, 2000). In the
following chapters, the history of the treaty will be revealed to be a public
commentary on the people of the region, the values they hold and a statement about
a regional approach to sustainability and development. In context, the treaty as ice-77
statue described at the beginning of this chapter has been carved and puton display
in the village green under the watchfuleye of an expectant region. Through that
view, it is possible to answer the second major research question. We havea
maturing knowledge of salmon and its value. As the region evolved, and continues
to evolve from a colonial economy into what may become a sustainable economy,
the methods have changed. Before therewere treaties, Canadian and U.S. fishers
harvested without regulation. When scarcity was recognized, clumsy and often-
inefficient management techniques were tried, implemented and replaced with
more efficient methods.
With this most recent treaty, an abundance-based philosophy has been put
into motion but its utility has yet to be proven. Much is still unknown. As full of
promise as it may be, the new treaty is still a political document; it isa tool for the
conservation of a resource. As such it is subject to the same fundamentals of
economics and the industrial value system that have perpetuated the decline of the
fishery. To better appreciate the relative prospect ofsuccess, it is necessary to
analyze the respective political cultures and the bureaucracies they sustain. I
believe that this investigation may provide needed clarity in terms of understanding
the force and drag of the structural obstacles surrounding this initiative.CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL CULTURE & SALMON POLICY
In previous chapters I discuss the contradictory meanings of salmon and the
history of the Pacific Salmon Fishery. While theseare important aspects of the
salmon issue they are not sufficient for the task at hand. Context is needed for
utility to be gained. Political culture provides context. Political culture defines and
maintains the relative boundaries of policy initiation, development and
implementation within a political state. Culture defines community norms- it
reaffirms societal values. It fosters a particular arrangement of societal institutions
that influence the balance of interests that in turn promote or constrain specific
policy administration. It helps define the relative reach of policy, in size and scope.
Ultimately, political culture explains the human-to-human relationships that
determine the context of a given time and place and the human activity therein.
This chapter is intended to provide an explanation of how political culture
shapes contexts that in turn produce salmon policy. To achieve this I will describe
the theoretical foundations of political culture, explain how and why Canadian and
U.S. cultures are different, illustrate the mechanics of the culture-policy
relationship through a case-study assessment of Oregon and its distinct political
culture, define the impact of culture upon an associated institutional arrangement
and then conclude with a brief assessment of its effect upon salmon policy
initiation, development and implementation.79
A Foundation
When assessing public activities and their resultant policy arrangements it is
helpful to recognize some basic rules. People living within a society exist within a
particular contextual space that is governed by societal norms. Particular actions
are allowed while others are not. For instance, peaceful public assembly in the
U.S. is tolerated while actions portraying a willful endangerment of others usually
are not. Rules, written and unwritten, maintain truths about the culture and its
expectations. This implies that repeated actions are the result of community
(cultural) allowance. If it is true, that continued human activities are the result of
cultural sanction, then enduring public policy is the result of purposeful
arrangements between knowledgeable people within a given societya society
with a distinct political culture. Political behavior researchers Jerry Yeric and John
Todd conclude, "No definition of the public is entirely adequate, but perhaps the
simplest way to describe it is as a collection of individuals who share a common
attitude" (Yenc and Todd 4). This finding supports the work of political scientist
Daniel Elazar.
Elazar's theories suggest that attitudes, values and beliefs held by a
particular group of people determine its political culture. Elazar argues, "Political
culture is the summation of persistent patterns of underlying political attitudes and
characteristic responses to political concerns that is manifest in a particular political
order" (Elazar 1993: 214). A distinct political culture then is a spatial thing; it is
the attitudes of members of society at an exact time. Political culture is an evolvingsocietal experience but is also a manifestation of formal and informal constraints.
Individuals within a given culture define institutions, power arrangements and
preferences toward policies through their everyday actions. The people living
within a society are involved as participants in the "culture process." This is
significant because people within a cultural context are participants whether they
recognize their participation or not.
In ancient Greece, the philosopher Aristotle is reported to have claimed that,
"Observation shows us, first, that every city [polis] is a species of association, and
secondly, that all associations come into being for the sake of some goodfor all
men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is in their view, a
good" (Barker 7). Aristotle saw people (men) as political animals that were most
comfortable within an associated political culture (Barker 10). He believed that
attitudes, values and beliefs converge into a framework for the public good.
Association understood the role of group dynamics. He recognized that culture is
developed through locally determined processes over time to govern through a
cooperative effort that in turn promotes "good" action. Later in this chapter I will
describe and employ Elazar's migration-based "culture streams" framework as a
theoretical tool for regional cultural analysis, but for now it is enough to say that
the existence of political culture provides context. It defines and sustains cultural
values through individual arrangement and collective adherence that in turn
strengthens or weakens particular institutional arrangements and policy
orientations.Political Culture and Schema Theory
Political culture "is one of the primary sources shaping politics..." because
it is the process by which collective attitudes, values and beliefs produce political
structure and in turn, collective decision-making (Elazar 1993: 214). To appreciate
the role of political culture it is vital to understand how people individually develop
their political perspectives and why the resulting cultural developments basedupon
groups of people with shared political perspectives form a policy context. In
previous chapters I argue that our understanding of salmon is multi-faceted and
complex and that people within the Northwest hold industrial and natural value
system orientations and that these frameworks are in perpetual competition with
our contradictory knowledge of salmon. Given these truths, how then do people
discern political truthsor more specifically, how do people discern political truths
related to salmon?
An answer may be found within the study of schema theory. In "The
Breadth, Depth, and Utility of Class, Partisan, and Ideological Schemata" Ruth
Hamill, Milton Lodge and Frederick Blake conclude that cognitive tools framed as
"knowledge structures" determine how people know and consequently organize the
political world around them. They argue that "one's prior knowledge about some
domain influences what one sees and remembers and how one interprets reality and
guides behavior" (Hamill, et al. 851). Furthermore, they claim that "The key
distinction here is between information and knowledge: facts, figures, beliefs, and
impressions about people, places, things, and events are not stored into memory asdiscrete bits and bytes, but are organized semantically into coherent 'clusters' of
knowledge" (Hamill, et al. 851). Knowledge, they argue implies more than
mastery of facts but rather management of discrete understandings (Hamill, et al.
851).
Schema theory suggests that organization of information through
amalgamated knowledge clusters that in turn sustain political schemas provide
citizens with a tool for discerning patterns of cooperation and conflict, relationships
between interests, and serve to differentiate between "good" and "bad" outcomes
(Hamill, et al. 852-853). The work of Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman
suggests that contrary to cognitive dissonance theory, people might be "cognitive
misers" that "have a limited capacity for dealing with information, and thus must
use cues and previously stored knowledge to reach judgment and decisions"
(Johnston and Feldman 96). With this in mind, cues have a special significance
because if they are based upon faulty information or worse, obsolete truth, all
future data will be similarly skewed. Further study is ongoing about how we
develop and utilize schemas, but regardless of the particulars involved in the
process, the notion of limited capacity "frames" of knowledge clustered around
pieces of information has real significance when trying to assess public
understanding of and involvement with complex environmental policy issues.
Knowledge clusters related to the ways people know salmon are often
triggered by contradictory visions spliced together throughout the Pacific
Northwest's history and culture. James Cantrill, a noted communication scholar onenvironmental rhetoric and its implications, argues that, "Much of whatwe 'know'
about the environment may depend onour age, economic well-being, region of the
country, and other demographic characteristics as well as the dominant cultural
forces which surround us" (Cantrill 72). He finds that, "These beliefs need not be
consistent and are selectively drawn upon in the processing of environmental
discourse. They also remind us of what we take to be 'true' about the world"
(Cantrill 76). Cantrill's analysis suggests that simultaneous inconsistent truths are
embedded into individual world view development and as such become embedded
cultural truths through association.
Schema theory suggests that over time locally determined culture is
reaffirmed through the nourishment of consistent ideology and the constraining of
contradictory notions. People within a given culture manage life within a set of
prescribed rules. Shared community-held constraints define the range of policy
options through formal and informal censorship of policy alternatives. Yeric and
Todd's work supports this finding. They argue that there are four "learning
processes that are directly linked to political socialization: imitation, anticipatory
socialization, political education, and political experience" (Yeric and Todd 55).
These four "steps" to political maturation suggest that members of a community
gradually assimilate the characteristics inherent in a unique political culture through
a normal socialization experience. This means that existing political culture is
sustained as long as population patterns are relatively constant (at least in numbers
that can be assimilated) and political arrangements remain devoid of transformingascendant world view shifts. In other words, barring great shifts in population,
political orientation, and extraordinary circumstances,a political culture reproduces
the same culture. This perspective helps illustrate how and whya certain state may
have a reputation and enduring capacity for creativity in terms of public policy
while its neighboring state may not. This also helps to explain differentiation in
terms of environmental public policy. In some places the prevailing political
culture demands "protection of the environment"as a social good. By contrast,
some places demand "protection of jobs" over all other social goals. This leads us
into a discussion of symbols and the connection between symbolic representation
and the schemas forged to support them.
Symbols as Tools
Symbols are tools of language. This is important when evaluating the role
of political culture upon salmon policy because through symbol abstract ideas are
given substance through the medium of language and as such provide meaning for
events and circumstances (Mach 68). Symbols affirm or discount previously
assembled knowledge and related information is then stored into individual and
collective memory accordingly. Symbols are the currency of influence within
political argument and as such they have a capacity of significant influence,
especially within the context of environmental crisis. It has been well established
that symbols by their function, have undeniable weight in political decision-making
(Edelman 1988). Therefore, it is critical to remember that symbols arerepresentatives of constructed truths. Symbolsare constructions that exist subject
to modification and change (Elder and Cobb 82). Symbols havepower but are
dependent upon context. The enduringpower of symbol stems not merely from the
common meanings they suggest, but more importantly from the affective
sentiments they foster (Elder and Cobb 83). In other words, symbolsare significant
because they tap into emotions formed around knowledge clustersthat act as
screening agents for information.
The result is that symbols in context forma frame of reference, a language
to interpret the political landscape through- a pathway for appeal (Elder and Cobb
84). Unfortunately, new languagescan be difficult to learn and facts that appear to
contradict "knowledge" previously storedcan be hard to reconcile. If we know
symbols as representatives of the "good life" and/ora threat to the "good life"
based upon the rhetorical visions inherentto our political culture, then more
rigorous analysis of the data will not occur. People will simply categorizenew
information according to pre-existing judgments. This will reinforceprevious
conceptions of environmental truths. If Moore is correct in hisassessment that
people "want our environment andour economy," is sustainability possible within
a context that firmly holds that there is no inherent conflict?
There may not be a sufficient answer, at least yet. However, if government
is an extension of individual will expressed collectively, thenour policies should
similarly reflect irreconcilable notions of salmon, its utility and long-term value.
But is this the case? Does political culture sustain contradictory truths?Todetermine the answer, weare compelled to thoughtfully assess the respective
political cultures of Canada and the U.S.as well as the policy paradigms they
engender.
CanadianU.S. Political Culture
Political culture is an important factor when considering salmonpolicy
within the Pacific Northwest because it determinesinstitutional arrangement.
Unfortunately, there is no singular Pacific Northwest culture butrather a collage of
many, these cultures may produce conflicts. Each distinct culture has been defined
by the challenges unique to its landscape, its specific settlementhistory and its
people. Culture determines culture and each tookroot and evolved independently.
While the cultures of the Pacific Northwest havean undeniable commonality they
have specific differences as well. New York Timesreporter and free-lance author
Timothy Egan's definition of the Pacific Northwestas "any place salmon can get
to" has poetic as well as conceptual utility but it isa limited description that is more
a rhetorical ideal than realistic assessment.
As professor Daniel Kemmis cxplains in his book Community and the
Politics of Place, "No real culture- whether we speak of food or of politics or of
anything elsecan exist in abstraction from place" (Kemmis 7). Place therefore
has considerable influence upon culture. The "Pacific Northwest" isa vast region
with many different kinds of places. Thereare deserts. There are rain forests.
There are valleys, and there are estuaries. Thereare also differing conceptions ofvalue within those places. This is why there isno universal "Pacific Northwest
Experience." In fact, I argue that any attempt to artificially imposea monoculture
conception of culture upon the region would be an unwise investment with little
scholarly return. This is because a macro-study would overlook significant
differences, not the least of which are the structural differences between the two
sovereign states of Canada and the U.S. and the cultures that sustain each.
Historian William Robbins writes,
Despite the aggressive designs of the United States,
especially in the nineteenth century, the Canadian-U.S.
boundary was established through negotiation rather than by
conquest. But that veneer of accommodation and sense
of common purpose masks more than it discloses because
there are notable differences separating the two
countries. Canada and the U.S. celebrate different traditions
and conventions; each has inherited unique and distinctive
historical legacies. Markedly disparate mythologies, cultural
attributes, and accumulated traits distinguish the two nation-states
(Robbins 1994:42).
Seymour Lipset in his landmark book Continental Divide further argues, "the two
countries differ in their basic organizing principles. Canada has been and is a more
class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectively-oriented, and group-oriented
society than the U.S." (Lipset 8). Lipset concludes, "fundamental distinctions stem
in large part from the American Revolution and the diverse social and
environmental ecologies flowing from the division of British North America"
(Lipset 8). Lipset contends that Canada and the U.S. maintain incongruent world
views and orientations. He argues that the mechanics of Canadian and U.S.
governance reflect these differences and are a major point of departure between therespective states. Lipset posits that Canada's first codified Constitution, written in
1867, was largely framed in reaction to the then recent U.S. Civil War. Power is
concentrated, purposefully, in a Parliamentary system. Precisely because of the
cultural aversions to a "civil war" Canadians constructed and have sustained a
culture that favors a government where authority is vested in the federal
government with specified powers shared by the provinces. These institutional
arrangements are a direct result of culture. In Canada careful attention was paid to
ensuring that national jurisdictional and not regional approaches to public policy
became the norm.
Significant Contrasts
In order to assess respective cultures of the Pacific Northwest it is first
necessary to recognize some obvious distinctions between Canada and the U.S.
When considering the larger issues it is crucial to remember that the United States
was born through violent revolution and Canada was not. This fundamental
divergence in experience produced a fundamentally different understanding of
governmentsustained through generations of culture. The United States
developed a form of self-government that vested "reserved" authority in local states
that in turn established and maintained the federal experience. Lipset argues that,
"The U.S. is still more religious, more patriotic, more populist and anti-elitist, more
committed to higher education for the majority and hence to meritocracy, and more
socially egalitarian than Canada" (Lipset 37).Lipset's research suggests that Americans in general are less inclined to
favor either large welfare programs or recognizable governmental constraints on
individual economic liberty (Lipset 37-8). Lipset sees the dramatic break with
England and the subsequent development of a "rugged individualist" philosophy as
undeniably "American" and itself a cultural foundationa foundation not shared
by or with Canadians. This foundation has produced a governmental philosophy
oriented towards local, de-centralized decision-making that assumes concurrent
jurisdictional authority. This penchant for fragmented power is not by accident. It
purposefully sacrifices efficiency for the benefit of individual rights and personal
liberties. Even though the threat of a "king" has long since passed, the fear of an
omniscient all-in-one uncontrollable federal entity strikes at the heart of the U.S.
consciousness. Table 1. illustrates some core differences in cultural inclinations
between Canada and the U.S.
Table 1. CanadianU.S. Cultural Inclinations
Canada
Inclination
General respect for authority More Less
Individual rights at expense Less More
of collective gain
Collective gain at expense More Less
of individual rightsThrough myth, literature and history, Canadian and U.S. political cultures
have evolved into separate conceptions of political existence. The contrasts are
stark. To begin with, U.S. culture is based upon a principle belief in sovereignty of
"The People" while Canada still recognizes the role and function of elites such as
the Queen. Secondly, the history of development and expansion in the United
States has been the result of naked desire and bloody conquest while Canada's
history has been a study in negotiation and conciliation. Thirdly, the United States
has been a dominant world force since the end of World War II while Canada has
played a supportive role in specific policy spheres. Finally, the United States
developed and implemented a republican presidential form of government with de-
centralized bureaucracies while Canada created a federal government in many ways
the antithesis of the U.S. system. The institutional differences between the U.S.
and Canada are not accidental: they are the logical results of distinct cultural
orientations and incumbent expectations, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. CanadianU.S. Institutional Orientations
Institutional Orientation Canada U.S.
Efficiency of government More Less
Representativeness of government Less More
Influence of interest groups Less More
Responsiveness of government (in time)Faster Slower
Fragmentation of power Less More91
Despite their differences in form it is important to remember that Canada
and the U.S. are both vibrant democracies with recognizable similarities in popular
culture. Both Canada and the U.S. have had defining relationships with Great
Britain. Canada and the U.S. have a strong friendship that will most likely become
even stronger. Canada and the U.S. are close relatives but they are not twins. It
would be counterproductive to clump Canadian and U.S. political cultures together
as the "same" because of quaint but inaccurate understandings that would most
likely produce more confusion than clarity. Historian Donald Meinig describes the
situation in the following way,
Americans routinely perceive and accept Canada itself as a
borderland and take for granted the easy transnational movement
of people, goods, money, and ideasall the while quite blind to
the fact that Canadians may have a rather different view of that
boundary and what it means to live within the towering shadow
of a world power (Robbins 1994: 40).
Meinig's conclusion has important implications for salmon policy. Scholars must
be sufficiently disciplined enough to ensure that the poetic rhetorical identity of
sameness attached to the people of North America, especially the Pacific
Northwest, is not overstated because such visions claim a level of sameness that
simply may not exist.
The Pacific Northwest: An Illusion with Limited Utility
The Pacific Northwest is a constructed illusion. It is a fusion of place and
people. It is a convergence of hidden dissimilarities and an expression of human
intent. People often think of the Pacific Northwest as a regional unit but this notion92
cannot be completely justified. \Vhile the region has a shared natural history, the
Canadian and U.S. experience within the region is, has been, and will continue to
be different. More importantly, the interpretations of the respective experiences
interpretations made through the prism of political culture and its related historical
contextsare vastly dissimilar. Robbins states that "In contrast to the great myths
of the American nation, especially in its western regions, in Canadian literature, as
Seymour Martin Lipset points out, 'the frontiersman' has never been a figure for
special glorification" (Robbins 1994: 42). This difference has important
implications. National identity, sustained through myths that reaffirm values and
value-systems, fosters a divergence in attitudes, beliefs, institutions and policy.
Cultural identity and the myths that transmit the identity's truths are
powerful forces. Through his research Elazar authors an approach to understanding
political culture and its development founded upon historic migration patterns of
settlement and the value-systems they perpetuate. His theory on "The 'geology' of
settlement and the cultural streams" suggests that major sub-cultures are formed, at
least in part, as a product of ethnic migration patternsand the associated contexts
they sustain. Elazar suggests that relative emphasis on personal enterprise, civic
purpose and the role of individual citizenship are key variables. Elazar finds three
distinct political sub-culture types within the U.S.: moralistic, traditionalistic and
individualistic (Elazar 1993). Within this theoretical model moralistic cultures
recognize politics as a method of achieving public good through individual civic
investment. These cultures sustain truths that legitimize an active role for93
government. Traditionalistic cultures, by contrast, recognize the roleofthe
existing order but view political participation as a reserved activity reserved for
selected elites. In these places cultural truths reinforce the legitimacyofelites and
thereby structurally inhibit the range, role and expectationsofaverage citizens.
Elazar argues that the third major sub-culture, individualistic, recognizes the
notion of democratic order as a marketplace for strictly utilitarian functions and
views participation as driven by private motivations and personal gain (Elazar
1966: 86). In an individualistic culture, most people play a minor role in
government and they often view those involved with a measure of suspicion.
Obviously these three classifications are generalized theoretical tools. However,
they are useful models for analysis. While categorization is not by itself conclusive
it is helpful for clarification of specific value dynamics within unique community
cultures. Elazar's theories are especially salient when looking at the origin of
Canadian and U.S. culture. Canada has a traditional, elitist orientation and proudly
so. This is not the case in the U.S. where all three threads can be discerned within
the text and spirit of the Declaration of Independence as well as the U.S.
Constitution of 1787. With these facts in mind then, political culture has
undeniable influence upon the range of activities granted license within its
respective context. Places where government is valued and supported by citizens
are more likely to sponsor policy-innovation whereas places where government is
not valued as a civic responsibility would be less likely to intervene.Canadian and U.S. culture derive alternative and often-contradictory
meanings from their respective "settlement" history. This is significant because
derived experience in turn produces initial expectations and over time "different
settlement experiences" promote different climates of expectation. With each new
experience respective values were affirmed or challenged, thereby interweaving
new threads of collectively constructed "truths" into the social fabric. Renowned
communication scholar Walter Fisher argues that, "human beings are inherently
storytellers who have a natural capacity to recognize the coherence and fidelity of
stories they tell and experience" (Fisher 24). Fisher's research suggests that this
CanadianU.S. difference about the frontier and the meaning of the stories that
came out of that experience is significant. Orientations that have sustained Frednck
Jackson Turner's notion of the frontier and its fundamental characteristics in the
U.S. may not stir the same range of cognitive and emotional support in Canada.
The moral virtues established during the respective settlements of the west
reflect the disparate expectations and orientations of Canadian and U.S. political
culture. The transformation of the land and the lessons gained from it are not
uniting experiences between the two countries. This supports the notion that
Canadian and U.S. understanding of nature and our role within it may be equally as
disparate. In their collaboration, "Political Culture, Postmaterial Values, and the
New Environmental Paradigm," Mary Steger, John Pierce, Brent Steel, and
Nicholas Lovrich argue that Canadian and U.S. attitudes about the environment are,
in fact, disparate. Through a detailed analysis of Canadian and U.S. orientations on95
acid rain as well as general environmental attitudes, they find that modern
"Canadian political culture is importantly different from that of the U.S." (Steger et
al. 249). They conclude that Canadian political culture was "more organic,
collectivistic, and holistic than the individualistic American political culture"
(Steger et al. 249). This finding suggests that Canadian citizens, asa whole, are
more concerned about environmental issues as well as more inclined to seek
collective governmental action in its name, than U.S. citizens.
The Pacific Northwest(s)
Now that the differences between the Canadian and U.S. cultures and their
resultant political development has been explained it is possible to look at a sub-
division that exists within the Pacific Northwest: the differences between the
Canadian Northwest and the U.S. Northwest. The Canadian Province of British
Columbia and the states of Alaska, Oregon and Washington reflect their respective
national culture as well as individually determined norms. This is important
because the institutions within these places reflect their culture. These entities
share an economic history as well as an ecological experience but each has a unique
political culture and by extension, distinct policy context. In general, Oregon
represents a dominant moralistic culture while Alaska, Idaho and Washington have
developed distinct moralistic/individualistic blends (Elazar 1993). Differences
exist even when comparing states as theoretically similar as Washington andOregon. In his book, The Pacific Raincoast: Environment and Culture inan
American Eden, Robert Bunting suggests,
Industrial society transformed the region, but much of the
change followed paths blazed during the settler era. Driven
by common processes of change, the region shared similar
cultural and ecological changes. Yet Washington and Oregon
also reacted somewhat differently, creating a slightly different
landscape north and south of the Columbia River. Oregon
continued to house a rather homogeneous population, held to its
conservative social imprinting, and maintained its long-standing
pattern of a largely 'home-owned' economy with resident
capitalists and mixed agricultural farms. Washington showed less
continuity, as well, by holding to its more expansive,
free-enterprise vision. Less exclusive than Oregon in its desire to
attract people and capital Washington continued to be more
pluralistic and development and growth-oriented (Bunting 103).
Bunting's assessment suggests that the differences between Washington and
Oregon are fundamental and structural, this despite the fact that Washington and
Oregon probably have more in common than any other two political entities within
the region.
Implied within Bunting's claim is an approach. Analysis of political culture
through a study of a particular state in contrast with Canadian norms can provide
needed insight into the mechanics of political culture and policy outcome.
Bunting's conclusion and inferred approach has added significance when combined
with Elazar's theories concerning political culture development. Taken together,
these thoughts suggest that Oregon is a sound choice for political culture and
context analysis because it has the most stable historically recognizable political
culture within the region. Oregon's distinct culture has promoted a policy context
that has allowed its government to make significant contributions as a policy97
innovator, especially within the natural resources arena. Oregon, the earliest U.S.
state government within the region, also served an important function in the
development of neighboring states and territoriesas well as an undeniable role in
the past and promise of salmon.
A Comparative Assessment: Oregon, Canada and the Origin of Culture
The State of Oregon is the result of a union of human vision and geography.
Consequently, the political culture that evolved within its sphere is itselfa
composite, a maturing blend of place and people. Oregon, like the rest of the
Pacific Northwest, is a product of human invention; it is a story about place remade
in human terms, sustained through myth and the political behaviors allowed within
its form. Oregon has sustained a dominant "moralistic" culture witha locally
determined perspective for most of its history (Elazar 1993). Through continuous
re-invention Oregon as legitimate sovereign state defines values, promotes socially
constructed visions of progress, and constrains and/or emphasizes human activity
based upon its created norms through narrative. The "Oregon Story" isa moralistic
tale of opportunity found, or perhaps more accurately, a narrative of opportunity
made. It is the result of myth and idealism.
The political culture of Oregon and the "Oregon Story" that sustains it is a
narrative that reaffirms the values of self-selected interventionists seeking idealistic
visions in a land rich with natural resources where such notions could be afforded.
It is also a story of people sustaining visions through the power of mythpassingon expectations through truths rooted in a constructed world. At the time of
settlement, Oregon (like much of the Northwest) was viewed as "a land abounding
in potential, a place where nature's wealth and human technical genius would
combine to forge a good society...[with] seemingly limitless opportunity" (Robbins
1997: 179). The U.S. Pacific Northwest was once described in a 1904 issue of
Pacific Monthly as, "this garden spot.. .this land pregnant with hidden
resources.. .possibilities that almost stagger the imagination..." (Robbins 1997:
180). These words suggest a convergence of opportunity and expected "human-
made" perfectionan idealistic notion that deserves more explanation.
Root Rhetorical Visions
Oregon, unlike the Canadian Northwest, was developed through a cultural
investment in the root vision of the "garden"an Eden realizable only through
human improvement of the natural world (Smith 1978). The garden focus and the
moralistic perspective sustaining it is an experience that Canadians did not and do
not share. This difference in vision and purpose cannot be over emphasized in
terms of its significance to the larger story. In Canada, the Hudson's Bay Company
was the agent of heroic standing. The company, as a legitimate agent of the crown,
functioned for measurable profit and managed its affairs accordingly. Its expansion
and the associated development of commerce was just thateconomic expansion.
Settlement occurred because people saw opportunities for private gain. By
contrast, the heroic image in the U.S. is of the individual pioneer individuallycarving out civilization from a stubborn wilderness on a mission from God. As
argued by Fisher, history told through stories conveys truths: the lessons,
characteristics of the heroes and villains, as well as the value-systems that support
these conceptions of truth perpetuate a particular world view orientation (Fisher
1987).
The idealistic vision of the garden drew people with a shared set of values,
expectations and faith to Oregon. In its purest form, the Oregon Story is the
outcome of a collision of complimentary root myths. In his book Virgin Land
Henry Nash Smith contends that the insatiable thirst for reconstitution of the garden
through the toil of the land by "yeoman" farmers that were "pioneering" the
frontier was nothing less than a spiritual quest. It should be recognized that our
Canadian neighbors did not share the questnor could they, given their cultural
view. Smith explains that U.S. citizens viewed the West as a "place where afflicted
humanity raises her drooping head; where conscience ceases to be a slave, and
where laws are no more than the security of happiness" (Smith 147). Smith's
description of superhuman justification fits nicely with Elazar's notion of Oregon
as a moralistic culture. The vision of the garden provides definition to the cultural
dynamics associated with a moralistic framework. Implementing "God's Will" on
the frontier became an embedded societal mission. However, Canadian folklore
does not similarly convey the nobility of the settlement enterprise. Elites within
Canada set direction and the masses responded, often for personal motive. It is
vital to recognize how the collective identification with the "pioneer" and100
associated orientations contained therein defined the cultural norms and the
institutions that developed within the U.S. Northwest during settlement. It is
equally important to recognize that these U.S. orientations did not, and could not,
define the cultural norms of the Canadian Northwest.
A Distinct Role
The Oregon Country was the first place settled in the U.S. Northwest.
Therefore, Elazar's theories would suggest that the moralistic tendencies that drove
early settlement would be most pronounced in the place where settlement took
hold. I contend that this is the case because the culture maintains certain unique
characteristics that can be directly linked to the root vision of the garden. In
Oregon, the vision of the people as the garden's master became embedded as truth
sustained through myth. This notion of "master" with legitimate rights of
absolute control in turn sustained behaviors consistent with a continuance of this
root rhetorical framework of values. At present Oregon culture still promotes a set
of assumptions about human activity and property rights that Canadians do not
fully understand. The pioneers shared an unquestioning belief in their cause and in
their view of Oregon as "pregnant land" to do with as they saw fit, but there is no
similarly held Canadian ideal. Canadians claim no sacred ordination of purpose, no
superhuman justification for collective activity. They maintain a widely different
set of values towards rights and responsibilities. This difference reveals much.
While U.S. settlers transformed the land into a majestic place of "heaven-sent"101
opportunity made for "human purpose," Canadians kept a more grounded,
utilitarian conception of the settlement of the land (Lipset 1990). This truth has
significant implications because idealistic and rationalistic methodologies rarely
co-exist.
ThreadsofCommonality
While there is no singular Pacific Northwest there are threads of
"sameness" woven throughout the region. There are cities, farms and structures of
civilization that look similar. Many people scattered throughout the region share
daily activities that have much in common with their international neighbors.
Geography, shared world history and necessity have undeniably connected the
people of the Pacific Northwest at least to some degree. This is undeniable.
However, the reasons for settlement and the culturally determined measures of
success were, and are, markedly different. I suggest that the symbiotic relationship
between place and people developed in the Canadian and U.S. Northwest spawned
a pattern of behaviors that in turn gave rise to many different political cultures that
helped to shape the region through the application of distinct value-systems. These
cultural inclinations were and are expressed through institutional arrangements and
individual expectations. Consequently, this evolution fostered respective political
contexts that legitimized rhetorical visions of the place and its people. Over time,
people reaffirmed the constructed truths through public policy that in turn sustained
the prevailing visions.102
Functionality: Political Culture is a Dependent Variable
Elazar's theories suggest that political culture is determined by the popular
will expressed through expectation and custom. By extension this means that the
Oregon Story and its associated investiture of citizen activism would not have
continued unless the original moralistic tendencies of Oregon's political culture
were strong enough to shape and constrain political organization and individual
behaviors. It also suggests that modem Canadian political orientationsare the
result of earlier determined truths. Put another way, political culture is a dependent
variable. It is a product of the people that sustain its norms. It sets the tone for
what is appropriate and inappropriate for discussion. In Oregon, as in Canada,
political culture establishes a policy context: a space where the "things we know"
collide with the things we want. Appeals consistent with the truths held by the
respective culture were projected through policy. This is an important point to
remember because appeals cannot succeed where contexts are ambiguous and
values are absent (Edelman 1988). As demonstrated in this and earlier chapters,
values do exist in Oregon, and in Canada, simultaneously. Symbols and icons that
have lost relevance are meaningless and impotent, while symbols with cultural
relevance are both meaningful and powerful (Edelman 1988).
The symbols of salmon, the pioneers, wheat, and fir trees that adorn the
Oregon Capitol are viable conceptions. The heroic image of former Governor Tom
McCall "saving the Willamette" and the environmental rhetoric of current
Governor John Kitzhaber have salient political utility or they would not endure103
(Duin 1999). Cultures promote policies and institutions that produce leaders. To
illustrate how culture determines policy in Oregon, it is useful to think of culture
and the institutions sustained by cultural norms as a filter (see figure 1.) that
"processes" information and produces policy-makers who develop policy. McCall
and Kitzhaber would not have been elected and re-elected if their actions did not
reflect cultural values. Likewise, the appeal of the crown, the expectation of order
and the shared collectivist notions of Canadians would not continue unless the
invisible forces of culture sustained them. Policies are not developed in a vacuum
but instead result of institutions and leaders that emerge from cultural inclinations.
Figure 1. The Policy-Process in Oregon
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Political culture defines the relative boundaries of political activity. For
example, during the 1960s and 1970s Governor McCall led an environmental
awakening in Oregon that led to the implementation of the returnable bottle bill, the
public beach access bill, the creation of a Department of Environmental Quality,
the clean-up of the Willamette River and the implementation of Senate Bill 100
"Land-use Planning." The culture allowed him to stretch the limits of government
activityand expand environmental understanding. It also helped him redefine
expectations. People learned that collective efforts could produce tangible benefits.
McCall' s leadership challenged traditional private/public understandings, this is
important because during the economically depressed 1980s and early 1990s
environmental values were stretched but not replaced by the pressures of industry.
More recently, the political culture of Oregon has sustained Governor
Kitzhaber in his sponsorship of a state-led salmon recovery plan, in the
establishment of Executive Order 00-07 formally committing Oregon to
"sustainable practices," and his co-sponsorship (with Utah Governor Mike Leavitt)
of "Enlibra" a new environmental approach. Kitzhaber maintains widespread
popular support at least in part because he exhibits personal leadership on
environmental issues (Duin 1999). He is allowed the political freedom to act on his
principles. This is a crucial point because culture sustains as well as it constrains.
Culture produces a leadership climate that governs policy development. The will
of the people sustains the rules that in turn produce policy and policy-makers.105
Kitzhaber explained the role of political culture upon the fate of the salmon in the
fol lowing way,
If salmon extinctions occur, it will not be the first time in our
history and probably not the last. But it will be the first time a
species has been allowed to become extinct in Oregon and in the
Northwestin the face of strong evidence of how that fate might
be avoided. My choice is to reject the guiltless complacency that
has permitted this drift toward extinction and to simply do what
needs to be done. (Kitzhaber Feb 18, 1999).
Culture then, has a direct and undeniable impact upon policy. Salmon, a species
dependent upon so many different factors, represents a convergence of policy
initiatives that are subject to the prevailing truths embedded within the respective
political cultures within the Pacific Northwest.
How Does Political Culture Relate to Salmon?
Political culture and its associated policy outcomes play a significant role in
the future of salmon. Through generations of human activity we have redefined the
natural landscape within the Pacific Northwest. We have constructed dams, moved
rivers, displaced riparian areas and generally put salmon at risk. Salmon are on the
brink of extinction precisely because of our action. Our alterations to the natural
economy and the systems that sustained the health of the fishery for thousands of
years have a cost. We must recognize the power of culture and internalize its
enduring legacy orrisklosing more than just salmon. William Robbins cautions
that, "The interface between human activities and the natural world is the story, but
a critical subset to its telling is the history that humans themselves have inscribed106
on the landscape over the last two centuries" (Robbins 1997: 15-16). In just two
centuries we have created a history of destruction and displacement. The face of the
Northwest was forever altered because of human activity that resulted from cultural
conditioning. In this way, culture transformed an Oregon wilderness into a
mechanical garden, a machine rebuilt in human terms for human design.
Contradictory Truths
Culture promotes rules that become institutional values. Unfortunately,
incomplete truths passed from culture to institutional values have the same
influence as complete truths. This has a significant impact upon environmental
context: the way we know the natural world and its relationship to expressed
economic realities. In his book, Discordant Harmonies, biologist Daniel Botkin
argues,
We have clouded our perception of nature with false images,
and as long as we continue to do that we will cloud our
perception of ourselves, cripple our ability to manage natural
resources, and choose the wrong approaches to dealing with
global environmental concerns (Botkin 189).
Botkin argues that incomplete notions of nature are sustained through institutional
processes. We allocate collective resources and prioritize government activities
based upon our knowledge about the world. This perpetuates insufficient as well as
sufficient truths. It embeds incomplete as well as complete knowledge about the
natural world. The Oregon Story can serve as a useful illustration, because the
garden ideal it perpetuates is itself a complex convergence of several contradictory107
storylines. These stories are basedupon particular conceptual associations with
key symbols of the garden ideal. Through myth they stimulate knowledge clusters
fashioned together by lifetimes of reaffirmation that in turn further solidify
respective truths. In circular fashion the stories reifyan Oregon that may not exist.
Oregonians with widely dissimilar environmental philosophies simultaneously
celebrate the virtues of the pioneers, thepower of a river and the meaning of
salmon despite the obvious differences in utilitarian, anthropocentric and biocentnc
values. This convergence of value-systems is why Oregonians in particular have
such a hard time reconciling a shared cultural faith in the enduring nature of salmon
with a simultaneous recognition thata "comfortable" quality of life is putting the
fate of salmon at risk.
The rhetorical vision of the garden may prove to be a tale of two visions:
the vision of garden in waiting and the vision of garden destroyed. The symbols
that identify the texture and societal beliefs exist concurrentlyas midwife and
executioner. They foster life but at its own expense. Dams produceenergy at
lowered cost but they kill salmon. Fish hatcheries produce salmon that in timecan
be harvested but they have put native runs at risk and threatened the biodiversity of
the species. Forestry produces wealth and has historically secured economic
vitality for Oregonians but its practices have devastated riparian areas and
endangered nature's capacity to support salmon spawning. Over time, dams,
hatcheries, fish harvests and timber practices have been embedded in the culture
and now exist as symbols of a particular orientation of experience passed oni1
through generations of political socialization. In many cases political culture has
sustained contradictory truths that are proving unsustainable, truths that lead to
policies with internal inconsistencies and unanticipated results.
Governing the Balance of Interests
There is mounting evidence that the people of the Northwest are heavily
invested in an inadequate framework of counterproductive screens for information
assessment and subsequent decision-making. We have old glasses with insufficient
prescriptive correction: we cannot see the truths before us. While many people
recognize that things are changing within the Northwest we have yet to make the
kind of policy shifts needed for real progress. Studies suggest that more people are
beginning to worry about the health of their environment (Kempton, Boster and
Hartley 1996). And yet, some industries have purposefully clouded truths and
fueled confusion because of perceived industrial economic self-interest - while
others have worked on creative alternatives for reasonable compromise. Culture
sustains values through institutional processes but it also helps govern the balance
between public and private interests. The group dynamics. of a society during times
of environmental conflict produce evolutionary changes in this relative balance.
Unfortunately, at present there are too many people that have yet to fully appreciate
the potential harm or are unable to accept needed change to the present balance of
interests. Throughout the U.S. Northwest, and especially in Oregon, the rights of
individuals are at odds with the needs of the environment within which they live.109
This suggests that Oregonians, people recognized for activist environmentalism,
may be uncertain about what can be andlor must be done and why.
The fundamental issue in the salmon crisis is uncertainty, which has led to
confusion, delayed decision-making and salmon decline because of the shared but
conflicting values salmon hold. The root conceptions sustained through cultureare
earnestly held and stridently protected, but they are contradictory. The outcome is
fragmented policy-formulation and unfocused administrative actions that allow
vested interests to continue making profits in their respective natural resource
industries even though their specific techniques may put the long-term health of the
fishery at risk. There must be a re-education process to replace insufficient truths.
This will temper the power of public and private interestsas well as invest people
in enduring rather than ephemeral approaches. The structural relationships within
the political context of the region are founded upon core value-systems that
contradict the natural economy. Until people reconcile the paradoxical notions of
the garden myth with a more accurate understanding of ecosystem sustainability
within rational limits, little progress seems possible.
Chapter Summary
This chapter is an answer to the third research question. Political culture
can be defined as the conventions and context of people with shared attitudes,
values and beliefs. People within particular political cultures know the world
around them through knowledge clusters that interpret and filter information for110
their limited memory capacity. Through an examination of the differences in
Canadian and U.S. culture I conclude that the Pacific Northwest exists as many
different locally developed associations that share an experience with salmon and
an interest in salmon policy. Finally, through a case study analysis of Oregon in
comparison to Canadian culture the importance of root visions in conflict has been
illustrated.
The inherent contradictions embedded within the political cultures of the
Pacific Northwest have tremendous influence. People hold the symbols of the
constructed ideal sacred even as they have different understandings of what that
each symbol means. They respond to symbols that perpetuate the simultaneous
reverence and utility of the air, land and sea while actively putting those resources
at perpetual risk. People relate those symbols of influence to knowledge clusters
that sift out inconsistent information and reaffirm obsolete assumptions. The case
study is helpful because it is a representative model of how humans relate what
they know to how they live within human constructed political cultures. If this
were true it suggests that people throughout the Northwest have similar, albeit not
necessarily the same, contradictory tendencies concerning nature and its
relationship to humankind as most people.
The notion that political cultures throughout the Pacific Northwest sustain
contradictory truths is supported by the internal inconsistencies of the modem
industrial economy and the orientations it engenders. While Canada and the U.S.
maintain different culture and sub-cultures, they may well share a human capacity111
to justify conflicting clusters of knowledge and value. New approaches that re-
examine the values of nature within a sustainable framework are needed, but have
they been found? Is the Pacific Salmon Treaty a structure flexible enough to
master the changing nature of the fishery and the biosystems that maintain it, given
the enormous power of the conflicting political cultures that spawned it? This is
the central question that the following chapters will try to answer.112
CHAPTER FOUR: PACIFIC SALMON TREATY A POLICY ASSESSMENT
Value, history and culture affect salmon policy. However to adequately
measure the functionality of policy it is necessary to evaluate administrative
processes and bureaucratic capacity. The Pacific Salmon Treaty is policy.
Therefore, a systematic assessment of the Pacific Salmon Treaty and the Pacific
Salmon Commission must be made. While this chapter is an answer to the fourth
research question it is also an attempt to explain, in clear terms, what exactly the
Pacific Salmon Treaty as renegotiated in June 1999 is; what this treaty means, what
the treaty does and why this particular treaty was needed. It will also provide an
understanding of environmental conflict as struggle, expressed through the
"Keitner Struggle Spectrum." Through this analysis the conflict-management
function and potential of the Pacific Salmon Treaty may be discerned. After these
issues have been adequately explored, I contend that the foundation has been set for
a summary assessment of the salmon crisis and its dependent relationship with the
newly re-born salmon treaty.
A Definition of "Treaty"
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is a treaty. It is an international policy initiative
that exists because two sovereign states believe it needs to exist.While arguably
the Pacific Salmon Treaty has symbolic value beyond the words of its text the fact
that it is a treaty is an important point to remember. It is a binding agreement113
negotiated within a unique political context about a free-ranging natural resource.
On one level the treaty is itself a shared resource. It is an instrument of policy.
The treaty is also a productdeveloped, sponsored and continued for tangible
gain(s). Canada and the U.S. each adopted the treaty for their own advantage,
period. It is an international marriage of convenience implemented because the
respective parties believe a formal relationship on salmon policy is a crucial need.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is more than the sum of its parts because it is an
expression of national will. It is a document that establishes active political
association for measurable gain within the context of geopolitical relations. Donald
Snow and Eugene Brown in their book Beyond the Water's Edge define foreign
policy as that which "deals with how states pursue their interests in a world where
those states lack authority over the actions of other states. The need for foreign
policy arises because all states have interests, conditions that are important to their
well-being or, in some cases even to their existence" (Snow and Brown 4). Snow
and Brown concede that all foreign policy interactions are subject to the shifting
nature of an environment that affects both the substance of policy and "ultimately
the processes by which that policy is determined" (Snow and Brown 5). Foreign
policy therefore can best be described as the process by which states attempt to
establish certainty in an uncertain world, the means of achieving relative security.
One of the most significant manifestations of this nation-state actualization then is
the development of treaties.114
What Treaties Do
In theory a treaty binds nation-states to particular policies for a specified
duration of time. This duration is usually measured in time and/or by specified
goals or targeted outcomes. The Panama Canal Treaty as well as the treaty
between China and the United Kingdom on Hong Kong can serve as useful
examples. Both of these treaties specified the purpose, duration and scope of
respective parties powers. Other well known treaties include the General
Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These
treaties produced (and are producing) specified objectives that have unfolded in an
agreed upon manner. From these examples it seems evident that treaties have been
traditionally reserved for "major issues" such as economic development, regional
security and global interconnectivity. However, with the breakdown of the Cold
War and the associated foreign policy challenges of a new order (and economic
patterns that reflect it) concerns that were either "absent or less important during
the Cold War" are now generating more interest and activity, more areas of
intergovernmental activity are becoming "major issues" (Snow and Brown 327).
At the present, environmental degradation and the forces that promote it
have increased transstate significance. The crises that have resulted from
environmental decay and natural resource collapse have become foreign policy
priorities because access to natural capital is becoming increasingly uncertain.
With the gradual recognition of fixed global limits in terms of raw material and115
pollution-carrying capacity, nation-statesare scrambling to find the kind of
certainty only treaties can provide. Interestingly, the Pacific Salmon Treaty isan
example of an issue that has more significance today than it had,at least of its own
merits, a decade or two ago. It is helpful to remember that in 1985 the Cold War
was the major issue in foreign policy. However, globalization and technological
developments have driven the demand for global certainty and have by extension,
elevated ecological concerns to new stature. With that in mind, it is important to
remember that substantive treaties especially over sharedaccess to a finite resource,
are usually entered into only after an extensive period of iritra- as well as inter-
national discussion, debate and posturing. This is especially true in the United
States where our structure of government vests power for treaty evolution in two
separate branches: advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is required through a two-
thirds vote before a U.S. President is allowed to consummate a binding agreement
(Kegley and Wittkopf 440-442).
The Treaty-Making Process
Within the U.S. treaties are the product of a collaborative necessity. This is
the desired result of our "founding fathers" because it prescribes a process where
Congress is "a constitutionally independent, coequal, and democratically rooted
voice in shaping U.S. foreign policy" (Snow and Brown 193). Treaties result from
a required collaboration between a sitting U.S. President and a majority of the U.S.
Senate. This produces a situation that achieves three things: 1) it ensures that the116
President is in consultation with the Senateover proposed changes and/or
extensions of foreign policy, 2) it provides added stature to the Senate that "spills"
over into other power arrangements, and 3) it guarantees that the treaties passedare
the fruit of a deliberative process and in theorymore reflective of the "public's
interest." This process has a colorful history. Since 1787 nearly all treaties have
passed the Congress. This is so despite the widely disparate political views held by
the various presidential administrations throughout U.S. History. Thereappears to
be a context of congressional deferenceas well as presidential accommodation in
terms of treaty development (Kegley and Wittkopf 440-442). However, there have
been exceptions to this general truth. The Treaty of Versailles standsas one of the
most notable and far-reaching examples of congressional and presidential failure in
terms of the treaty-making process (Kegley and Wittkopf 441).
Over the course of U.S. history treaties have reflected particular values of
American culture. Often treaties have been stymied through informalprocesses
before they were presented in formal fashion. The privilege to reject treatiesmay
well provide the U.S. Senate with a degree of latent power that compels U.S.
Presidents to self-censor policy alternativesor choose non-treaty devices. It is
helpful to remember that international executive agreements, like domestic
executive orders can carry the force of law until challenged by Congressor the
courts. Whatever the case, the U.S. structure is not the norm. in most countries,
including Canada, the executive authority has the power to make and keep internal
as well as external agreements (Kegley and Wittkopf).117
What a Treaty Means
In global context adopted treaties are statements of trust and co-dependence.
Often a treaty is the preferred solution to crisis: historical feuding, political
upheaval and/or multinational misunderstanding. In general, treaties serve many
functions: instrument of hostility cessation, instrument of coordination, instrument
of definition, instrument of description and ultimately instrument of collaboration.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty fulfills all of these historical functions. Unfortunately,
treaties are generally established for large, often long-standing disputes; they are
seldom drafted for small or inconsequential tasks. Treaties are quite often a
temporary relief for a situation in need of an enduring solution. The function of a
treaty serves to bind sovereign interests together for collective gain or loss.
Consequently, all treaties contain inherent risk. This is especially true of treaties
entered into by major powers because treaties broken can be more de-stabilizing
than treaties never made. A treaty is an act of law. A treaty is a legitimate compact
that welds nationally determined public policy to shared international objectives.
Over time, treaties and the administrative bureaucracies developed to enforce them
often gain derived power. The longer a treaty and its political context exist the
more difficult it proves to change the prevailing policy orientations and
bureaucratic behaviors the treaty helps to foster. This suggests that treaties are
dependent upon structured administrations and as such can act as constraining
forces. In other words, treaties are not policy-neutraland cannot be policy-
neutral by function. This further suggests that treaties should be developed and118
implemented when, and only when, nation-states are willing to implement the
language as intended for the specified duration of collaboration with full
understanding of probable implications, most notably a transformation of the
associated political landscape.
What the Pacific Salmon Treaty Really Means: Shared Sovereignty
Earlier in this study I argue that Canada has historically demonstrated a
greater capacity for treaty implementation than the U.S. As evidence I cite the
Canadian ratification of the first proposed CanadianU.S. salmon treaty, the
Bryce-Root Treaty of 1908. Since then Canada has continued to demonstrate a
national desire and a structural capacity to manage its salmon interests in a bilateral
cooperative manner. By contrast, The U.S. has not demonstrated a similar
commitment or capacity. I emphasize this point because the world is changing,
especially in relation to its understanding of environmental politics. Karen Liftin in
her essay "The Greening of Sovereignty" claims that, "The establishment of
international environmental institutions and the activities of transnational
environmental actors, particularly NGOs and scientists, are creating new forms of
governance and authority. While they may not stand poised to replace the state,
they may be modifying the character of sovereignty" (Liftin 9). Liftin suggests the
"New World" is a place where environmental regionalism may be increasingly
more significant for policy expectations. She contends that sovereignty might
evolve into a collaborative existence, at least within prescribed areas of traditional119
governmental action. Paul Wapner supports Liftin's conclusion. He argues,
"While sovereignty suggests that states have authority and control over their own
territories, those territories themselves are part and parcel of the global ecosystem
and cannot be isolated in any meaningful fashion" (Wapner 276).
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is a treaty that ultimately redefines absolute
sovereignty, at least in terms of salmon production and management for Canada
and the U.S. By function, the treaty recasts sovereignty as a regional concern. The
treaty commits Canada and the U.S. to a broadening of traditional understandings
of control and authority through shared process. This is an important point because
the U.S. has traditionally been less willing to publicly commit to enduring
relationships when U.S. control isn't absolutely guaranteed. Therefore, a challenge
for the U.S. is recognizing the shifting nature of sovereignty. Raymond Cohen in
his book Negotiating Across Cultures argues, "Two broad topics have proved
especially delicate for U.S. diplomacy in its dealings with non-European countries:
status and sovereignty" (Cohen 45). While Canada and its people are usually
classified as products of European culture, the history of U.S. salmon policy in the
Pacific Northwest is added evidence to his primary conclusion.
F.H. Hinsley's definition of sovereignty as "final and absolute authority in a
political community" may no longer be valid. Wapner suggests that, "The concept
of sovereignty has gone through a long but ultimately slow evolution with regard to
international environmental issues" (Wapner 277). Within a world increasingly
aware of the interconnectedness of ecological relationships, status and sovereignty120
will clearly need to be redefined (Liftin 5). Past identity built upon the relative
prowess of a nation-state to "control" territory is fast becoming an obsolete means
of nation-state power assessment. It appears that the legitimizing influence of
international treaties may actually provide for "pseudo-sovereignty" where states
enjoy standing with specified rights but do not necessarily retain capabilities (Liftin
7). This understanding reflects an increasingly connected world and must be kept
in mind. Whatever the eventual designation, an enduring balance between rights,
responsibilities and expectations on the part of nation-states with shared resource
ecosystems clearly must be sought.
Treaties in Context
Treaties are developed, implemented and continued as the expressed will of
nation-states. This cultural allowance, in the form of policy, gives treaties internal
legitimacy. I contend that in the ideal they are written, adopted and implemented as
instruments of collaboration as public bonds between peoples. I further contend
that in the realm of the practical they exist as reasonable accommodations over
identified national interests. Treaties prescribe specific actions based upon
enumerated principles, rights, truths, and mutual expectations. They are often the
result of tense pre-negotiations and serve compromises that respective nation-states
would more than likely have preferred not to make. I submit that treaties serve the
function of "riverboat pilot." Employed specifically for defined purposes they
provide "safe" passage through dangerous obstacles. When successful they121
transport ideas to mutually beneficial destinations intact. Treaties then, exist as
more than instruments of collaboration and agreement. They exist as carriers,
carriers of bilateral investment, trust, and promise.
The Mechanics of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Treaties transform ideas into public activity through language. The
elasticity of negotiation rhetoric must be recast into concrete form and bureaucratic
process. Most treaties also prescribe a process by which the governing
administration can measure progress. The Pacific Salmon Treaty is not an
exception. It established a policy approach that is structurally dependent upon the
respective governments internal as well as external commitment. Canada and the
U.S. have formalized specified conduct. The Pacific Salmon Commission measures
progress in terms of adherence to the principles enumerated in Article III. through
yearly status reports and regularly scheduled discussion. Should either side stray
from the stated policies then the other side, through formal and informal means,
would most likely acknowledge the behavior and call for sanction.
Treaties are legal documents. They are subject to certain (issue and/or place
dependent) provisions of international law. Accordingly, the Pacific Salmon
Commission is legally bound to construct and manage policy within the relevant
international legal frameworks. At times, nation-states duly engaged within the
activities allowed by treaty litigate interests associated with root issues or are
themselves litigated against in national or sub-national courts for political gain.122
The Genera] Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is sucha treaty. Interests inside and
outside the World Trade Organization have litigated various elements of the
Uruguay Round of GATT for targeted advantage. Consequently, treaties like the
Pacific Salmon Treaty exist as enduring targets for groups that seek relative
advantage at the expense of other groups within a "zero-sum mentality." Treaties
act as law and are subject to law. They govern through regulation of nation-state
behaviors.
The Pacific Salmon Commission
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is a governing/management treaty. Through its
perpetuation a bilateral collaboration has been established, empowered and
legitimized. Its agent, the Pacific Salmon Commission, is a government
functionary that exists at the will of Canada and of the U.S. jointly. It is a
symbiotic bureaucratic construct that answers equally to both respective powers.
The Pacific Salmon Commission simultaneously determines macro-salmon policy
while using its influence to indirectly administer oversight of Canadian and U.S.
efforts. Through treaty both nations have committed their internal fisheries
administrations to the shared objectives spelled out by the language of the
document.
The Pacific Salmon Commission determines broad policy recommendations
that the respective governments and their internal bureaucracies are contextually
bound to implement. I contend that this is a crucial point because the respective123
Canadian and U.S. fisheries management agencies are compelled by the constraints
of a unique political situation. The treaty governs the sustainability of a shared
resource and is itself an agent of law. This suggests that failure to follow the
recommendations of the Pacific Salmon Commission (once determined) would be
nothing short of an international breech of faith. Deviation from recommended
policy is subject to public pronouncement as well as "unofficial" political sanction.
Internal Organization
The internal organization of the Pacific Salmon Commission minors the
complexities of salmon politics. It is a sixteen-member body that provides
regulatory advice and specific technical recommendations to Canada and the U.S.
for conservation and maximization of the salmon fishery. It is composed of three
regional panels: the Northern Panel, Southern Panel and Fraser River Panel, and
one Transboundary Panel. These panels formulate specific recommendations for
differing aspects of the fishery for their respective geographic areas of concern. All
panel-adopted proposals are then sent to the full Pacific Salmon Commission.
Membership on the Commission and its sub-units is equally distributed between the
respective parties. Each panel has a chair and vice-chair that traditionally rotate
nationality providing Canadian and U.S. "leadership" alternately. An interesting
structural component of the Commission is the designation of publicly recognized
alternates, defined as a slate of individuals, which mirrors the seated membership
for each panel as well as the Commission itself.124
To accomplish its mission the Pacific Salmon Commission has a second tier
of organization. Serving these "policy-making panels" are discipline specific
"bilateral technical committees" that analyze data through scientific processes to
assist respective panels with their decision-making. These focused groups provide
data for each of the panels and to the full commission as needed. In addition to the
panels and technical committees the Pacific Salmon Commission maintains
administrative "standing committees" on finance and administration, fishery
evaluation and a working group on data standards. Behind the scenes, a small full-
time staff referred to as the "Secretariat" administers the internal management of
information technology, scheduling, publishing and coordination of activities for
the Commission as a whole (www.psc.org).
How the Commission Works
Don Kowal, former Director for Oceans Policy for the Canadian
Department of Oceans and Fisheries, currently serves as the Executive Secretary of
the Pacific Salmon Commission. In this capacity Mr. Kowal is the chief
administrative officer for the commission and its professional staff. In a telephone
conversation on July 31, 2000, he explained that Canada and the U.S. provide
information to the Commission on management procedures and fisheries status.
Relevant information is then assessed by the related technical committees and
forwarded to the jurisdictional panel(s). Panels assess options and send
management recommendations to the full commission for consideratiOn. Thefull125
commission retains final authority over all formal policy. When necessary the full
commission sends formal and informal recommendations to the respective
governments for final approval and regulatory implementation (Kowal July 31,
2000). In a follow-up electronic interview completed on September 25, 2000, Mr.
Kowal stressed the importance of the scientific committees for the newly adopted
"abundance-based management" approach (Kowal Sept 25, 2000). While Mr.
Kowal is hopeful about the new agreement, he emphasized that the Pacific Salmon
Commission cannot administer or enforce adopted fishery management plans.
These functions are left to the internal bureaucracies of the respective parties. A
more fully developed explanation of Canadian and U.S. internal fisheries
management is provided later in this chapter but a general description of the
process is provided in the diagram below (see figure 2.).
Figure 2. PSC Recommendation Process
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In earlier chapters 1 suggest that Canada and the U.S. are different. I
establish that culture and the historical legacies inherent to culture's development
are undeniably a reason for the differences. I further suggest that the structural
underpinnings of the respective powers also play a role. Canada maintainsa
federal parliamentary democracy. Unlike the U.S. they havea Prime Minister as
head of government and a "Governor General"as de facto head of stateappointed
by the Queen of England, s/he serves at the discretion of thecrown (Forsey 2000).
The structure of government divides "federal duties" from "provincial duties" but
has not historically recognized provincial powers as "reserved sovereign states" in
the same general way the U.S. Constitution has. In the Canadian System fisheries
is a federal jurisdiction and Provincial authority is non-existent. Within Canada,
the Cabinet, under the direction of the Prime Minister exercises executive authority
that in the particular case of salmon means complete direct authority (Canada
Information Office).
The Canadian Approach
The Canadian Cabinet is comprised of Members of Parliament and each
serves at the discretion of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet as the senior members
of the majority coalition (or party) administers the affairs of government. They do
this by initiating policies consistent with fulfilling the responsibilities inherent to
the task. The Canada Information Office lists the following federal Parliament
responsibilities "national defense, interprovincial and international trade and127
commerce, the banking and monetary system, criminal law, and fisheries" (Canada
Information Office). Interestingly, management of the fisheries is listed in the top
five priorities within the Canadian system. This elevated profile has the double
advantage of providing fisheries managers extra political heft in policy-setting as
well as securing funds for desired activities (as a national priority). I suggest that
the fact that there exists a Minister of Fisheries and Oceans within the Canadian
Cabinet, with the singular responsibility of maintaining sustainable fisheries and
oceans through administration of the Canadian bureaucracy, is itself a tremendous
difference.
In accordance with the spirit and language of national policy, Canada
established and maintains a Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The DFO
directs fisheries policy throughout Canada through regional plans developed and
implemented by its internal administration and sub-directorates. It serves as the
primary federal component for all management activities related to fisheries and
ocean functions. This is an important point to remember. The DFO, one unit of
government with one leadership team, has jurisdiction and responsibility for
sustaining the nation's fisheries. Canada maintains a group-oriented inclusive
approach to governance. This has in turn promoted an underlying respect for the
role and authority of the federal government. This is significant when considering
the process by which Canada manages its fisheries. It helps explain how Canada
can sustain a dynamic citizen-invested process while retaining the bureaucratic
capacity for timely action.128
The Canadian MinistryofFisheries and Oceans
As a member of the federal Cabinet The Honorable Herb Dhaliwal,
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, has regular contact and thus direct influence
upon the Prime Minister as well as other Cabinet members for coordination of
policy related to his responsibilities. When considering the Canadian government
it is helpful to remember that the Canadian Cabinet is by structural design a power-
concentrating political construct. The Cabinet is filled to further the interests of the
governing coalition. This has not traditionally been an easy task. The multi-party
splintered-interest nature of parliamentary systems should not be overlooked,
especially in Canada. Maintaining a governing coalition has become even more
challenging in recent years. Since the 1987 "Meech Lake Accord" (between the
federal government and the provinces), regional interests have been pushing for
more influence and say on specific policies (Lipset 1990). Therefore, membership
within the Cabinet in Canada appears to play a symbolic as well as functional
process.
Prime Ministers may influence policy more through their selection of a
person (representing an area or issue) for a particular Cabinet post than through any
of the specific policies they promote during their tenure. Who gets what, and why
matters very much within the politics of the Canadian Cabinet. Often the seats are
apportioned out of internal or external necessity. Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
Dhaliwal, a twice-elected Member of Parliament from British Columbia, former
businessman and possible "up-and-coming" leader within the Liberal Party of129
Canada, probably has more influence than many other cabinet members precisely
because of who he is, where he is from and what his selection meant to interested
parties. Minister Dhaliwal's selection for his post was not an accident. His
previous experience as member of the Steering Committee on Fisheries and Oceans
and on the Standing Committees of Finance and Fisheries and Oceans during his
time in Parliament has given him internal as well as external credibility (www.dfo-
mpo.gc.cal MINISTER/Minister.htm). In simple terms, Minister Dhaliwal may
well be positioned to implement far-reaching policies with minimal delay. Such is
the nature of the centralized but responsive Canadian federal government.
The Canadian system of self-rule is unique. While provincial interests
usually respect federal policy because of the concentrated administrative processes
and management capacities inherent to a federal priority, the provinces have
historically found ways to ensure their concerns are addressed (Lipset 1990). In
Canada, issues resolved at the federal level are customarily accepted at the regional
level as "previously settled." However, regional interests influence is growing and
being projected, usually at the deputy minister level (Lipset 196-201). While
specific provinces have occasionally challenged the authority of the federal
government through "succession" rhetoric, these situations have usually had more
to do with self-governance ideology and local control than with specified issues of
federal policy (Lipset 193-196). Ironically, Canadian governance has not
traditionally rewarded "guerilla tactics" as expressed through endless litigation and
perpetual "interest warfare" (Forsey 2000).130
Canadians have proven to be culturally oriented towards collaborative
cooperative solutions. This has produced a Canadian tradition of efficient use of
power for targeted federal objectives (Forsey 2000). This apparent contradiction is
worthy of note. Canadian culture seems to value representation as expressed at the
most local level while simultaneously favoring bureaucratic capacity and timely
responsiveness. This suggests that internal cooperation between agencies within
Canada for development of fisheries policy (a stated federal priority) is relatively
strong and comparatively expedient. I argue that Canadian history is evidence of
an internal capacity to capitalize upon international collaboration precisely because
of their cultural expectations and structural efficiencies.
The U.S. Approach
Unlike Canada, the U.S. is a de-centralized presidential system with clear
and theoretically finite separation of powers. In the U.S. jurisdictional authority is
shared. On some issues, geographically determined state sovereignty retains
jurisdiction. On other issues, several distinct "levels of government" often with
overlapping authorities compete for jurisdiction. The underlying philosophy of
U.S. self-governance reflects the anxieties and rewards of a revolution that Canada
never experienced. Consequently, the national political experience emphasizes
fragmented governance, segmented powers and over-lapping administrative
controls. Institutional arrangements often contribute to the adversarial nature of
regulation adding complexity to policy implementation (Wilson, J. 1989). As a131
result, the U.S. has fostered a political culture that favors local solutions even when
such actions are at the expense of national objectives. Within the U.S., states are
recognized as "sovereign" with all powers not expressly "granted" to the national
government, save those "captured" through Congressional determinationthrough
the "necessary and proper clause" and/or other broad provisions in the Constitution
such as the "commerce clause."
The Canadian conception of federalism forged by the Constitutional Actof
1867 is the polar opposite of the U.S. ideal. It appears that the U.S. Civil War was
the major contributing factor for the respective differences. The document is
evidence that Canada wanted to avoid the conflict they saw inherent to shared
jurisdictional authority (Lipset 1990). I contend that the core difference between
Canadian and U.S. ideology is the role of trust in governmentand a
corresponding centralization or decentralization of authority. Thus far, the U.S.has
demonstrated a willingness to accept the tradeoffs of an autonomous administration
of locally determined priorities. Even though the U.S. President has a Cabinet,law
demands of this Cabinet a distinct role. Cabinet officers are not membersof the
Congress or of the Courts. This promotes inconsistency in terms of bureaucratic
discretion. When administrators managed by an executive branch with littlereal
control over the allocation of their agency's public resources and subject to a
Congress governed by shifting coalitions that may enact a new programonly to
supplant it shortly thereafter long-term bureaucratic consistency issacrificed
(Wilson, J. 1989)132
Purposeful FragmentationofPowers
Another challenge in terms of functional management of the respective
agencies within the bureaucracy is the elevated role of lobbyists, Congressional
staff and career public employees that understand the ephemeral nature of U.S
Presidential administrations. Presidential administrations are the result of
"candidate-centered" campaigns. Often they reflect the short-term concerns of the
agenda that delivered the office. The relationships between agencies and other
political interests have been and remain a contributing factor to the continued
fragmentation of governance within the U.S. because administrations are by
definition short-lived experiences. This is an interesting field of study and it
probably demands more research into how influence is gained and lost, what it can
or cannot achieve, and how it is sustained within the U.S. system of government
administration. However, the purpose of this study is not to posit a cause but rather
suggest that the relationships between the agencies of government, the Congress
and the Executive are complex, constantly shifting and subject to the will of an
unpredictable public. Unfortunately, these are not the only challenges inherent to
the U.S. system.
Added to this landscape are the respective interests, their objectives and the
influence of regional and state powers. Within the U.S. structure, state
governments often minor federal bureaucracies and often in full expectation of
playing almost equal roles. Interestingly, on issues of shared authority between the
federal government and the states governors may have equal power, if not formal133
authority, equal to the related federal bureaucracies. This additional tier of
complexity is especially significant in environmental policy because environmental
policy was in many cases fostered by state initiative. As described in chapter three,
this is especially significant in Oregon where landmark legislation on
environmental issues has helped sustain a political culture of innovation. During
the1960sand 1970s Oregon established a reputation that in turn provided
expanded discretionary standing on environmental issues because the state "got
there first." The result has been an environmental policy context within which
states, particularly in the West, play a more dominant role than in other, more
traditional areas of public policy.
National Governor's Association (NGA) - A Locally Oriented Nationalizing Agent
The National Governor's Association recently adopted the "Enlibra"
proposal. This nationalizing approach for rational, science-driven environmental
policy-making is evidence that governors and the states that sustain them are
coming of age. Through this body governors are seeking expanded discretionary
powers on environmental issues as well as other targeted policy spheres (National
Governor's Association). Although governors have historically been recognized as
regional figures, the recent ascension of gubernatorial prowess in terms of national
presidential elections by "rising stars" of the NGA (Dukakis1988,Clinton1992,
Bush2000)is a significant development. Governors are now more involved in
regional cooperation and local administration for targeted policy goals. These134
trends may well transform the structural relationships between the states and the
federal government as state capacity evolves. Whether by design or circumstance
this gradual shift of responsibility from federal bureaucracies onto the states
appears to have fostered a spirit of renewed activism, at least on the part of the
nation's governors (Bowman & Kearney 1999). For good or for ill, this "state
versus federal" power dynamic is not as present in Canada and it necessitates
slower more complex policy formulation behaviors.
U.S. Fisheries Management - "The Big Picture"
The simplest way to explain fisheries management in the U.S. is this: it is
nearly everything Canadian fisheries management is not. There are literally
hundreds of distinct governmental authorities that must find solutions (together)
within a political landscape stocked full of private, public-non-profit and public
interests. It is a system with confusing sovereignty. Tribal rights have particular
standing depending upon the place, issue and objective. It is within this larger
frame that fisheries management policy in the U.S. is crafted, funded, implemented
and measured. In contrast to Canada where there exists a singular federal
jurisdictional authority, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)the entity
primarily responsible for management of the Pacific Salmon fisheryis a sub-unit
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, itself a sub-unit of the
Department of Commerce. While the Secretary of Commerce is a member of the135
U.S. President's Cabinet, s/he is neither a member of Congress nor primarily
concerned (as a matter of structure) with fisheries policy.
Traditionally, U.S. Secretaries of Commerce have been selected because of
their interests and proven abilities to implement enduring policies that promote fair
commerce (business). Fish are usually not the majorfocus for a Commerce
Secretary. Interestingly, while NMFS maintains certain and specific authorities
within the arena of fisheries management and its administration, NMFS ishardly
the last word. Three other major departments, Agriculture, Defense and Interior
have a direct role in policy formulation, at least in terms of dams, forests andland
management. It is significant that major departments by constructhave internally
developed and sustained organizational culture and bureaucratic tradition. In
consequence, salmon policy is subject to at least fourdistinct bureaucratic cultures
and their associated political contexts, in clash (Wilson, J. 1989).
A Complicated Puzzle
Thus far, I argue that fisheries management in the U.S. is a complicated
process. To illustrate this point I want to showcaseOregon and the salmon stocks
associated with the Columbia River. From birth they are wards of anevolving
plethora of government agencies and authorities all seeking toimplement action for
their own reasons. Most of the time, "salmon policies" reflect thebureaucracies
from whence they came; the product of culture. Salmon have differentvalues
based upon the recognized mission of the respective agency.Interestingly, the136
Oregon and Washington Departments of Fish and Wildlife, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, United States Departments of Agriculture and Interior, as well as the
Department of Commerce (through NOAA, NMFS) all share discretionary
authority over salmondependent upon situation, location and subject. On a
second tier of legitimate authority rests the Northwest Power Planning Council,the
Bonneville Power Administration, the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality, Oregon Division of State Lands, Oregon Parks Department, the Oregon
Department of Forestry, as well as countless regional water districts and local
watershed councils.
The list of participants cited earlier is more a sampling than a definitivelist
of legitimate government agencies involved in fisheries management. Thelist did
not include the non-governmental interests such as Oregon Trout,1000 Friends of
Oregon, the Native Fish Society, and the Oregon Business Council to name just a
few. Interest groups (non-governmental organizations) have played andcontinue to
play a major role in the policy-formulation and implementation ofsalmon
management. Business, recreation, government, science, ecology,and anti-growth
interests are all legitimate recognized political participants in the on-goingdebate.
This probably is as it should be given the American political context.History is
evidence of the enormous sway some of the "non-governmentalinterests" have on
salmon issues in Oregon as well as in most of the northwest states.In a few cases
these organizations have maintained even more influence thanformal governmental
structures. Simply put, the American system offisheries management is137
incremental in nature and inclusive. Within the American system, interest groups
have legitimate access to formal processes including the courts. In contrast to the
Canadian preference for bureaucratic efficiency, the U.S. structure favors
representation to responsiveness.
Salmon policy in the U.S. is the result of a philosophy of fragmented
governance. It is a process that values individual participation. It is a process
reflective of the fears of a centralized government and it is a process with the
expectations of a revolutionary spirit.I contend that the process is like a mirror to
the soul that is the American Ideal. It is a slow, complex, inefficient approach that
is by its essential nature potentially captive to the grandstanding of a solitary
activist. In his book A Common Fate, Joseph Cone illustrates the impact of
dedicated activists such as Bill Bakke, the man that helped lead the fight for ESA
listings of Pacific Salmon stocks (Cone 1996). Bakke and others like him used the
system against itself to make a point. His story and many others are evidence that
the American system is by function a participatory organism. At its best, fisheries
management in the U.S. is a process that exists as a living manifestation of the
dialectic that the "Founding Fathers" wanted. At its worst, it is a powerful
unorganized slothful mess.
The relative extremes of Canadian and U.S. fisheries management helps
clarify the differences in approach. While the same economic and environmental
interests are involved, the manners in which the respective interests express
themselves, as well as the duration of play, are significantly more complex (and138
public) in the U.S. In Canada, when policy is determined and appropriately funded
it can be implemented without the political, legal and cultural cacophony that has
become merely "the ordinary" in U.S. policy-making. This differentiation has an
effect when considering a joint approach to resource management specified by a
binding bilateral treaty.
The Mission of the Pacific Salmon Commission
The Pacific Salmon Commission exists so that Canada and the U.S. can
rationally manage the Pacific Salmon fishery in such a fashion that the respective
nations are assured harvests into perpetuity. The Commission was established and
has been strengthened to ensure harvest rates and mediate potential conflicts
between vested interests before they arise. Secretary Kowal suggests that the
Pacific Salmon Commission serves the function of neutral agent, stressing
scientifically rational approaches to shared challenges (Kowal Sep 25, 2000). He
contends that the Commission played a vital role in the salmon crisis (1992-1999)
by continuing to stress the importance of solvency while simultaneously
performing their charge. Kowal views the Pacific Salmon Commission Annual
Reports (summary accounts of yearly Commission activities) as well as the
scientific reports passed on to respective nations' bureaucracies as the tools of
progress. When asked about particular statements, pronouncementand/or
resolutions that helped foster the 1999 agreement, Kowal referred to the existence139
of the commission as the forum through which progress was made (Kowal Sep 25,
2000).
Since its inception, the mission of the Pacific Salmon Commission has
proven as difficult to accomplish, as it was easy to explicate. On a continued basis
it is expected to bring order out of chaos and rational policy out of political crisis.
The principles so clearly stated within the treaty binds Canada and the U.S. to the
administration of the fishery in such a fashion that abundance is determined,
achieved and then secured in perpetuity. Within that framework, salmon as valued
but scare natural resource is to be sustained through an aggressive conservation
methodology that has been built upon the human conceptions of "abundance",
"harvest" and "natural bounty." Through the language of the new agreement the
commission has been charged with nothing less than the salvation of the Pacific
Salmon fishery, through jointly determined collaborative effort.
Why Treaties?
Earlier in this study I argue that treaties are developed when conflict
previously unresolved must be resolved for mutual gain. I further contend that they
are necessary when governments either cannot or will not curtail specificactions
voluntarily. Nation-states, contrary to the will of respective governments do not
exist within a vacuum. The world is an interdependent collage of shared interests,
needs and expectations. Treaties are often needed as tools of resolution, providing
relief within situations where nation-states cannot do so alone. It is important to140
recognize that the most recent agreement for continuation of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty was re-negotiated only when conflict and political pressures compelled the
respective participants to seek resolution.
The Factors of Success
The Pacific Salmon Treaty represents an earnest attempt at rationally
governing the Pacific Salmon fishery. It is probably the best treaty we can build, at
least for now. The treaty emphasizes scientific investigation, provides for formal
policy-making through a legitimate bilateral commission and protects the
respective nations internal administrative bureaucratic controls. These are
significant. However at least four other factors will help determine whether the
effort is an enduring success: 1) adherence to the treaty, 2) cultural acceptance of
lessened harvests, 3) re-defined economic relationships and 4) continued
commitment by Canada and the U.S. to implement the spirit as well as the language
of the treaty. Ultimately, whether we can get "there" from "here" will depend in
large measure on whether the people of Canada and the U.S. will choose to make
the Pacific Salmon fishery a long-term priority.
The first consideration is whether the respective interests will allow the
treaty to be implemented as drafted. Adherence to the treaty is an obviousbut vital
first step. Once abundance is determined and the harvest levels are set for the
fishery both nations must live by them. This is easier to do during "good" years
when fish are plentiful and the profits are high. This is not so easy when internal141
and external pressures compress the fishery. It is important to remember that
people are dependent upon the promise of the fishery for their lifestyle. This
suggests that some will be inclined to try and find relative advantage or favor
outright non-adherence. This could occur in many forms. Subtle actions such as
the "loosening" of the language for a particular aspect of the fishery at the Pacific
Salmon Commission, or targeted pressure at the agency level in either the Canadian
or U.S. fisheries management bureaucracies might take place. More overt attempts
to gain advantage might include funding battles, conflict over the accuracy of the
science involved or even challenges to the members making policy. If the fishery
continues to decline it is possible that politicians in both countries might favor
dissolution of the treaty altogether.
Cultural acceptance of lessened harvests is a second major factor regarding
the success of the treaty. People must recognize that things have changed. The
symbols that have defined a particular orientation are incomplete. Some of the
tools of management may require revisiting other policy choices. Dams, timber
practices, urban and rural development as well as lessened availability of salmon
for industrial and sports harvests are all issues that must be rationally discussed on
their merits. As long as people cling to representations of nature "as it never was"
the fishery is at risk because people will not do the kinds of things that will need to
be done to save it. Cultural recognition of the problems, potential costs involved in
implementing solutions and possibilities of a healthy fishery is a necessity.142
The industrial economic principles and practices related to salmon must be
redefined for the treaty to succeed. As long as short-term thinking is the most
rational, cost-effective paradigm the fishery is at risk. Economic pressures are
powerful influences upon all involved in the process of determining fishery policy.
However, when they are skewed salmon policies reflect it. Many involved in the
harvest are over-capitalized and dependent upon larger and larger harvests to pay
mounting debt. The declining price for salmon and its increasing worldwide
availability has increased the pressure and made the situation worse. The need for
return on investmentcoupled with the increasing difficulty in profitability suggest
that the fishing interests will be more inclined to push for rules that favor short-
term profit at the expense of long-term sustainability. Until the crisis is
internalized by the cultures involved and new values for salmon become embedded
into institutional arrangements and formal policy practices success of the treaty
cannot be guaranteed.
The last major factor for consideration when assessing the viability of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty is the relative commitment held by Canada and the U.S. to
implement the spirit as well as the language of the document. Earlier in this
chapter I mention several significant treaties and their function. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations are all
treaty-constructsthey are legitimate bodies sustained through international
commitment. The Pacific Salmon Commission is not on the same level because
there is not the same level of commitment by either Canada or the U.S. to make it143
so. Defense and trade are issues that strike at the heart of national self-interest and
because of this, treaties related to defense and trade, have traditionally wielded
enforcement authorities, that is, they have had "teeth" to enforce policies.
The Pacific Salmon Commission does not have the administrative power to
manage the fishery. It is a recommendation-making body that is dependent upon
Canadian and U.S. fisheries bureaucracies for implementation of policy. While this
does not in and of itself ensure failure, it demands of Canada and the U.S. a higher
level of interest and an assurance that within their respective internal processes that
each maintain a commitment to the spirit as well as the language of the document.
This suggests that instead of merely meeting the letter of the law, Canada and the
U.S. must commit themselves to securing the enduring sustainability of the fishery.
This will be a difficult task because so much is at risk, so much uncertainty
remains. To better understand why and how these internal and external pressures
impact the Pacific Salmon Treaty I believe it is helpful to explore the nature of
conflict and assess the fundamental role of this treaty, the forum for struggle
management.
Conflict Defined, Struggle Assessed
In their publication "Foundations of Natural Resource Conflict: Conflict.
Theory and Public Policy," professors Gregg Walker and Steven Daniels define
conflict as an "incompatibility involving what (issues), who (parties), when
(situated in time and place), how (how addressed or responded to), results144
(outcome), and by whom (how decided)" (Walker and Daniels 14). They recognize
conflict as an experience to be managed rather than a result to be avoided.
Scholarship in the field has emphasized the " interaction of interdependent people
who perceive incompatible goals" while similarly finding that "incompatible
activitiesoccur within cooperative as well as competitive contexts" (Folger,
Poole, and Stutman 1997: Tjosvold and Van de Vliert 1994). In simple terms,
conflict suggests circumstance where people recognize scarcity and seek resolution
to the incompatibilities associated with achievement of the benefits related to the
object. I contend that this notion is especially salient in terms of environmental
policy.
Conflict exists when and where people cannot see attainment of recognized
goals reasonably occurring. It produces a particular kind of context fueled by
ambiguities and charged with emotion. Through their research, Walker and
Daniels find that issues managed within an alternative context, a collaborative
learning based approach, produced better outcomes. Their findings suggest that
natural resource conflict can be successfully managed within a conceptual
framework composed of "three dimensions"substance, procedure and
relationship (Walker and Daniels 22). This "conflict management process triangle"
identifies the specific structural forces that interact and produce conflict. Walker
and Daniels argue that conflict can be managed through finding connections
between the issues involved in the triangle and improving the relative conditionof
each aspect. Walker and Daniels' work posits the notion that specific145
environmental policy crises can be significantly improved when attention is paid to
all three dimensions.
The Struggle Spectrum
Even though the research of Walker and Daniels has been more domestic in
nature, I argue that it has immense utility in terms of understanding conflict and its
impact upon relationships between nation-states bound together through treaty.
However, I further argue that their work is strengthened by the work of J. W.
"Sam" Keitner. Through his research, Dr. Keitner suggests that the term "struggle"
is more useful than the term conflict because struggle implied positive as well as
negative utility. He finds that struggle has six distinct stages: "mild difference,
disagreement, dispute, campaign, litigation, and fight or war" (Keltner 2-17). He
also find that struggle has ten specific conditions: "process leading to resolution,
problem-solving behavior, relationship between parties, goals, orientation to each
other, communication, decision-making, intervention possibilities, possible
outcomes, and intractability potential" (Keitner 5). He argues that the point of
intersection for each stage/condition has a particular methodology of resolution, or
in simpler termsno two stages can be resolved by the same approach.This
understanding of struggle reveals underlying factors that may not be visible in "the
heat of the moment" yet contribute to the relative intractability of the respective
parties. Interestingly, Keitner concluded that struggle could move up or down the
spectrum without necessarily passing through each stage in sequence. These146
notions of struggle as an ongoing relationship subject to stages where collaboration
is identified as more or less likely; have direct implications for a treaty.
A Synthesized Framework
Through synthesis of Walker and Daniels' work and Keltner's approach a
useful tool for understanding the Pacific Salmon crisis is revealed. The product of
this convergence provides a rational methodology for understanding the context of
crisis as well as a rational approach for improving its state. Precisely because
treaties are what they are, formal agreements (relations) between respective parties,
they provide a forum for improvement. Treaties by function can act as instruments
of collaboration between invested nation-states through the establishment and
continuance of procedures and governance mechanisms designed to manage
struggle. Struggle, whether caused by internal or external pressures are inherent to
treaty implementation and can be managed for positive effect. However, this can
only occur when struggle is managed effectively through on-going assessment and
awareness of the "stage of struggle" as well as tailored "stage-specific"
management techniques. The Pacific Salmon Treaty empowers the Pacific Salmon
Commission for just this kind of role. Therefore, if the Commission can learn to
employ a rational approach to struggle management, an approach that is sensitive to
the nation-state relationship, the substantive needs of those involved, as well as the
process (of management) itself, the respective parties may well be able toretain the
most important commodity: management of ambiguity and security of the resource.147
The Bottom Line: Collaboration
The Pacific Salmon Commission is charged with establishing a sustainable
salmon fishery. The commission has no direct junsdictional authority for fishery
techniques or any administrative controls over respective national internal
administration. Yet it is expected to succeed nonetheless. Accordingly, the
commission provides general guidance for respective national bureaucracies to
follow. The treaty (as law) formally commits all Canadian and U.S. agencies to a
shared salmon management regime and measures results. Internally crafted
initiatives for national goals are supposed to give way to broader, bilateral
necessity. In theory, Canadian and U.S. policy act in a singular voice through the
established respective administrative norms. This process of treaty implementation
developed and sustained within a context of bilateral political and economic
pressure has a structural impact upon the respective nationsinternal fisheries
management bureaucracies. This clash is justification for an increasedemphasis on
bilateral struggle management in lieu of further investment in absolute conflict
avoidance.
When considering the process through which salmon policy is formulated
the influence of internal constituencies, public as well as private, cannot beignored.
The influence of these constituencies remains significant. As a consequence,their
concerns are made known. Even though theirinfluence is exercised differently in
the respective countries, the incumbent relationships between vestedinterestscannot help but constrain policy development and implementation. James Q.
Wilson argues that,
The existence of so many contextual goals and political constraints
has several consequences for the management of public agencies.
First, managers have a strong incentive to worry more about
constraints than tasks, which means to worry more about processes
than outcomes. Outcomes often are uncertain, delayed, and
controversial; procedures are known, immediate, and defined by
law or rule. It is hard to hold managers accountable for attaining
a goal, easy to hold them accountable for conforming to the rules.
Even when a bureau's primary goals are clear and progress
toward them measurable, the managers of the bureau cannot
be content with achieving them with the least use of resources;
they also must worry about serving the contextual goals of the
agency... (Wilson,J. 131).
In the ideal, the Pacific Salmon Commission would have absolute authority over
salmon policy through administrative control of the agencies working under its
auspices. The language of the treaty suggests as much, at least in ideal form.
Unfortunately, respective national bureaucracies and the political realities that
sustain them exist within a particular context. Within it, the individuals and groups
charged with specific administrative functions are compelled to act upon a myriad
of contending goalssome of which emphasized through targeted use ofinfluence.
After reviewing the fisheries management process of Canada and the U.S. I
have found that there are inherent administrative differences. While the politics of
the American political system is largely the result of the purposeful separation of
governmental powers, the Canadian system is the result of a national predisposition
towards a collaborative communal approach (Lipset 1990). The bureaucracies of
Canada and the U.S. are reflective of their national political culture as well astheir149
structures of governance. This is a significant factor in the past, present and future
success of the Pacific Salmon Commission and its policies.
Chapter Summary
The Pacific Salmon Treaty serves at least three functions. First, it is an
instrument of bilateral commitment. It publicly acknowledges and by so doing
legitimizes the shared nature of the salmon fishery and its significance to the
respective nations' political, economic and cultural investments. Through its
formal and informal structures the treaty promotes the ideal of collaboration.
Second, it is a management tool with an inherent capacity for expansion. The
treaty binds Canada and the U.S. to a jointly determined policy approach based
upon expandable science-driven methodologies built upon a regional perspective.
It has evolved over time and the scope of scientific study has expanded with each
reassessment. Finally, it empowers the Pacific Salmon Commission with an
organizational capacity to manage struggle, at least theoretically. By function, the
Commission is expected to act as a unifying agent. As such, it can establish and
sustain an administrative culture for as long as the treaty remains in effect. Over
time this may result in a policy synthesis that blends together the "best" elements of
fisheries management perspectives.
Much about the enduring prospects of the Pacific Salmon Treaty and its
implementation remain unknown, and cannot be known for some time. While the
agreement is "on track," the effects of the renegotiated treaty are difficult to150
measure (Kowal July 31, 2000). The treaty's function is the resolution of conflict
and the promotion of cooperation and collaboration in salmon policy. Science in
partnership with an aggressive conservation intervention strategy is the underlying
purpose of the new agreement. If this principle is implemented much can be done
to improve the fishery. However, much can be lost if the Pacific Salmon
Commission fails to recognize its concurrent responsibilities in managing the
struggles between the respective parities and more importantly, maintaining the
bilateral relationship between Canada and the U.S. during the various stages of
struggle.
The underlying forces of relationship, substance and procedure lie at the
heart of successful treaty implementation over time. Harvest rates, interception
activities, sovereignty questions and habitat production capacities are all issues that
will likely produce struggle and should be managed. A long-term solution will not
magically appear, instead it must be developed over time within a framework of
trust. An enduring solution may well turn out to be less a matter of proportionality
than relationship. If the Pacific Salmon Commission can effectively achieve a
balanced approach that is firmly invested in the associated relationships a regional
outlook may become the new context. This in turn could help foster the kind of
climate within which a sustainable fishery is realized.151
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS
When I began this study in the fall of 1997 Canadian fishermen had just
blockaded the Malaspina and tensions were escalating. Things have changed. At
present, the Pacific Salmon Commission has received the first year's installment of
endowment funds and is patiently expecting the second. The 1999 Agreement is
holding and there is a deafening calm. The war rhetoric has subsided and people
appear generally optimistic about the treaty's newfound approach (Kowal July 31,
2000). It has been an opportune time to be a student of the Pacific Salmon fishery
and its political management. Over the past few years I have watched as the events
leading to a renegotiated treaty have taken place, one failure after another, until
success was achieved. Sadly, much of the recent past can best be described as the
"two steps forward, one step back" method of progress. But progress was made.
Now that a solution has been found the pieces to the picture puzzle are in place.
The following assessment is my best attempt at describing the image; the
composite mosaic that has been crafted as solution and its probable effectthe
image that is our present reality.
Simultaneous Values
From the beginning of this study I argue that salmon maintain simultaneous
and competing values. 1 further argue that it is precisely because of the salience as
well as the contradictory nature of these values that the fate of salmon within the152
Pacific Northwest has an elevated status. The very fact that there is such a thing as
the Pacific Salmon Treaty is evidence enough that salmon and the issues that
surround their existence have extraordinary significance. After all, to date there is
no "Pacific Trashfish Treaty." In this study I suggest that humans know salmon
through human constructed values that we have chosen to assign. The associated
economic and political relationships formed around the assigned value of salmon
have produced a complex political crisis with few answers. I argue that through
this process we have reduced salmon's existence. Salmon are no longer an
independent species with natural values. Instead, salmon are a resource for
exploitation, a regional icon, a religious symbol and an endangered "indicator"
species. These findings provide context for the Pacific Salmon crisis.
A History of Crisis
I believe that once the values of salmon are understood the history of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty makes sense. It has proven to be a colorful history of
changing relationships. I contend that the recent agreement and subsequent
rededication of the Pacific Salmon Treaty is the evolutionary outcome of continued
negotiations that trace their origin to circumstances pre-dating the 1900s. I further
contend that the history of salmon as resource has in large measure maintained
regional prominence because resource-exploitative based societies that developed
within the Pacific Northwest efficiently turned natural wonder into free wealth.153
During this analysis I find that Canada and the U.S. have a shared history but a
varied experience with salmon policy.
Through my examination of the treaty's history I find that conservation and
equity have most often been framed in utilitarian terms. The industrial economy
and its monopolization of human constructed language and by extension action
based upon our shared vocabulary have constrained the range of alternatives.
Through the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to recognize the landmark 1985
Pacific Salmon Treaty for what it was and was not. It was negotiated and
implemented in the spirit of the day with a trust in the absolute terms of scientific
management. At the time, it was widely recognized asenduring solution.
Unfortunately, it proved not to be. Seven years later when renewal was to be
consummated Canada and the U.S. were so entangled in the effects of the treaties
weaknesses that they could not reconcile the differences between expectation and
reality. The science had been flawed and as a result an administrative regime had
aggressively pursued a false and/or insufficient understanding of nature that led to a
fishery in crisis.
I argue that the "crisis" we experienced from 1992 until 1999 was as
predictable as it was preventable. The ideological assumptions that sustain
Canadian and U.S. fisheries management are dissimilar. This is most likely
because of the great differences in our respective approaches to governance.
While the 1997 "salmon war" was a tragedy, it was the logical outcome of interests
so thoroughly engaged in conflict that rational solvency wasnearly abandoned154
despite the undeniable subsequent diminishment of the resource. By contrast,I
contend that the agreement announced in June 1999 is the result of anevolutionary
process. It is a good treaty. It is reflective ofthe changing nature and assumed
expectations of the fishery and its health. It is much more flexiblethan its
predecessor and it came about after crisis. After analyzing thehistory of the
salmon experience in the Euro-American Pacific Northwest, Idiscovered several
truths: 1) there will not be a perfect (permanent) solution sincethe nature of the
fishery demands a flexible management response; 2) science-drivenmechanisms
must contain inherent flexibility for changing sciencewhile simultaneously
retaining a role for struggle management; and 3) salmon managementis an
evolving developing relationship between Canada, the U.S. andsalmon.
Culture for Context
Because I believe history has lessened utility outside ofcultural context I
used chapter three to explore political culture and its impact uponsalmon policy
within the Pacific Northwest. I argue that the constructed world weknow is itself
the result of human action within a particular political situation.Through schema
theory it is easier to recognize how humans form understandingsof the world and
then act upon those understandings. This in turn suggeststhat the dynamics of
culture perpetuate certain kinds of knowledge and byextension specific actions.
Through an analysis of political culture I find that Canadianand U.S. participants
approach environmental policy from different perspectivesthat in turn produce155
different results. I also find that salmon policy is an outcome of culturally held
ideological expectations manifested through governance structures. This is
especially evident in Oregon where the culture has maintained a distinctive role
within the formulation and non-formulation of environmental policy. In Oregon,
political culture developed and sustains socially constructed environmental truths
through policy. Government, the agent of societal action is nothing less and
nothing more than an expression of the constructed truths held by its citizenry.
Treaties then, as legitimate expressions of political will, carry qualitative measures
of community value. Treaties should be recognized as reflections of national
concern and products of a distinct circumstance.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty, an outcome of bilateral cultural expression,
empowered the Pacific Salmon Commission with general administrative duties.
The Pacific Salmon Commission was created to establish and then maintain
conservation of the salmon resource in perpetuity. Through a brief description of
the role of treaties in general, as well as the Pacific Salmon Treaty in specific, I
argue that treaties rarely perform exactly as envisioned.I further argue that they
are often expected to achieve the desired endsregardless of the implementation
schedules and the relative limitations of discretionary authority. Thischaracteristic
suggests that ends and not means may be the true functionof treaties. In other
words, much is expected of the Pacific Salmon Commission, regardlessof its
inherent capacity to achieve the desired ends. Even though the newscience-driven
approaches provide the Pacific Salmon Commission more latitude onspecies156
management, the expectations are proportionately affixed. It will succeed because
people are invested in the outcome. Abundance, the human construct that it is, will
be attained at least in name because the organization of the treaty as well as the
interests surrounding its renegotiation as an instrument deems that it must; whether
or not the human concept abundance actually promotes natural abundance.
Cultural Product & Evolutionary Improvement
Through a thorough policy analysis of the treaty I find that, on paper at
least, the Pacific Salmon Treaty is an amazing achievement. It simultaneously
guarantees the conservation of the fisheries and ensures profitable harvests inthe
future. It promises a flexible proactive style that will close specific "at risk"
fisheries if needed. However, ambiguity in terms of methodology exists. The
Pacific Salmon Commission has not firmly determined the factors that would
prescribe the closing of a fishery or how such a closing would be achieved. The
endowment funds that promise government subsidized investments in habitat
restoration and fisheries conservation techniques were an innovative way of buying
off at least some of the inconvenience this new approach will secure but are
unproven. Given the recent past, the funds may havebeen one of the only "carrots"
compelling enough to bring interests together for agreement because of the
possibility of success. Whatever the case, the treaty is a remarkable diplomatic
achievement because it grounds Canada and the U.S. in a more realistic
understanding of the fishery while establishing an adjustable method offishery157
management and increased research capacity for future outcomes. Itpromises
relief if not enduring resolution.
An Interdisciplinary Perspective
In an era of increased uncertainty over environmental issuesthe
renegotiated Pacific Salmon Treaty brings a degree of certainty. It reaffirms an
enduring partnership on behalf of salmon and the ecosystem that sustainssalmon.
Fourteen years in the making, it was an evolution in the continuingdevelopment of
natural resource management. Oddly, the treaty process succeededbecause of an
approach that allowed economic need to squelch economic incentivethrough a
government subsidy in the form of endowment funds. It must benoted that the
shifting nature of sovereignty as well as the growing necessity for regionally
determined solutions to transboundary issues fostered an atmosphere thatallowed
traditional methods of bargaining, aided by a generous stimulus package, tofind
compromise where it had not previously existed (Kowal Sep 25,2000). In form
and function the Pacific Salmon Treaty is probably as good a bilateral agreement as
can be expected given the situation. Unfortunately,salmon policy is enigmatic;
people want sustainability even as they harvest.
After studying this topic and the surrounding "salmon story"through a
policy/political/communication framework, I cannot help but recognize thatthe
treaty is likely inadequate for the larger task at hand:the creation of a sustainable
salmon fishery. The Pacific Salmon Treaty, like most politicalinstruments within158
the natural resource context, is insufficient because we have constructed
skyscrapers on shifting ground and because we have been unable tofundamentally
change the way we coexist with our environment. The natural economy does not
work by the same rules as the prevailing industrial economy. Yet public policy
demands structured certainty that can be measured and maintained despite
situations that require flexibility and responsiveness. Botkin had it right. Our
conceptual notions are incomplete and in turn they produce inadequate processes.
While the Pacific Salmon Treaty produced an evolution of thinking in
environmental administration, it is grounded upon an embedded faith in human
management of the natural world and a primarily economicorientation toward
salmon as a renewable resource. The short-term economic expectations attached to
the production of available wealth cannot help but provide insufficient guidance
over the long-term because the rules favor certainty.
The Treaty We Need
The treaty we need is the treaty we will probably never build. Ourcultural
orientations have sustained institutional arrangements that are too hardened, too
settled for meaningful change to be probable. We need a treaty thatvalues non-
industrial economic exchange, a treaty that recognizes the transferenceof solar
energy brought by returning salmon as a legitimatevalue but this will result in
smaller harvests. We need a treaty that provides the Pacific SalmonCommission
with enforcement authorities as well as the funds necessary toaggressively pursue159
a healthy fishery, but this will require a significantCanadian and U.S. delegation of
power. We need a treaty that limits harvest in short-termand long-term cycles, that
is sensitive enough to recognize changes within the fishery and strong enough to
shut the fishery down when needed so it can repair itself, but this will requirebetter
science, more resources and different administrative structures. We need a treaty
that recognizes that other industrial economic functions have an undeniable impact
upon the fishery as a whole and then grants the PacificSalmon Commission license
to act when necessary, but this will require intergovernmentalcooperation at a level
that has not been attained previously. We need a treaty that provides "buy-out"
procedures so we can limit the salmon fleet and gradually lessen itslethality but
this will require costly public repayment of private investments. I contendthat we
can construct the treaty we need but that doing so willrequire the same sense of
mission that landed men on the moon, defeated the Nazi war machine andhas kept
the atomic genie in the bottle. It will demand of us an absolute commitment tothe
sustainability of the fishery, a level of commitment yet to be proven.
Is Progress Possible?
This assessment suggests that the world we "know" is notthe world we live
in. We know we operate with incomplete models yet we attempt to"manage" our
world nonetheless. Salmon are so much a part of how PacificNorthwestemers
define the "good life" that change even for salmon's long-termsake will come at a
high price in industrial economic as well as non-industrialeconomic terms. This is160
especially true in Oregon where we have constructed notions of human-made
perfection and sustained these truths through heroic metaphor. Dams, agriculture,
timber, salmon and the transformation of nature into a "new garden" define who we
are, what we want, and why we want it. When these arechallenged, ambiguity
produces conflict. This is not new, but it has long been so. We have yet to come to
terms with a salient truth: "the garden" is an illusion. The world we seethrough
metaphor is an invented reality. Until we develop more complete models for
understanding "the real world" we risk staking policy to fragile foundations.
It is fitting that the fifth major research question of this thesis requires an
answer that cannot be offered, at least in the present. Once upon asimpler time, the
Pacific Northwest had the natural capacity to carry a developing civilization
without being "at risk." That time no longer exists. Unfortunately, the core ideals
that crafted Canadian and U.S. political culture have perpetuated an illusion and in
turn produced ideologies, institutions and policies that are at odds withthe natural
world. This may well be the central problem of our time. How do we refine our
understandings of the present so that we can secure a future? At issue is not merely
the salmon but rather ourselves: are we able to adapt? Can we, and will we make
the choices necessary to sustain both the salmon and ourselves? Do we understand
that salmon and the ecosystem that sustains salmon are more important than an
economic enterprise? Can we construct a vision of the good life that seeks
sustainability and balance instead of profits and dominance? These are primary
questions we should be asking ourselves; the visions we should be in search of.161
Lichatowich argues that, "we must seek a balance between thenatural and
the industrial economies in the Northwest" (Lichatowich 226). Hehas suggested a
sound course of action. We must find balance between the natural economyand
the industrial economy but we must also do more. We must seek abalance
between the world we knew and the world we must learn. We must recognizethe
limitations of policy and find methodologies of managing the strugglesinherent to
changing our knowledge of life and of life's sustainability. We must relearnthe
Pacific Northwest on its own terms through eyes open to the world as it is. Until
then, we risk making and re-making the same mistakes. We risk developing
political solutions to problems insufficiently framed and ultimately implementing
solutions that make bad situations worse, in the name of "progress."
Conclusion
The Pacific Salmon Treaty is a good beginning but it should not be anend
itself. While it has immense inherent capacity as a management tool it canhave no
enduring legacy if we fail to utilize that tool effectively and eventually move
beyond its limits. Collaborative regionally determined solutions consistentwith
national and international protocols are the path we must take to ensuresustainable
outcomes. These solutions must be made with the conflicting natureof our
conceptions of salmon in mind, lest they lead us to conclusions andsubsequent
actions that harm more than heal. Thus far, our history is witness to ourpropensity
to act in our own worst long-term interest. It appearsthat the new agreement162
provides both nations with an awkward but useful instrument for long-term
planning as well as conflict management. We must endeavor to keep
communication open and constant, all the while adjusting our policies toreflect the
enduring interests of the salmon fishery we are duty-bound to perpetuate.
Ironically, the salmon, a species forged over time through the massive
geological change that is our region's past, is at risk because our policies reflect a
physical and conceptual industrial transformation of the Pacific Northwest. We
have remade the landscape into something that reflects our image of what we
believe should be instead of what is. Unfortunately, the impact of our blurred
vision and our actions based upon the information we "saw" through that blurred
vision has yet to be fully known. Fortunately, our vision has improved, at least a
little. The 1999 agreement and subsequent adoption the Pacific Salmon Treaty is
our best attempt yet, but even it reflects our evolvingassumptions.
In the final analysis, I conclude that the industrial economy has not so much
replaced the natural economy as it has perpetually held it hostage. The natural
economy still exists even when we fail to recognize it. Ourignorance does not
negate natural truths. The enduring lesson that can be drawn from this treatyis that
together we have more to lose than we can afford. Together we must find a
sustainable future based upon a balance of the industrial and natural economy
implemented through a management regime built to manage struggle, or else risk
repeating the mistakes of our shared past.163
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Associated Press. (1999) "Stevens says he's 'come to terms' with White House
over Salmon treaty" AP file: Anchorage, AK:November 15, 1999
Axworthy, Lloyd and Madeleine K. Albright (1999) "Joint Statement on Pacific
Salmon Treaty Agreement" Department of Foreign Affairs and Int'l
Trade (www.dfait-maeci .gc.ca) Text: http://1 98.103.104.11 8/minpub
Puhlication.asp?FileSpec=/Min Pub Docs/ 1 00882.htm
Backgrounder "Abundance-based Management Regimes" Department of
Fisheries and Oceans http://www .dfo- mpo.gc .caJCOMMUNIC/
BACKGROU/ I 999/hq29( 1 02)_e.htm
Backgrounder "Habitat Protection and Restoration" Department of Fisheries and
Oceans http://www .dfo-mpo. gc .ca/COMMUNIC/
BACKGROU/1 999/hq29( 11 2)_e.htm
Backgrounder "Implementing the Strangway-Ruckelshaus Report" Department of
Fisheries and Oceans http://www.dfo-mpo.gc .caJCOMMUNIC/
BACKGROU/ 1 999/hq29( 1 14)e.htm
Backgrounder "Pacific Salmon Treaty Endowment Funds" Department of Fisheries
and Oceans http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNIC/
BACKGROU/1999/hq29( 1 10)_e.htm
Barker, Ernest [Translator] (1995) Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Botkin, Daniel B. (1990) Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-
First Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Bowman, Ann 0. and Richard Kearney. (1999) State and Local Government
(4th
Ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Briscoe, David. (1999) "U.S., Canada Sign Salmon Treaty" Associated Press State
& Wire Line: June 30, 1999
Bunting, Robert. (1997) The Pacific Raincoast: Environment and Culture in an
American Eden, 1778-1900. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas
Canadian Information Office (2000) www.infocan.gc .ca/aboutgov_e.html164
Cantrill, James G. (1993) "Communication and Our Environment: Categorizing
Research in Environmental Advocacy" Journal of Applied Communication
February 1993: Pages 66-94
Cohen, Raymond. (1997) Negotiating Across Cultures. Washington, DC:
United States Institute for Peace Press
Cone, Joseph. (1996) A Common Fate: Endangered Salmon and thePeople of the
Pacific Northwest (Rev. Ed.). Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press
Cone, Joseph. and Sandy Ridlington. (1996) The Northwest SalmonCrisis: A
Documentary History. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press
Conover, Pamela J. and Stanley Feldman (1984) "How People Organize the
Political World: A Schematic Model" American Journal of Political
Science: Vol. 28, No. 1: Pages 95-126
Daley, William M. (1999) "Statement by Commerce Secretary William M.
Daley on Pacific Northwest Salmon" March 16, 1999
www .nwr.noaa.gov/ 1 press/03 1 699_2.htm
Economist, The. (1997) "Salmon War on Two Fronts" Vol. 343, No 8023:
June 28, 1997: 36
Edelman, Murray. (1988) Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press
Edelman, Murray. (1964) The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press
Egan, Timothy. (1997) "Salmon War in Northwest Spurs Wishes forGood Fences"
New York Times: Vol. CXLVI, No. 50,913: September 12, 1997: Al,A14-
15
Egan, Timothy. (1990) The Good Rain. New York: Vintage Books
Elazar, Daniel. (1966) American Federalism: A View from the States(2n' Edition).
Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press, Inc.
Elazar, Daniel. (1993) The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time,
and Culture on American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
Elder, Charles D. and Roger W. Cobb (1983) The Political Uses ofSymbols.
New York: Longman165
Finley, Carmel. (1998) "Pacific Salmon Treaty Summary": Unpublished
Manuscript: OSU Department of History
Finely, Carmel. (2000) Fish Tales: Salmon and the Stories We Tell About Theni
1945-1980. Master's Thesis: OSU Department of History
Finlay, ii. and D.N. Sprague (1989) The Structure of Canadian History.
(31dEd.)
Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.
Fiorino, Daniel J. (1995) Making Environmental Policy. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press
Fisher, Walter R. (1987) Human communication as narration: toward a philosophy
of reason, value, and action. Columbia, SC: The University of South
Carolina Press
Folger, J.P., Poole, M.S. and Stutman, R.K. (1997) Working through conflict. (3
Ed.) New York: Longman
Forsey, Eugene. A. (2000) How Canadians Govern Themselves
(4thEd.)
www .parl . gc .ca136/refmat/library/forsey/how-e.htm.
Glavin, Terry. (1996) Dead Reckoning: Confronting the Crisis in Pacific
Fisheries. Vancouver, BC: Greystone Books
Groot, C. and L. Margolis (Editors) (1991) Pacific Salmon Life Histories.
Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press
Hamill, Ruth, Milton Lodge, and Fredrick Blake (1985) "The Breadth, Depth, and
Utility of Class, partisan, and Ideological Schemata" American Journal of
Political Science: Vol. 29, No. 4: Pages 850870
Hanna, Susan S. and Carl Folke, Karl-Goran Maler. (1996)gts to Nature.
Washington DC: Island Press
Hardin, Garrett. (1968) "Tragedy of the Commons" Science: 162: 1234-1248
Hogben, David. (1998) "Scrap Salmon Treaty" Vancouver Sun: Vancouver,B.C.:
September 29, 1998: News: Page E8
Homer, Charles R. (1998) "Habitat Preservation and Restoration Under the
Pacific Salmon Treaty." Ocean Development & InternationalLaw 29:
43-72166
Hughes, John. (1999) "Salmon Recovery Plans Suffer Funding Setback"
Associated Press State & Local Wire: October 20, 1999
Tudicello, Suzanne, Michael Weber, and Robert Wieland. (1999) Fish, Markets,
and Fishermen: The Economics of Overfishing. Washington, DC:
Island Press
Jensen, Thomas C. (1986) "The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception
Treaty: An Historical and Legal Overview." Environmental Law 16: 363-
422
Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1996) American Foreign Policy
(51hEd.). New York: St. Martin's Press
Keisling, Phil. (1999) Oregon Blue Book 1999-2000: Oregon Secretary ofState's
Office
Keltner, J.W. (1994) The Management of Struggle. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press,
Chapter 1.
Kemmis, Daniel. (1990) Community and the Politics of Place. Norman,OK:
University of Oklahoma Press
Kempton, Willet, James S. Boster, and Jennifer A. Hartley (1996) Environmental
Values in American Culture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Kitzhaber, John A. (Jan 6, 2000) "The Oregon Approach to Environmental
Problems" www. govemor.state.or.us/govemor/speeches/s000 106.html
Kitzhaber, John A. (Jan 21, 2000) "2000 State of the State Address"
www.govemor.state.or.us/govemor/speeches/s000 121 .html
Kowal, Donald. (Jul 31, 2000) Telephone interview and conversation
Pacific Salmon Commission Executive Secretary: (604) 684-8081
Kowal, Donald (Sep 25, 2000) Electronic correspondence
www.psc.org (kowal@psc.org)
Lakeoff, George. and Mark Johnson. (1980) Metaphors We Live By.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Lichatowich, James A. (1999) Salmon Without Rivers: A Historyof the Pacific
Salmon Crisis. Washington, DC: Island Press167
Liftin, Karen T. (1998) The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics. Cambridge:
MA: The MIT Press
Lipset, Seymour M. (1990) Continental Divide: The Values and Institutionsof the
United States and Canada. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall Inc.
Mach, Zdzislaw. (1993) Symbols, Conflict, and Identity: Essays in Political
Anthropology. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press
McDonald, Lee. (1969) "Myth, Politics, and Political Science". Western
Political Quarterly 22: 141-150
McGinnis, Michael V. "On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River System,
Wild Salmon and the Northwest Power Planning Council." Natural
Resources Journal 35: 63-92
McGoodwin, James R. (1990) Crisis in the World's Fisheries: People, Problems,
and Policies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Moore, M.P. (1993) "Constructing the irreconcilable conflict: The functionof
synecdoche in the spotted owl controversy." Communication Monographs
60: 258-274
Munro, Gordon, Ted McDorman, and Robert McKelvey. (1998)"Transboundary
Fishery Resources and the Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty."
Canadian-American Public Policy 33: The Canadian-American Center
Murkowski, Frank H. "Caveat Emptor" (1994) Alaskan Fisherman's Journal:
September 1994: Page 17, 35
Oregonian Editorial Board (1999) "Putting salmon first" The Oregonian:Portland
Oregon: June 4, 1999: D8
Pacific Salmon Commission Webpage (2000) www.psc.org
Pacific Salmon Treaty (1985: 1999) www.psc.org/Who/treaty.htm
Paulson, Michael. (1999) "Rifts Threaten Salmon Treaty; As NWGovernors
Feud, Congress Won't Pay Up" Seattle Post-Iritelligencer: Seattle,WA:
October 29, 1999: News Page Al
Pipkin, James. (1999) "Testimony October 28, 1999" United StatesHouse of
Representatives, House Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans Committee
Federal Document Clearing House: Congressional TestimonyRobbins, William G. (1994) Colony & Empire. Lawrence, KS: The University
Press of Kansas
Robbins, William G. (1997) Landscapes of Promise: The Oregon Story 1800-1940.
Seattle, WA: The University of Washington Press
Ronda, James P. (1984) Lewis and Clark among the Indians. Lincoln, NE: The
University of Nebraska Press
Schmidt, Jr. Robert J. (1996) "International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic
Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon
Commission" Environmental Law: Vol. 26: 95-139
Schwantes, Carlos (1996) The Pacific Northwest: An Interpretive History. (Rev.
Ed.) Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press
Shelton, Jev. and Jeffery Koenings. (1995) "Marine Factors in the Production of
Salmon: Their Significance to the Pacific Salmon Treaty" Alaska Fishery
Research Bulletin: Vol. 2. No. 2: 156-163
Shepard, M. and A. Argue (1998) "Ocean Pasturage in the Pacific Salmon Treaty:
Fact of Fiction?" Canadian Industry Report of Fisheries and Aquatic
Sciences: February 1998
Silver, Beth (1999) "New Treaty Elevates Fish Above Fishermen" The News
Tribune: Tacoma, WA: Front page: Al (June 4, 1999)
Smith, Henry N. (1978) Virgin Land. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown. (1997) Beyond the Water's Edge. New
York: St. Martin's Press
Spencer, Hal. (1999) "Canada, U.S. agree to salmon fishing limits lower quotas,
Emphasis on science part of historic deal" The Idaho Statesman: National:
Pg. 14A (June 6, 1999)
Steger, Mary A., John C. Pierce, Brent S. Steel, and Nicholas P. Lovrich (1989)
"Political Culture, Postmaterial Values, and the New Environmental
Paradigm: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States"
Political Behavior: Vol. 11, No. 3: pages 233-254
Strangway, David and William Ruckeishaus. (1998) "Pacific Salmon Report to
the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States"Tjosvold, Dean. (1991) The Conflict-Positive Organization: Stimulate diversity
and create unity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Tobin, Brian. (1994) "A Matter of Equity" Alaska Fisherman's Journal:
September 1994: Page 17, 40
VanderZwaag, David L. (1983) The Fish Feud. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books
Walker, Gregg and Steven Daniels. (1996) "Foundatios of natural resource
Conflict: Conflict theory and public policy" In B. Solberg & S. Milna (eds.)
Conflict Management and Public Participation in Land Management
White, Richard. (1995) The Organic Machine: The Remaking, of the Columbia
River. New York: Hill & Wang
Whitney, David. (1999) "Salmon Dispute Arises; States Differ on Limiting
Catches" Anchorage Daily News: Anchorage, AK: October 26, 1999:
Business Page iF
Wilmot, William W. and Joyce L. Hocker. (1998) Interpersonal Conflict.
(51hEd.)
Boston, MA: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.
Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government ARencies Do AndWhy
They Do It. United States of America: Basic Books Inc.: Harper Collins
Wilson-Smith. (1997) "Under friendly fire - Land mines and fish test Canada-U.S.
Relations" Maclean's Magazine. Vol. 110, No. 39: September 29, 1997:24-
26
Wood, Chris. (1997) "Darn Yankees!" Maclean's Magazine. Vol. 110, No.31:
August 4, 1997: 12-19
Yanagida, Joy A. (1987) "The Pacific Salmon Treaty" The AmericanJournal of
International Law: Vol. 81: 577-592
Yeric, Jerry L. and John Todd (1996) Public Opinion: The Visible Politics.
(31(1Ed.)
Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers Inc.
Zuanich, Robert "Testimony October 28, 1999" United States House of
Representatives, House Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans Committee
Federal Document Clearing House: Congressional Testimony